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IN MEMORIAM: CELEBRATING THE
LIFE OF BILL SAMSON

WILLIAM DONALD SAMSON (1947-2005)
Bill was a big man. Yet, even in Alabama’s football stadium, you would know of his presence, hearing him without
seeing him. He was an asset to every gathering. Richard Vanger
meersch recollects how Bill and Joni were the lives of the party,
from Australia to the U.K., and all points between.
Bill was a man of fierce loyalties – to Joni, of course, to Alabama, to accounting history and the Academy he once headed,
to the multitude of his friends. Who else would have been able
to make accounting history a front page story of the Wall Street
Journal? Who else could have shamed his more conservative coauthors on the U.S. railroading project into wearing engineering
caps at their presentations? Perhaps Bill’s reverence for his mentor, Paul Garner, exemplifies his loyalty and his respect for the
past.
Bill was one of the biggest hearted men I have ever had the
privilege to know. Just ask the stray cats and dogs he and Joni
rescued and welcomed into their home. Whenever I had occasion to visit Tuscaloosa, they took grand care of me.
The two articles that follow are offered as a tribute to Bill’s
remarkable contributions to accounting history. The first is
the latest of a lengthy stream of archival research undertaken
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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by Bill, Dale Flesher, and Gary Previts to extend to accounting
history Alfred Chandler’s belief that the U.S. transcontinental
railroads were in many ways the first corporations of the modern type. The second paper, of a totally different genre, is the
product of one of Bill’s most heartfelt projects – to convince
accounting educators of the possibilities for using Theresa
Hammond’s A White-Collar Profession for the dual purposes of
generating awareness of accountancy’s diversity issues while, at
the same time, creating an interest in the profession’s past.
Bill, we will miss thee.
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Dale L. Flesher
UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI

Gary J. Previts
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

and  
William D. Samson
UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

EARLY AMERICAN CORPORATE
REPORTING AND EUROPEAN CAPITAL
MARKETS: THE CASE OF THE ILLINOIS
CENTRAL RAILROAD, 1851-1861
Abstract: This study of the annual reports of the Illinois Central
Railroad (IC) from the 1850s supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form and content, were developed to serve the needs of
two classes of investors and to inform the general community of the
activities of the company. The need to report to the public as to the
success of the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the
state required details of a demographic nature, which were provided
by the land commissioner. Operating results provided evidence of the
ability to service the debts held by European investors and to inform
British venture capitalists of the extent of the company’s operations.
This communication with the distant capital providers was a new
development in financial reporting as the capital-intensive railroads

experienced management and ownership separation on a scale not
seen before. In summary, the IC provided annual reports more detailed and informative than those of other corporations of the period
because of a need to provide European investors with evidence of
management’s activities.

INTRODUCTION
From as early as the 1850s, the Illinois Central Railroad
(IC) published annual reports aimed at both the general, noninvesting, American public and the European (primarily British)
capital markets, which represented the majority of investors. Although the IC, because of the way it was founded, was a unique
corporation that had a greater responsibility to the general public than do most for-profit corporations, its reporting provides
an excellent example of duality reporting at its finest since its
annual reports addressed the needs of both audiences.
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The IC, sometimes called the “Main Line of Mid-America,”
was America’s first coast-to-coast railroad system, extending
from Lake Michigan in the north to the Gulf of Mexico. The IC
was also America’s first land-grant railroad, and thus an experiment in social economy. The transportation that the IC provided
was the intended product of the U.S. Congress when northern
senator Stephen Douglas of Illinois and southern senators Jefferson Davis of Mississippi (later president of the Confederate
States) and William R. King of Alabama (later vice president of
the U.S.) joined forces to provide an unprecedented form of federal subsidy that could link agricultural markets and shipping
points in the emerging population centers in the Midwest and
Mid-south.
The subsidy, in the form of federal land grants, was to shape
the modernization of America’s frontier. America’s rich interior
land was almost worthless without the access to markets that
railroads were to provide. To opponents Senator King remarked
[Carstensen, 1963, p. 128]:
We are met by the objection that this is an immense
grant – that it is a great quantity of land. Well, sir, it is
a great quantity; but it will be there for five hundred
years; and unless some mode of the kind proposed be
adopted, it will never command ten cents.
This paper, based on the IC’s corporate annual reports
from the 1850s, analyzes the impact of the land grants (public
investment) and more traditional private investment, primarily by British investors, on the railroad and the corresponding
development of the American frontier. These corporate reports
provided not only financial details to benefit the British capitalists who invested in the road, but also a longitudinal view of the
results of the company’s impact on the development of Illinois
and related markets. Further, the farmers and merchants who
were to be the principal customers and beneficiaries of the IC’s
services were also parties interested in the information provided
in these increasingly detailed and complex annual reports. The
analysis begins with the IC’s first report and ends with the onset
of the Civil War.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
first section identifies the principal research questions, followed
by a review of the origins and background of the IC. A section
on the land-grant legislation of 1850 is provided to give the
reader historic perspective. Next, the economic development
and capital sourcing plan, especially as it pertains to its influence on financial statements for the period 1851 through 1861,
Published by eGrove, 2006
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is examined. An assessment of the content of the shareholder reports relative to the communication of operating objectives and
economic development to the European investors follows. The
paper concludes with observations about the research questions,
including implications for further research.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The IC annual reports of the 1850s were quite detailed and
information laden. Therefore, the principal research question
addressed in this paper is, why did the IC management publish
the type and amount of information found in them? In short,
what dictated the form and content of these early corporate
reports? Such reports were neither mandatory nor common
among other types of entities. Other railroads, including the
Pennsylvania, dating from 1847, and the Baltimore and Ohio,
commencing in 1827, produced quite different reports in terms
of style, content, and form.1 By undertaking this archival investigation of an antebellum corporate enterprise, the hope is to add
to the knowledge of the role of information provided to British
capital markets during a period that has been seldom studied.
Although the IC is an important company to study for
purely historical reasons, it is also important for contemporary
reasons. Recently, the IC agreed to a merger with the Canadian
National Railway Co., which creates a railway system extending from Halifax in the east, Vancouver and Seattle in the west,
to New Orleans in the south, with Chicago as the geographic
center. A further 15-year alliance with the Kansas City Southern
Railway, which operates Mexico’s Transportation Ferroviaria
Mexicana, will produce a 25,000 mile rail network to capture
fast-growing cargo traffic stimulated by the North American
Free Trade Agreement. Again in the 21st century, the “Mainline
of Mid-America” is being positioned to become the “Mainline of
North America.” More importantly, examining the financial disclosures of the early railroads gives insight into how new technology impacts accounting and corporate reporting. A parallel
between the railroad revolution and the Internet revolution can
be drawn.
Noteworthy is the fact that railroads, even in their earliest years of development, presented lengthy annual reports with many tables and exhibits laden
with data. Thus, the IC was not unique among railroads in this regard. By contrast, the annual reports of industrial companies fifty years later were “postcard”
size with very little detailed information since such data were considered “proprietary.”
1
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BACKGROUND
The federal land-grant legislation of September 1850
marked the first time that public lands from the U.S. federal government were to be used to aid in the construction of
a private rail line [Stover, 1975, p. 15].2 Senator Stephen A.
Douglas was the main supporter of the bill in Congress, with
help in the House from Abraham Lincoln. An original bill in
1848, limited to public lands in Illinois, was narrowly defeated.
In 1850, Senators King and Davis amended the bill to extend the
grants to the southern states. With this new source of support,
the bill passed the Senate in May and the House in September.
Initially, there was concern that President Taylor would veto the
bill because of his possible sympathies for New Orleans. Taylor
was a plantation owner from Louisiana, and the bill appeared
to favor Mobile over New Orleans. However, Taylor died in July
1850, shortly before the bill was approved by Congress. Fillmore
became president and signed the bill on September 20, 1850,
within three days after it had passed the House [Stover, 1975,
pp. 19-21].
As noted in Senator King’s statement in the introduction,
the main argument in support of the legislation was the opinion
that the federal land was worthless without a railroad in the vicinity, and no railroad would build where there was no population. However, if a portion of the land were given to the railroad,
in checkerboard fashion, the remaining land still owned by the
government would become far more valuable. Thus, the sale
of the land could be used to finance the railroad, which in turn
made both the railroad’s land and the government’s land more
valuable. In reality, Congress viewed the land grants not as subsidies, but as investments to make federal land marketable.
As the Illinois legislature began meeting in 1851, there were
three rival groups vying for the right to build the railroad in Illinois and receive the federal grant of over 2.5 million acres.
The winning group, composed of Eastern capitalists, was led by
Robert Schuyler (“America’s Railroad King”) and Robert Rantoul [Stover, 1975, p. 26]. This group’s earlier successful development of the New York and New Haven Railroad seemed to be
an important ingredient, given the need for the involvement of
credible and experienced management. In return for the rights
to the federal grant, the Schuyler/Rantoul group agreed to pay
State governments had previously used land grants to support canal building [Baskin and Miranti, 1997, p. 133].
2
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the state a tax consisting of a percentage of gross receipts. This
tax, set by the legislature at seven percent, exempted the corporation from paying Illinois state and local taxes.3 Eventually, the
revenue from this tax enabled the state to pay off its debts from
an ill-fated internal improvements program of 1837. The IC was
officially chartered on February 10, 1851, when the Illinois governor signed the charter bill after passage by both houses of the
legislature.
The IC is the only major rail carrier in the U.S. that operated under its charter name for more than 150 years. Chartered
on February 10, 1851, parts of the IC system date back even
further. For example, the West Feliciana Railroad in Mississippi,
chartered in 1831 as the first railroad west of the Appalachians,
became a part of the IC in 1892 [Stover, 1975, p. 228]. As noted
previously, the IC was the first land-grant railroad in America.
The land-grant details specified that the states of Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama were granted a right of way through the
public lands for the construction of a railroad to extend from
the western end of the Illinois and Michigan Canal to Mobile,
Alabama, by way of Cairo, with a branch to Dubuque, Iowa, by
way of Galena and another to Chicago [Gates, 1934]. The Mobile
and Ohio Railroad would be the southern land grant railroad to
complete the link of the Great Lakes and Gulf Coast when the
lines met on the Ohio River at Cairo.
Notable political and popular figures were associated with
the IC. Its corporate attorney in the 1850s was Abraham Lincoln. Some of Lincoln’s most famous cases were on behalf of
the IC, and his son later became a director of the company. The
promoters and senior managers of the early IC included many
linked to important names in American financial circles. Jonathan Sturges (1782-1863), a founding director who participated
in the syndicate to incorporate the IC, had learned business in
the counting houses of Boston, and eventually formed his own
investment concern [Johnson and Supple, 1967, p. 22]. Sturges’
youngest daughter Amelia married J. Pierpont Morgan in 1861.
Tragically, she suffered from tuberculosis and died on their honThis exemption had far-reaching implications. When McLean County tried
to assess the IC’s property, corporate attorney Abraham Lincoln took the case to
the State Supreme Court where the local exemption for both land and operating
property was validated. The result was that buyers of railroad lands were content
to delay payment on land notes for as long as possible so the land would stay
under IC ownership and be exempt from taxes. As long as the landholders were
willing to pay interest, the IC management was willing to be lenient with respect
to payment terms [Decker, 1964, p. 13].
3
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eymoon abroad [Baughman, 1966]. Another daughter of Sturges
married William H. Osborn, who was to become a dominant figure in the IC from 1853 to 1882 [Cochran, 1953, p. 422]. Osborn,
who became involved in 1853 when President Robert Schuyler
“retired,” is identified as the president of the IC as early as 1855
[Brownson, 1915, p. 41]. Popular and folk heroes identified
with the IC abound. Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) piloted IC
steamboats on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers from 1859 to
1861.4 Train engineer “Casey” Jones died on the IC’s “Cannonball
Express” train wreck at Vaughn, Mississippi, in 1900. George
B. McClellan and at least 19 other Civil War generals served as
corporate officers of the IC either before or following the war. In
fact, the 1857 annual report identifies McClellan (later Lincoln’s
opponent in the 1864 presidential election) as the only vice president [Stover, 1975]. Another future general, Ambrose Burnside
(the inventor of sideburns), was the treasurer in 1860.
Within four years of being chartered, the IC had more than
600 miles of track, making it by the mid-1850s the longest railroad in the world, bisecting Illinois from Chicago to Cairo and
veering westward at Galena into Iowa.
FINANCING THE IC
The incorporators’ plan for financing the IC was simple
and, to insiders, most attractive. They anticipated using the land
grant as security for a bond issue, primarily to European investors, the proceeds of which would pay for construction. Thereafter the bonds could be paid off with proceeds from the sale
of the land, whose value was enhanced by the passenger and
freight transportation provided by the railroad. This plan would
permit the incorporators to own the railroad and to operate it
with minimal investment.5 It was outlined in a letter in 1851
from one of the incorporators to a Boston business associate as
follows [Johnson and Supple, 1967, pp. 134-135]:
The fact is that it is expected to pay for the whole Road
by the sale of lands – It would be rather a singular thing
if it should turn out that this company should own a
Road . . . and cost the stockholders [the present ones]
Before a bridge could be built across the Ohio River, the IC exchanged
freight shipments with the M&O via steamboat. Thus, coast-to-coast rail service was available even before the two lines were connected via the Ohio River
Bridge.
5
The leveraged buy-out artists of the 1980s merely were mimicking the business model of the “Railroad King” who won the bid to build and operate the IC.
4
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nothing. . . . Come . . . see for yourself – all depends on
the selling of the Bonds. Please keep this to yourself.
In March 1851, the IC board of directors held its first meeting, elected Schuyler as president, and authorized a deposit
of $200,000 with the State of Illinois to guarantee good faith
on behalf of the incorporators. The $200,000 came from the
sale of stock to the 13 incorporators6 [Stover, 1975, pp. 28-30].
The incorporators wanted to keep their cash investments at a
minimum, and they would later respond to assessments of their
stock that would far exceed their original plan or intention.
Bond sales were slow, particularly in Europe where investors,
especially in Great Britain, were wary of the State of Illinois
because it had missed interest payments on several loan agreements related to the financing of earlier public works projects.
However, by adding options to buy stock, large quantities of
bonds were eventually sold in mid-1852 in both the U.S. and in
Europe [Stover, 1975, p. 35].
In the fall of 1851, IC president Schuyler had dispatched
Robert J. Walker, a former secretary of the treasury during the
Polk administration, to England to sell IC mortgage construction bonds. Walker had many wealthy friends in Great Britain.
He was to receive a one percent commission per dollar of debt
placed. David Neal, an IC vice president, sailed with Walker on
the Atlantic, the finest and fastest Cunard line ship. Upon reaching Liverpool, Neal continued to Holland to try to place the IC
bonds with Amsterdam and Rotterdam investors. It was initially
felt that the bonds would be easily placed because of the 2.5
million acres of land serving as collateral for the debt. Unfortunately for the IC, the missions of Walker and Neal failed miserably. No bonds were sold. Europeans wanted nothing to do with
any security with “Illinois” on it, given the investors’ experience
with their 1837 Illinois bonds, $15 million of which were still
outstanding and in default [Stover, 1975, pp. 32-35].
Another reason that the IC bonds could not be placed was
that the IC was headed by Robert Schuyler, a “gambler, not
a railroad man” in the eyes of the Europeans who had prior investment experiences with Schuyler railroads. Second, William
H. Swift, a West Pointer and former army officer, was advising
the British investment house of Barings Brothers that the IC
land, which backed the bonds, was being appraised at too high a
Actually, the incorporators subscribed to $1,000,000 of stock, but the initial
assessment was for only 20% of the stock subscribed [Stover, 1975, p. 32].
6
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value by company officials [Stover, 1975, p. 33]. In actuality, the
2.5 million acres were probably not worth more than $3 million
in 1851, but company estimates placed their future value (1856)
at a hundred times greater, an appraisal that seemed extremely
far-fetched at the time but was to prove accurate. In addition to
Barings, the House of Rothschild also turned down the offer to
buy IC bonds. Walker and Neal returned to America in December 1851 without a single bond sold.
Spring 1852 brought new hope to the IC. First, $4 million
of bonds were sold to U.S. investors. These bonds carried a
seven percent interest rate with an option to buy ten shares of
stock for each $1,000 bond. This latter feature made the bond
sale successful. The IC directors realized that the equity had to
be increased since the ownership interest could not be limited
to only 13 investors. During the same time that the bonds were
sold, the Michigan Central Railroad subscribed to $2 million of
IC notes in exchange for the right to use the IC rail line into Chicago after it was built. The Michigan Central had no access into
Chicago and was desperate. Consequently, despite the disdain
that its management had for the over-leveraged IC, the Michigan
Central helped the IC start its construction.
With this start-up capital raised, David Neal and George W.
Billings sailed to England in March 1852 to try again to sell IC
bonds. This time the English investment syndicate headed by
Charles Devaux & Company bought $5 million of IC bonds. The
interest rate was six percent and the owner of each $1,000 bond
was given the option to acquire five shares of IC stock. Again,
it was that option that made the loan attractive to the Devaux
syndicate. In addition, extant copies of the bonds (see Exhibit
1) indicate that the investors were allowed to pay in the loaned
amount in ten quarterly installments starting in August 1852
and ending on October 1, 1854. This payment schedule coincided with the IC’s need for financing its construction progress.
With the bond issue fully subscribed by August 16, 1852, Neal
and Billings set sail for America knowing that the IC had the
financing that would guarantee the construction of the railroad
[Stover, 1975, p. 35].
The IC’s construction began, but scandal soon overtook the
organization. Schuyler, the IC’s absentee, part-time president,
was its first wreck even before the trains began running. Between the fall of 1853 and the summer of 1854, Schuyler found
that holding the dual roles of both the president and the transfer
agent for the New York and New Haven Railroad, in addition to
his presidency of the IC, was too tempting, and he succumbed
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EXHIBIT 1
Illinois Central 1852 Installment Bond

to selling unauthorized shares of the New York and New Haven stock and pocketing the proceeds. When Schuyler became
ill in early July 1854, Morris Ketchum, the locomotive builder
and one of the IC’s founders, took over Schuyler’s duties and
uncovered his misdeeds. Schuyler resigned from all of his posts
and fled to Canada. Even though the IC was not involved in the
fraud, European investors were shaken. By late August 1854,
IC bond prices had fallen to 62% of their face amount with the
stock plummeting as well [Stover, 1975, pp. 35-36].
The commencement of operations, however, soon led investors to forget the Schuyler matter. During the next two years,
European ownership of IC securities increased. The price of the
IC securities rebounded as the farmland sales in Illinois were
being promoted throughout the European continent. By 1856,
80,000 shares of IC stock ($100 par value) and $12 million of
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bonds were held by European investors, primarily British. The
bonds, because of the right to subscribe to stock, were an attractive but speculative investment. In particular, the subscription
price of $20 controlled the $100 par stock. This was a highly leveraged way of speculating in the completion of the railroad. The
British ownership of IC securities amounted to over 50% of the
outstanding subscribed shares; Dutch and American investors
each owned 15%. Thus, within the U.S., the IC was viewed as a
foreign-owned corporation. Among the largest IC shareholders
were noteworthy Englishmen such as Richard Cobden, William
Gladstone, John Bright, and Samuel Cunard (the shipping magnate).7
Investors were caught off guard on August 10, 1854, when
the IC demanded a $5 per share call against the common stock
subscribers. This call was followed by another $5 per share call
on December 10, 1854. These calls for additional capital con
tributions were a surprise because the shareholders had subscribed to the IC stock believing that their $20 down payment
for each $100 share would be the extent of their investment.
This understanding had been based on the early leverage strategy employed by the initial directors. Actually, the 1854 assessments were due to cost overruns on construction
By 1857, IC stock was selling for $120 per share, and bonds
were selling at par or higher. According to the American Railroad
Journal, “no other Company enjoyed the unlimited confidence of
money lenders of England and America to the same extent,” as
the IC [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. This rapture was quick to change.
The Panic of 1857 affected all companies in America. Illinois
land speculators who had borrowed to buy federal land on the
expectation of rising land prices were hard hit. This, in turn, led
to bank foreclosures and land sales at distressed prices. The European investors became concerned about the value of their collateral, the two million unsold acres that the IC held. The value
of the land from the federal grant again became an important
issue to European investors. By September 1857, there had been
more calls on equity investors for capital. At the same time,
Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright were all members of the British Parliament
at various times in their careers. Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, became prime minister in 1868. In his early career, he had been junior
lord of the Treasury and under-secretary for the colonies. In 1844, he had been
responsible for the passage of a railway bill. Cobden and Bright were defeated
in the 1857 election, and Gladstone was put out of office that year because of
the change in prime ministers. As a result, all three seemed to have leisure time
available to deal with IC issues.
7
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both stock and bond prices had dropped about 50% during the
year. This led to British investors forming the London Protective Committee. William Gladstone, a former Chancellor of the
Exchequer, was elected the head of the group. The IC’s 1858 annual report to shareholders noted, with respect to these London
meetings [IC, March 16, 1859, p. 2]:
. . . no direct representative of the company, intimate
with its affairs and fully cognizant of the various ramifications of its interests, is present to take part in the discussions, can hardly fail to be injurious to the general
interests, and the Directors respectfully suggest to the
English Shareholders that at least sixty day’s notice of
any such meeting and its objects, be given, that, if possible, one of their number may be present.
From the time the first bonds had been issued in 1852, the
British shareholders had exerted a powerful influence on the affairs of the IC, but the Panic of 1857 caused the overseas investors to seek even more control over the company’s operations.
The 1858 annual report stated that two gentlemen from the
London Protective Committee had visited Chicago to examine
the company’s books. It is likely that they also inspected the railroad’s assets, including the constructed line and the unsold acres
of land. Apparently, this visit was positive for both sides, and the
result was an attempt to arrange a line of communication between management and the English investors [IC, 1857, p. 2].
In 1859, Gladstone appointed Richard Cobden to come to
America to evaluate the true condition of the IC. Cobden was
reportedly impressed with what he saw. After seeing the quality
of the company’s lands, Cobden wrote back to England of his
support for President Osborn and his endorsement of the fiscal
policies of the company [Stover, 1975, p. 37]. In return for his
support, Cobden had a town named for him in southern Illinois
as did other British shareholders Lawrence Heyworth and Sir
Joseph Paxton [Corliss, 1951, p. 92]. The 1859 annual report [IC,
1859, p. 1] noted:
At the urgent request of the London Committee, the
Directors deferred calls [assessments] in 1858 and 1859,
although they believed then, as they do at the present
moment, that the fact of this Company situated as it is,
with unassessed capital, presenting itself as a borrower
for short periods, at high rates of interest, has been
the chief reason for the depreciation of its securities in
public estimation.
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The “interference” with the London Protective Committee was
then discussed [IC, 1859, p. 2]:
London Committee: The experience of the past year has
confirmed the Board in the opinion expressed in the
last annual report, that it is not practicable to act with
sufficient promptness and efficiency in concert with a
Committee of Shareholders in London, inasmuch as a
decision upon the Company’s affairs cannot be speedily
arrived at by correspondence: therefore the Board will
consider their relations with the Committee as terminated, unless otherwise directed at the next meeting of
the Shareholders. We are informed that a majority of
the present Committee concur in this opinion.
EARLY CORPORATE REPORTING, 1851-18618
At a time when the patterns and expectations about the content of published annual reports were not well established, the
IC was thorough in its reporting. In retrospect, the European
investors should have been able to get a reasonable understanding of the company’s operations from the published reports. The
stockholder report series began with a three-page report dated
November 20, 1852. That report covered the activities from the
founding of the company on February 10, 1851 through November 1, 1852. A rudimentary receipts and expenditures statement
and a budget (ways and means) statement are all that accompany the single-page letter of President Schuyler.
This first report provides few clues about the capital formation and construction issues that would develop in the years to
follow. This is not unexpected given the fact that most of the
issues had not yet been worked out and probably no real plans
had yet been developed. The next report (from approximately
November 1852 to December 31, 1853) has not been located
although it is listed in the catalog at the Newberry Library. The
next available report, which contains financial statements for
1854, although dated January 1, 1855, is addressed to the Directors of the Road. There were 441 shareholders identified as
subscribing to 127,690 shares as of that date. The statements
provided in the 1854 report are identified with the capital letters
A, B, C, and D. The four are (A) a type of balance sheet, (B) a
form of expenditures statement, (C) a unique interest fund state8
The IC annual reports are available at the Newberry Library in Chicago [see
Mohr, 1951, for holdings], the Williams Library at the University of Mississippi,
and the Bruno Library at the University of Alabama.
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ment, and (D) a budget (ways and means) reporting the status
of bonded indebtedness.9 The latter two appear to respond to
the terms of the mortgage bond indenture agreement of June
23, 1852, between the IC and the bond trustees. The terms of
the agreement, as detailed in sections six, seven, and eight of the
indenture, appear to establish a special account for the funding
of interest payments. Steps were taken to prioritize interest payments, including assigning operating revenues for that purpose
as needed and earmarking 250,000 acres of land as security for
the payment of interest.
By the end of 1855, the first full year of operations, the report had expanded to over 50 pages of fine print. The financial
statements are provided on four pages (pp. 13-16) and follow the
pattern of the previous year but without the alphabetic designators. Although there was no external auditor, the statements for
years after 1854 were examined and approved by a three-man
audit committee of the board of directors.
The need to produce such summary statements from detailed records, as found in these early years, versus using the
records themselves seems clear. There was no “income statement” because operations did not begin until late 1854. Also, the
company did not begin public land sales until October 1, 1854,
although, as indicated earlier, land had been pledged as security
on various bond issues and to secure the interest fund.
A full balance sheet appears for the first time for the year
ended 1856. Each line of the balance sheet is keyed to abstracts,
identified as A through H and printed immediately below the
balance sheet, that provide details on the capital stock, the construction bonds, the free land bonds, and the other keyed lines
on the balance sheet; e.g., short-term debt (scrip) and floating
(working capital) liabilities. The statement set concludes with
a novel determination of net earnings, which is then reconciled
with the interest fund to assure adequacy of that account. The
next year’s statements follow this pattern of reporting, and a
Alphabetic designation of reports, it should be observed, was found to be
a common practice in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad statements beginning
shortly after it was established in 1827 [Previts and Samson, 2000]. However, the
B&O statements are different in content. So it does not appear that the IC was
simply following the pattern of other established roads, but more likely was responding to the information needs of the British creditors who were concerned
about the integrity of their interest payments and the related principal. Lardner
[1850, p. 424] referred to detailed reports with numbered statements in his 1850
book on railway economics. He stated that such practices were not typical in
Britain, but were used by Belgian railroads.
9
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resume of cash transactions (a cash-flow statement with full
particulars) is added. With minor exceptions, through the year
ended 1861, the form and content of the IC financial statements
seem to follow what was established by 1856, with a balance
sheet detailing the assets committed to the interest fund as the
principal statement. The IC’s income statement, designated as
the “Interest Fund Account” (see Exhibit 2), was not carried to
stockholders’ equity, but to an account essentially equivalent to
“Bondholders’ Equity.” Again, this was an indirect capitulation
to the British venture capitalists and their claims to the earnings
streams of the company. The concept is in sharp contrast to proprietary theory, which would call for the residual to be credited
to owners’ equity.
Comparative columns are added in some instances in the
annual reports, such as for expenditures, so that trends between
years, starting in 1852, can be studied. In fact, the reports are
useful benchmarking documents with many examples of fiveyear trends.
The 1857 report contains an opening statement that asserts
that the annual report is indeed a report to provide information
useful for investment decision making [IC, 1857, p. 1]:
The Directors submit herewith the Reports and Statements of the Officers of the Company in charge of the
several Departments of its business, to which the careful examination of the Shareholders is invited, as affording sufficient data to enable each proprietor to form
his own judgment as to the value of his investment and
the details of its administration.
Many examples can be found of analyses of managerial decisions; for instance, the 1859 report [IC, 1859, p. 6] includes a
study of the advantage of burning coal over wood. Finally, the
economic development of the region is highlighted.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORTING
Beginning with 1854, the tenor of the annual reports began
to change with respect to the information content about the
railroad’s impact on economic development. The 1854 report
referred to the growth of new towns along the line and the financing by bankers of coal fields in the vicinity of the railroad.
Economic development was occurring and following the path of
the railroad. The report [IC, 1854, p. 1] states that:
The Prairie lands of Illinois are the garden of North
America, and when peopled will become the granary of
Published by eGrove, 2006
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the Mississippi. The Illinois Central R.R. passes through
the best of them, bringing them within easy reach of a
market. Its lands also include large and valuable Coal
fields.
When rail operations began, management presented financial information in great detail, including monthly revenues
and costs at each depot along the line. Revenues by depot were
also listed by the nature of the item shipped. The 1855 report
included a spreadsheet with 32 columns for the transportation
of different types of commodities, including wheat, rye, hogs,
whiskey, apples, butter, cheese, and coal. Such detail, in everdeclining print size, continued throughout the pre-Civil War
era. By 1860, the spreadsheet had 42 columns, all prepared
without benefit of computer. The IC management also provided
extensive commentary on the economic environment within
which the company operated. For instance, in the 1855 report,
a table listed every station along the line, with columns for the
population, the number of houses, and the number of churches,
schools, stores, hotels, mills, factories, and physicians in 1850
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 3]. The 1855 report went on to mention
the growth in the importance of coal traffic on the railroad: “We
are fully persuaded that the coal traffic will become one of the
most important elements of profit to this road” [IC, 1855, p. 4].
The report also included a forecast of $2.5 million of income for
1856 and a prediction that the road could be operated for fifty
percent of its gross revenues.
Given that the IC owned a great deal of land, it was only
appropriate that the annual report discuss the sale of land to
settlers, which amounted to $5,598,577.83 for 528,863 acres, or
over $10 per acre in 1855. The 1855 report also mentioned that
since the 1851 grant, the federal government had disposed of
nearly three million acres of land within 15 miles of the company’s tracks, and that the counties adjacent to the railroad had
experienced a population increase of over 250,000 between 1850
and 1855 [IC, 1855, p. 5]. At the time the report was issued in
March 1856, the IC had 515 stockholders, mostly British, holding 129,256 shares, each share having thus far been assessed for
an average of $20 [IC, 1856, p. 9].
Management identified itself with the economic development in the region in the 1855 report with the following paragraph [IC, 1855, pp. 10-11]:
. . . an examination of the statistics of the progress of
the country since it has been opened by railroad comPublished by eGrove, 2006
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munication, evidences the great value of the Company’s
lands, from which, in the opinion of the Board, the entire cost of the road will be realized, leaving free of cost
to the Stockholders, the revenues of this great highway,
which unites the waters of the Northern Lakes, with
those of the Ohio and Mississippi, soon to be joined
at Cairo by the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, . . . and will,
when completed, form the great avenue of communication from the Northern States, to the important cities of
the Gulf of Mexico.
The above comment was after the 1854 assessment call on stock
subscribers, yet management still was maintaining that the entire cost of the road would be paid for from land sales, leaving
the revenues “free of cost to the Stockholders.”
In the annual report section entitled the “Report of the Land
Commissioner,” there were indications that the report might
have some public relations or marketing objectives, a factor not
atypical from modern annual reports.10 It was noted that some
of the company’s land “is rolling, undulating like the waves of
the ocean under the influence of a gentle breeze” [IC, 1854, p.
42]. Other pages celebrated the fertility of the soil, the massive
deposits of coal and other minerals, and the fact that the lands
were well watered. This line of argument concluded with the impact on economic development [IC, 1854, pp. 43-44]:
In no other instance, probably, have such abundant
benefits flowed from like causes. To the Government,
the lands were comparatively valueless; to the State,
they were in no way profitable; to the farmers, their productiveness was of no avail, while the quarries of stone
and marble, and mines of coal with which the lands
abound, were wholly undeveloped. . . . This Company
took these lands thus comparatively valueless . . . , and
by the expenditure of about twenty millions of dollars,
imparted vitality to the whole matter by the construction and equipment of this road.
In the event that stockholders, many of whom were in far
off England, failed to understand the underlying meaning of the
preceding statements, a concluding paragraph attributed to the
company president bragged [IC, 1854, p. 46]:
The gain to the State has been a largely increased popu-

For a study of the public relations and marketing aspects of annual reports, see Graves et al., 1996.
10
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lation of industrious, intelligent, and enterprising citizens, chiefly producers, a very heavy increase of taxable
property, an immense acquisition of trade and capital,
and seven per cent of the gross receipts of this road,
which will soon go far towards relieving the people
from all taxation for State purposes.
President Osborn was publicizing the economic progress of the
state being served by the company, thereby promoting the IC’s
cause. Whether this was for the purposes of encouraging further
land sales or merely an attempt to appeal to the penurious interests of European investors cannot be known.11 Nevertheless, it
should have accomplished both purposes.
The 1856 annual report continued the story of economic
development, with analyses by the directors of changes that had
occurred in virtually every town along the line. For Kankakee,
it was noted that the population had swelled to 3,000 and that
“this will become a smart inland town, being beautifully situated; eligible lots are worth $750 to $1,200. It is difficult to realize
that 3 years since the tract of timber, about 900 acres, on which
the town is located, was sold at $15 per acre.” For most towns
and villages, the report was glowing with respect to development. For Cairo, it was noted that land prices had doubled from
the preceding year [IC, 1856, p. 2].
Much of the 1857 annual report was devoted to the problems the company had faced due to the Panic of 1857, a major
snowfall in January and February, and record floods late in the
year. All of these dislocations slowed railway operations. Still,
there was room for continued discussion of economic development. For example, it was noted that on the west side of the
tracks from Calumet to Mattoon, a distance of 150 miles, there
had been erected 639 dwellings, 400 out-buildings, 114 orchards,
and 56,352 plowed acres, none of which existed a few years earlier [IC, 1857, p. 9].
The question remains as to why IC management elected to
publish such detailed annual reports, given that they were not

The European investors, noting the extensive and “lavish” IC advertisements for land in their newspapers and magazines had been concerned about
the “waste” of money. However, the ads did seem to support the outcome of
drawing large numbers of European immigrants as the availability of rich, cheap
farm land was appealing in a place where land was held by the nobility and the
landless worked for this gentry. Victims of the Irish potato famine were also targets of the ads. The IC reports were intended to soothe the European investors’
concern that the ads were a waste of money.
11
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mandated to do so by the corporate charter. It appears that both
subsequent contracts, (1) the bond indenture with British investors and the corresponding need to establish organizational legitimacy, and (2) the need to promote land sales, were addressed
by the form and content of the annual reports. Such detail also
might have been a way of signaling directors and distant investors that management had control over operations. To this end,
writing to J. Newton Perkins, the treasurer, in July 1856, Osborn
observed [Cochran, 1953, p. 423]:
I do not think any of them [directors] are aware of what
an immense machine this is to handle and I do wish
them to understand more fully the details of this enterprise. I am left alone to this business and have no time
for my family and for those hours of leisure which the
other gentlemen enjoy.
If Osborn thought the directors did not understand the extent of
operations, he surely had even stronger feelings about the distant European venture capitalists.
Management was desirous of reporting more than financial numbers. In the broadest sense of corporate reporting and
communication, the accounting that occurred went “beyond
the numbers” to include evidence relating to economic development. Management indeed believed that the IC was the core of
economic development in the Midwest, and that development
was a virtue for which the IC should be recognized. Ultimately,
the IC was the source of many precedents. Later land-grant railroads adopted the IC’s classification and appraisal system as well
as its contract and credit systems. In addition, the IC’s colonization and advertising techniques were later used by other landgrant railroads [Decker, 1964, p. 101].
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study of the earliest annual reports to shareholders
of the IC supports a conclusion that the statements, as to form
and content, were developed to serve the needs of two classes
of statement users, European investors and politicians, on the
one hand, and the general community on the other. The balance sheet orientation and the interest fund emphasis indicate
the need to provide the European bondholders with the data
required by the bond indenture. A preliminary and supportable
premise of this work is that the bond indenture was the legal
agreement and document that drove the development of the
IC’s financial report content. At the same time, the European
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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stockholders demanded more information than would an investor who could see the trains passing by on a daily basis, or who
could see land being sold and farms and towns being developed.
Further, the need to report to the public as to the success of
the company’s role in its “social contract” to develop the state
required the details of transactions of a demographic nature,
which were provided by the land commissioner. Operating details, on a station-by-station basis, also served as evidence of the
impact of the railroad’s service in areas that had heretofore been
wilderness. In modern parlance, the details of the reports might
be rationalized by the need to establish organizational legitimacy [see Deegan, 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002].
Alternatively, a critic might suggest that instead of trying to
impress readers with the quality of reporting, management was
merely trying to defend itself against investor criticisms with a
quantitative response in the form of detailed analyses of routine
items. The large quantity of data helped to hide recognition of
conceptual issues for which management either had no answers
or for which publication would cast the company in an unfavorable light, such as the deduction of depreciation expense.
During the 1850s, the IC was more than a railroad; it was
the change agent in a major social experiment, an attempt by
government to foster economic development by using raw, fertile land to motivate not only corporate investors, but to attract
a productive population as well. The glue that held this experiment together was the financial capital provided by European
investors. This experiment, as detailed in the narrative of the
annual reports to shareholders, proved successful, at least that
is the conclusion based on the information provided by IC management. Population and agricultural productivity swelled, despite major disturbances, including the Panic of 1857.
This project has assisted in identifying several reporting
practices that had not heretofore been acknowledged. Examples
are the early use of cash-flow statements, the identification of
“net earnings,” and extensive social economic reporting. Perhaps a more important example is the British investors’ practice
of sending representatives to America to examine (audit?) the
IC during the late1850s. To what extent this can be compared to
the external audit of today is conjecture at this point, as well as
whether this was the start of British auditors coming to America
on behalf of English investors as occurred extensively several
decades later. In any event, the dispatch of representatives of
British investors was reassuring for those providers of capital
as to the soundness of the IC assets, the progress made by the
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railroad’s development program, and the reality of its financial
numbers. Given Schuyler’s scandalous departure and the volatile
and speculative economic condition of the “Wild West,” the use
of an inspector/auditor representative seems most prudent given
that the investors’ agency problem was magnified by distance.
Finally, while not original with the IC, additional assurance of
proper control over funds was ensured by the use of the audit
committee of the board of directors.12
The examples in the preceding paragraph are not necessarily to be construed as “firsts.” However, these early uses support
an a priori belief that the corporate form of business, and the
need to please distant European investors, served to justify and
instigate such reporting practices. Further study, employing a
larger set of antebellum railroad reports, is needed to support
this assertion. For example, the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, the
IC’s southern sister, first issued British notes in 1854 through
George Peabody, commencing the M&O’s relationship with the
London capital market [Samson et al., 2003, p. 338]. The M&O
annual reports seem to be equally informative as those of the IC.
Finally, this study represents an initial inquiry into the annual shareholder reports of the IC. This major corporation,
which began as an economic development project to some and
a leveraged land speculation to others, appears to have enjoyed
success by the end of the period under study. Sharing in this
success were European investors who made up the majority of
the IC’s owners and creditors. More than just sharing in the success, the European investors were seemingly responsible for the
detailed financial reporting of the IC. The need to satisfy investors in another hemisphere led to detailed financial reporting at
the IC and at future railroads that emulated it. This narrative
ends with 1861, as by then the nation was engaged in a violent
Civil War whose outcome would change the character and role
of the IC and other railroads. That is another story.
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Abstract: Accounting educators no doubt agree that diversity is an
important and much neglected part of accounting education. They
further recognize that it is difficult to incorporate this important topic
into the accounting curriculum. This paper describes the efforts of
various professors to expose business and accounting students to the
evolution of diversity issues related to the accounting profession by
using the book A White-Collar Profession [Hammond, 2002]. A WhiteCollar Profession: African-American CPAs Since 1921 is a seminal work
which presents a history of the profession as it relates to AfricanAmerican CPAs and documents the individual struggles of many of
the first one hundred blacks to become certified. This paper describes
efforts of faculty at four different colleges to utilize this book in their
teaching of accounting. Instructors found that students not only developed an enhanced awareness about the history of the accounting
profession, but that other educational objectives were advanced, such
as improved communication and critical thinking skills, increased
social awareness, and empathy for others. African-American students,
in particular, embraced the people in the book as role models, while
most every student saw the characters as heroic in a day when the accounting profession is badly in need of role models and heroes. This
is encouraging given the profession’s concern with diversity and the
attention and resources directed at increasing the number of minorities entering the profession.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout its history, America has struggled with the issues of discrimination despite its renown as a cultural melting
pot. A number of groups have received treatment ranging from
less than fair to extraordinarily harsh with regard to justice, economic opportunity, social acceptance, and equality based on
race, religion, sexual preference, and gender. The accounting
profession has contributed to this shameful history as minorities have encountered obstacles blocking their way to licensure
as CPAs [Hammond, 2002]. A White-Collar Profession documents
the struggles of many of the first one hundred African-American CPAs to enter the accounting profession by recounting their
efforts to achieve licensure. It comes at a time when the pro
fession is at a low-point, in desperate need of attracting qualified minorities. The nation is re-examining issues of race and op
portunity in areas such as college admission criteria and the role
of affirmative action and preference [Euben, 2001; Gudeman,
2001; Downing et al., 2002].
This paper describes the experience of the authors in using A White-Collar Profession at various colleges and in various
ways. The objective of this paper is to share these  experiences
with instructors who might be reluctant to incorporate such an
assignment into their accounting courses. A range of institutions of higher education is represented in this article: 1) a predominately white, large, public university in the deep south; 2)
an historically black, public college; 3) an historically black, private college; and 4) a small, private, urban, Catholic, northern
university. The instructors’ approaches differed at each institution as did the courses and the level of students. While the impact the book has had upon students varied somewhat, the authors have all found A White-Collar Profession valuable as a
supplementary text for their courses and its overall impact as
consciousness raising.
In the next section of the paper, the objectives of incorporating the book into an accounting course are described. This is
followed by a discussion of alternatives for using A White-Collar Profession in accounting courses. In the succeeding sections,
the four instructors describe their experiences: what took place,
the approaches used, and the student reactions observed. The final section of the paper considers the concerns reluctant readers
may still have in adopting this book.
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SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
A White-Collar Profession has as its focal point the underrepresentation of African Americans in the public accounting
profession. Currently, fewer than one percent of certified public accountants are African American, a marked contrast to other large professions in the U.S., including those with more rigorous educational requirements (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
African-American Representation in Three Professions
Year

Lawyers

Doctors

CPAs

Total Population

1930

0.8%

2.5%

0.03%

9.7%

1960

1.0

2.0

0.1

10.5

1997

2.7

4.2

0.75-0.99

12.3*

* as per the 2000 Census
Source: Hammond, 2002, p. 2

The book chronicles how the history of the profession was
one of the major determinants of today’s shortage of AfricanAmerican CPAs. Until the late 1960s, very few white-owned CPA
firms, including the “Big Eight,” had hired any African-American staff. Most states required experience working for a CPA as
a prerequisite for licensure, thereby posing a difficult challenge
for those who wanted to enter the profession. Drawing on oral
histories of one-third of the first one hundred African-American
CPAs, Hammond narrates the stories of the persistence, talent,
and determination that eventuated in their success.
A key characteristic of the book is its focus on the stories of
individual CPAs rather than on the details of accounting work
or statistics about exclusion. The book also covers the changes
in the profession resulting from the civil rights movement and
the consequent passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
forbade employment discrimination on the basis of race. The
major, white-owned CPA firms began to hire African-American
employees, and accounting departments at historically black
colleges mushroomed as students availed themselves of the new
opportunities. While progress continued through the 1970s, the
representation of African Americans in the major firms declined
through the 1980s and stagnated in the 1990s. According to the
latest AICPA data, African Americans today average only one per
thousand partners in major CPA firms.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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OBJECTIVES IN ASSIGNING THE BOOK
The authors posit that incorporating A White-Collar Pro
fession will help move an accounting course beyond the more
mundane functions of covering text materials, reviewing homework problems, and lecturing on mind-numbing FASB standards. The book offers instructors the opportunity to inject the
history of the profession which both the Bedford Committee Report [1986, p. 183] and the Accounting Education Change Commission (AECC) [1990, pp. 310-311] urged should be part of accounting graduates’ understanding of the discipline. One theme
of the book relates the efforts on the part of the first one hundred black accountants to achieve licensure as CPAs. While the
episodes of discrimination are harsh, the success stories are uplifting. Considering the image problem the CPA profession is
currently facing, this struggle is an inspiring story about persistence, hard work, determination, ambition, focus, and sacrifice
to reach a goal. Indeed, “ambition and persistence” are personal qualities which the Bedford Committee [1986, p. 183] specified for accounting education to develop in students. Unsolicited
comments from student participants indicate that this message
has inspired some students who were struggling in accounting. The implication is, the book tells the stories of heroes with
whom students of all races can identify as models of accomplishment.
The book allows students to see diversity developments in
the profession, making them aware of the human side of accounting and “the evolutionary nature of society” [Bedford Report, 1986, p. 181]. As will be described subsequently, assignments can contribute to the development of written and oral
communication skills [Bedford Report, 1986, p. 182; AECC,
1990, pp. 305, 311] and teamwork [AECC, 1990, p. 311]. Critical
thinking skills can be engaged and ethical/moral issues raised
through assignments related to the book [AECC, 1990, p. 311].
Student comments, oral and written, reflect the degree to which
the attitudes of a significant number of students were changed
by reading the book. This observed phenomenon fits the objectives of both the Bedford Committee and the AECC. The Bedford Committee [1986, p. 183] cited “empathy” and “sensitivity to social responsibilities” as two explicit “personal capacities”
that it recommended be “fostered” in teaching. Similarly, the
AECC [1990, p. 311] sought “an awareness of personal and social values” and “sensitivity to social responsibilities” be developed in accounting graduates. The use of this book meets these
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educational goals heretofore infrequently addressed in accounting courses.
The authors found another strength of the book is to make
readers more sensitive to issues of race and problems of dis
crimination. Thus, A White-Collar Profession is an excellent
means to meet the AACSB International’s criterion for introducing diversity into the curriculum [AACSB, 2003]. This AACSB accreditation standard dovetails with the goals of the Bedford Committee and the AECC to raise the social consciousness
of students. The authors believe that the book helps fill a void
that current pedagogy is not addressing. In the follow section,
the authors who have incorporated A White-Collar Profession in
their teaching of traditional accounting classes describe their
experiences. A variety of methods were used as were the types
of institutions, students, and classes. From this discussion, the
reader should gain insights (and confidence perhaps) as to how
the book might be utilized in an accounting course. Noteworthy
are the opportunities to accomplish additional objectives such
as enhancing oral or written communication skills, developing
team-working skills, engaging students in critical thinking, and
dealing with the subject of discrimination in the CPA profession
from an ethical perspective.
THE MOREHOUSE CONNECTION
You do not have to turn a page to find the Morehouse connection to A White-Collar Profession! The picture on the front
cover of the book is that of Mr. J.B. Blayton, the first AfricanAmerican CPA in the State of Georgia and the founding father
of Morehouse’s Department of Economics and Business Administration. When Professor Hammond spoke about her book at
Morehouse College, she was accompanied by Mrs. Willie Boyd
(Saddler), assistant to Mr. Blayton during his tenure at Clark-Atlanta University, where he became known as the “Dean of Negro Accountants.” The audience was very interested in the stories Mrs. Boyd shared with them about Mr. Blayton. Much of
the two-hour program was spent talking about him and his role
in encouraging students to become CPAs.
At the presentation, I got the idea to use the book in my accounting class as a means of exposing students to the extent of
Morehouse’s influence. J.B. Blayton personified that impact. He
had audited the books of the famous civil rights organization,
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. He had been
highly involved in defending Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. against
false tax evasion charges which might have derailed the civilhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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rights movement. In the 1930s, he had met with Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins to discuss President Roosevelt’s New Deal
programs from an African-American perspective. In addition to
Blayton, Charles Beckett, also a Morehouse graduate, is among
the first one hundred African-American CPAs.
Morehouse College, the nation’s only private, historically black, four-year, liberal-arts college for men, is located three
miles southwest of downtown Atlanta. Approximately one thousand students are enrolled in a business major, with about 250
students taking accounting principles yearly. Accordingly, this
class provides the opportunity to introduce all business students to Blayton’s contribution and the Morehouse legacy. I also
thought that exposing them to the history of blacks in the accounting profession might help recruiting efforts directed at minority students. Learning about the struggles of these first African-American CPAs might ignite a sense of pride and inspire
students to become a part of the profession that many pioneers
had spent many years trying to enter. On the other hand, I worried that assigning the book had the potential to hurt recruiting efforts. Would sophomores be deterred from becoming accounting majors because of the struggles depicted in the book?
I contemplated making the assignment only to my auditing class
since the career paths of senior accounting majors were already
determined. Ultimately, I decided to assign the book to my principles class during the subsequent spring semester.
The Assignment: Students enrolled in my two managerial principles of accounting classes were assigned to read the book during their spring break. At that time, they had completed one of
four major examinations. The students were aware that ten percent of their grade would be based on a special assignment.
About two weeks prior to spring break, I instructed the students
to bring money to pay for the cost of their special assignment.
On the last day of class before spring break, the students completed a pre-test questionnaire (see Appendix 1). Upon completion of the survey questionnaire, each student who had paid for
a copy of the book received it, along with the assignment requiring them to read the book and to submit a three-to-five page paper describing their reactions. The paper was due ten days later
on the first day of class following spring break. The rationale for
limiting the reading time was to help mitigate potential threats
to the internal and external validity for measuring the book’s impact on each student.
During the first class meeting following spring break, I colPublished by eGrove, 2006
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lected the students’ reaction papers. We did not discuss the book
during this session. During the very next class meeting, I administered the post-test questionnaire which was identical to the
pre-test survey. I was able to match the two surveys because the
students included their names on each. Given the low level of
sensitive information contained in the questionnaire, I did not
view this as a material threat to the internal validity of the responses. Students who did not purchase a book or did not complete both questionnaires were excluded from the sample. Fourteen students were excluded based on the criteria, leaving a
sample size of 29.
TABLE 2
Sample: Morehouse College
Total enrolled
Less: Did not complete before
Did not complete after
Did not complete either
Did not purchase book

43
3
5
2
4

		

––

Total Sample

29

Results of the Survey: The Questionnaire: Appendix 1 contains the
entire questionnaire. The questions varied over a range of areas.
Some questions required the students to rank on a ten-point Likert scale their (a) knowledge of accounting history, (b) attitude
toward diversity, and (c) appreciation of the importance of the
accounting profession. Other questions required the students to
rank their agreement with statements assessing their determination to achieve goals. A ten-point Likert scale was used for all
questions.
Panel A of Table 3 reports some descriptive statistics for
the sample. The 29 African-American males had a mean age
of 20. The majority (19) of the participants were sophomores
with a major other than accounting. Most of the students knew
what CPA stood for (26) and reportedly knew an African-American CPA (22) before reading the book. However, after reading
the book, more students reported knowing an African-American CPA (27), resulting in a significant increase, p < .05. Panel B of Table 3 reports frequencies for the two perception questions. Students’ perception of the number of African-American
CPAs did not change significantly after reading the book. Many
thought that the number ranged from less than 1,000 to 5,000
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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(23 and 21 respectively); several more felt the number to be
greater than 5,000 but less than 10,000. Only two students believed that there are more than 10,000 African-American CPAs.
Before the reading, a majority (19) of the students thought that
1% to 5% of CPAs in the country were African American. More
(25) subscribed to this perception after reading the book.
TABLE 3
Results: Morehouse College
Panel A: Mean
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Age
Know definition of CPA
Know a CPA
Know African-American CPA

Before
20
26
22
22

After
20
29
27
27

Panel B:
Frequency Responses –
Non-Scaled Questions

Before

After

3
7
3
16

2
9
6
12

19
7
2
1

25
3
1
0

12. Perception of number of African-American
CPAs in the country?
a. 10,000 or more
b. < 1,000
c. < 10,000 but >5,000
d. 1,000 - 5,000
13. Perception of % of African-American
CPAs in the country
a. 1% to 5%
b. >5% but < 10%
c. > 10% < 25%
d. more than 25%

Table 4 reports the mean responses of the participants to the
scaled questions contained in the questionnaire. The mean difference reported is based on the students’ pre- and post-test responses to each question. The difference is used to evaluate the
impact of the book on the students’ perceptions and attitudes.
The results show that the book had significance across several parameters. Without question, the book greatly enhanced the
students’ knowledge of the history of accounting, particularly
the history of African Americans in the accounting profession.
Their knowledge of the history of accounting moved from the
one-to-five to the four-to-ten range. The mean difference is computed by subtracting the response after reading the book from
the response before reading the book. Thus, the non-positive
Published by eGrove, 2006
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mean difference of -3.28 indicates that the students’ responses after reading the book were greater than the response before
the reading. In this case, students reported that they were more
knowledgeable about the history of accounting after reading the
book. The mean difference is significant (p < .001). Similarly,
students’ knowledge of the history of African Americans in the
accounting profession increased significantly (mean difference
= -5.01; p < .001) after reading the book. The mode response before reading the book was 1 and 3; the post-reading mode response was 8. The mode response regarding tolerance of diversity was 10 in both the pre- and post-survey responses, suggesting
that the book did not impact this factor. Perhaps the high pretest
score forestalled any revealed improvement from the book; perhaps a flaw in the survey’s structure masked a real influence. A
similar problem occurred at the University of Alabama with the
pretest survey question related to working with others who were
different from themselves (age, gender, and race).
TABLE 4
Mean Responses: Morehouse College
			
Questionnaire
Before
After

(p-value) of
Mean Difference

Rank yourself (scale 1-10):
14. knowledge of the history of the
accounting profession

3.5172

6.7931

-3.2759

(.000)

15. knowledge of the history of
blacks in the accounting profession

2.4138

7.4828

-5.0690

(.000)

16. willingness to work as group
members on teams with members who are different from
yourself as to gender, religion,
race, and culture.

8.9310

8.8276

.1034

(.742)

17. determination to complete this
course

9.7931

9.5862

.2069

(.206)

18. appreciation for the importance of this course

8.6552

9.1034

-.4483

(.030)

19. appreciation for the importance of the accounting profession

8.8621

9.2414

-.3793

(.094)
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TABLE 4 (continued)
			
Agree (scale 1 to 10):
Before
After

(p-value) of
Mean Difference

20. make up mind easily

6.9310

7.3103

-.3793

(.459)

21. make decisions slowly

5.1379

5.8621

-.7241

(.017)

22. denied something really wanted

8.6071

8.7500

-.1429

(.708)

23. will probably drop a class before graduation

5.2759

5.8966

-.6207

(.350)

24. would consider dropping a class

5/3103

5.8276

-.5172

(.390)

25. would consider dropping accounting

2.3103

2.4138

-1.034

(.794)

26. usually get what I ask for the
first time I ask

4.6897

4.4828

.2069

(.586)

27. would drop a class if: the professor said I lacked the required
skills and background

2.7241

2.4138

.3103

(.272)

28. pursue my goal no matter how
long it took to achieve it.

8.9655

8.0345

.9310

(.010)

29. would drop a class if: required
workload for the class was too
time consuming

3.2069

3.0345

.1724

(.655)

30. would register for a class even
if: professor is known for being
difficult

7.4828

7.8276

-.3448

(.414)

31. would become discouraged
from pursuing goal if: I did not
have any money

3.0690

2.8966

.1724

(.627)

32. would become discouraged
from pursuing my goal if: It
took more than 5 years to
achieve

2.4483

2.8966

-.4483

(.256)

33. discouraged from pursuing goal
if: required school workload
was too difficult

2.7931

2.6552

.1379

(.743)

34. discouraged from pursuing goal
if: If it took longer than 20 years
to achieve

4.3448

4.0690

.2758

(.499)
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Students had a heightened appreciation for the managerial
principles course after reading the book (p < .05). Although not
at the conventional level, they also reported having a greater appreciation for the accounting profession after reading the book
(p < .10). They agreed strongly with the statement related to pursuing a goal (mean response = 8.96); however, their conviction
diminished somewhat after reading the book (mean response =
8.03). The mean difference of .93 is significant, p = .01. Finally,
the book seemingly had an impact on the students’ assessment
of their decision-making ability. Before reading the book, students felt that they made decisions more hastily. Subsequently,
they revised this assessment and reported that they make decisions more slowly (p = .017).
Student Reactions: Most students openly expressed verbal and
nonverbal disappointment and disbelief that I assigned this
reading during their spring break. However, after class resumed,
at least two students stopped by my office to thank me for making the assignment. I could feel their excitement and sincerity. Students were disappointed that I did not allow them to continue discussing the book during the first class back. However, I
did commit to allowing them to discuss their reactions at a later
time. That evening at a company-sponsored reception, a recruiter informed me that several of the students in attendance used
the book as an “ice-breaker.” The company representatives were
impressed.
I reviewed the students’ written reactions to the book. The
papers were graded primarily on content and completeness.
About 25% of the participants merely prepared book reports
rather than describing their own reactions. The remaining students gave candid reactions to the book. “Uplifting,” “enlightening,” and “inspiring” were words commonly used by the students. Some expressed that they were angered, amazed, and
saddened by the events chronicled in the book. Most described
early African-American CPAs as persistent, intelligent, strong,
and focused, and believed that these qualities should be instilled
in all. Understandably, almost all of the students indicated that
prior to reading the book, they were unaware of the racism to
which African Americans had been subjected in the accounting
field. A resounding message was an increased appreciation for
the importance of accounting and respect for those choosing to
pursue a career in accounting.
Many comments were insightful, indicating that the struggles in the book mirrored the struggles of the general populahttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23

44

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2006, Vol. 33, no. 1
36

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006

tion of African Americans. Two students included reference to
a line from a poem written by Langston Hughes – “life for me
ain’t been no crystal staircase.” A number of students expressed
admiration of the African-American CPAs for sticking together,
noting the importance of mentoring. While a few students perceived that the book will help attract African-Americans to the
accounting profession, many expressed that they were reluctant
to pursue a career in accounting given the historic struggles.
One student wrote: “It is wiser to pursue a career that has been
thoroughly explored.” Another comment suggested that the early discrimination of blacks in the field has resulted in the lack of
mentors, and, thus, the lack of awareness in the African-American community of the accounting profession. The “oppression
of blacks in the past may have led to African-Americans’ disinterest in accounting.” Many acknowledged progress, but noted that the profession has a long way to go. In an introspective
comment, one student wrote, “although against our nature, we
(students) have been pacified to a point such that we tend to shy
away from that which requires practice and work.” Others tried
to imagine being in the shoes of the “firsters,” and wondered if
they could have persevered.
Most striking to me were the somewhat naïve comments
expressed by the students. In general, the students did not understand why the exceptionally intelligent persons highlighted in the book were not hired given the fact that they possessed
the appropriate credentials. They were genuinely surprised that
being at the “top of your game” was not enough! They were
amazed that certification (i.e., passing the exam) did not guaran
tee a job. Some students thought of racism as only an informal
system. However, after reading the book, they viewed racism in
accounting as more deeply ingrained since firms and key organ
izations were the primary culprits. They were appalled at the
open insensitivity of the firms and organizations; particular reference was made to the use of jokes and racial slurs recorded in
the minutes of the national organization. One student could not
fathom professional societies holding meetings in “all white” hotels; it seems he was surprised that segregated hotels existed. I
got the impression that my students had been sheltered from
the discrimination that many of my era had either experienced,
lived first-hand, or had been told about.
The book, A White-Collar Profession, proved to be an extremely meaningful assignment. The students’ awareness of African Americans in the profession seemingly softened their attitude toward accounting. When reviewing the students’ written
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comments, I found overall that the written reactions were consistent with the responses noted in the pre-test, post-test questionnaires. Further, I observed that many were curious about
why these facts were not well known, especially among blacks.
The most common reaction among the students was that the
book should be assigned in future classes. I concur.
THE JOHN CARROLL EXPERIENCE
John Carroll University, a Catholic and Jesuit University located in the fashionable eastern suburbs of Cleveland, Ohio, has
a very small minority population. The university reports a minority percentage of 9.2%1 for undergraduates of whom 4.3%
are African Americans. The situation in the Department of Accountancy is significantly lower as illustrated by the fact that
of the 53 Intermediate Accounting students who participated in
this assignment, only one was an African American.
It was within this context of a predominately Caucasian environment that Professor Hammond’s book, A White-Collar Profession, was assigned as collateral reading. The student’s knowledge of and reactions to the book were tested through the
mechanism of a take-home essay that constituted 20% of the final examination in my Intermediate Accounting I course. The
specific question upon which the essay was based follows:
Write an essay of two-three pages in which you discuss
why you think A White-Collar Profession was assigned to
you as collateral reading. Support your position(s) with
specific references (quotes and page numbers) from
the book. Do you feel that the book provided you with
an appreciation of how diversity issues have plagued
the accounting profession historically? Do you feel that
it is fair to condemn the accounting professionals of
the past for prejudicial attitudes that seemingly have a
greater relevance in the present?
I expected that the students’ resentment over a rather timeconsuming assignment at the end of a difficult class that already
had required more than its fair share of effort would result in
a negative response to the book. On the other hand, I considered that this dire expectation would be tempered by the natural
propensity on the part of our students to attempt to please their
professors and, thus, to write what they thought I might want to
hear. To mitigate these threats to the validity of the responses, I
1

This figure is inclusive of Asian students.
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urged the students to provide an honest reaction and informed
them that the department had designated an independent reader (a graduate student, who teaches English composition) for
this particular course since it is deemed writing intensive. Thus,
I would not see the papers until after the grades had been assigned.
I completed an informal and unscientific word-content analysis of the 53 essays submitted by the above-mentioned accounting students. Immediately evident and personally gratifying was
a total absence of complaints about the assignment. In point of
fact, several students confessed that they had had serious doubts
about the relevance of this exercise in the context of a methodology-oriented course such as Intermediate I, but that these reservations were quickly dispelled as they had gotten into the reading. Some saw the value of learning about the history of the
profession that they were aspiring to enter.
The message that came across loudest and clearest in the
essays was an appreciation for having been made aware of the
struggles African Americans endured in gaining some measure
of acceptance into accountancy. From my perspective as reader,
I tried to distinguish between those students who simply averred
they were made aware of the African-American plight from
those who seemed to express gratitude for having been made
aware. The revelation that no knowledge had become some
knowledge is not particularly powerful. Why should 20-year-old
students, or even their 60-something professor for that matter,
know of such things? The more poignant demonstration from
my perspective lies in the fact that the information is taken to
heart, either through an overt revulsion to accounting’s past on
racial issues or through an indication that the profession needs
to move forward proactively to right past wrongs. My sense was
that 40 of the 53 students took a stronger stance than merely recounting the more powerful episodes of prejudice and claiming
that they had not been aware of such happenings in the past.
I specifically asked the question in the essay assignment
whether it was “fair to condemn” past accountants for prejudicial actions that were more antithetical to present mores than
to those that existed back then. This question has been one that
has impacted contemporary accounting historiography, particularly in separating “critical” historians from the more “traditional.” Critical historians aspire to using their narratives of the
events of the past as a catalyst for changing the present. Traditional historians see themselves more as non-partisan purveyors
of information. I anticipated that my students would universally
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think it unfair to ascribe blame, but the results indicated a more
equal division of opinion. Twenty-three concluded that condemnation was unfair, while sixteen took a harder line. However, a
lack of knowledge of U.S. history may have aversely affected an
informed evaluation of this question. For example, a number of
papers actually commented that the timing of the early AfricanAmerican struggle for licensure militated against a prejudicefree thinking since the country had just emerged from slavery.
One final point I looked for in reading these essays was
whether the students indicated any degree of satisfaction that
the racial issues in the accounting profession had dissipated as
a result of the improvements of recent years compared to the
struggles of the protagonists in Professor Hammond’s book.
Again, I found the results surprising. Thirty-three students made
statements to the effect that the profession had not yet done
nearly enough and that there was a long way to go before African Americans were dealt with fairly as accounting professionals. Only ten students felt comfortable that the situation was
much improved, and that the evils of the past had been handled
satisfactorily. In summation, I am of the opinion that assigning A White-Collar Profession was an extraordinary experience
for both my students and for me. A substantial group of wealthy,
Caucasian students showed me an immense and unexpected empathy for a suppressed minority.
AN EXPERIENCE IN HISTORY AT
NORTH CAROLINA A&T UNIVERSITY
North Carolina A&T State University, a public, historically
black university has approximately 11,000 students and is located in the small, metropolitan city of Greensboro, North Carolina. Given that the university’s School of Business and Accounting Department are AACSB-accredited, an assignment using A
White-Collar Profession was a means by which the AACSB’s diversity requirement could be satisfied.
The semester-long project was assigned to 37 cost accounting students, who were all African American. Additionally, articles that profiled minorities in the accounting profession [Benson, 1981; Hayes, 1986; Ostrowski, 1986] were also assigned;
these articles provided background, support, and further emphasis on topics described in A White-Collar Profession.
The students formed groups by self-selection, and each
group was assigned at least two chapters of Hammond’s book.
The group was then responsible for summarizing and presenthttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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ing these assigned chapters to the class. These presentations became the highlight of the semester. Groups presented in the closing minutes of each class meeting; the discussion/debate became
lively and stimulating. Because each chapter focuses on a different theme (or time period), the student presentation comments
were generally unique to each session. Communication skills
were developed and “thinking on the feet” was practiced during
these sessions as students were not shy in their exchanges.
In addition to the group work, each student was also required to submit an essay describing how the book affected his/
her perception of the accounting profession. Questions were
provided to guide the development of the essay. These questions
centered around the book’s impact on the student and included the following: (1) did the book make students uncomfortable
with their pursuit of accounting careers? (2) did the book influence the role that the student saw himself or herself playing
to change the profession? (3) did the book impact the student’s
present or future endeavors? (4) what aspect of the book did the
student dislike or disagree with? The essay, the article summary,
and the group presentation constituted 15% of the course grade.
The following summary represents the impact of the Hammond book on students’ perceptions of the accounting profession, discrimination, and their responsibility/role as account
ants.
• Students felt overwhelmed (and a few were aggravated)
by the struggles that the trailblazers endured.
• A few students perceived that the system (earlier discriminatory policies and practices) was insurmountable and
stated that, “I would have just given up” and “selected another career.” Others felt that they would have become
extremely radical and aggressive in their pursuits.
• All students agreed that this is a history that was relevant
to them. Many felt that the knowledge prepared them for
discrimination that they could encounter as an accounting professional.
• Many of the students had worked as interns and had related their experiences to those events in the book. Most
felt that there genuinely had been diversity improvements
in the profession. However, the scarcity in the number of
minority partners and senior managers observed during
their internship made them conclude that “the profession
still has a long-way to go, to reach a truly diverse profession.”
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• The students were especially pleased in finding people
of the same race becoming CPAs with whom they could
identify. For the students, being able to relate to black
CPAs was important. Other than the few instructors
and recruiters, students did not know many black CPAs.
Learning about the first one hundred African-American
CPAs made the book experience enjoyable. Students recognized these individuals as role models; the book became a means for the students to live vicariously the lives
of these heroic pioneers and brave leaders who became
the first black CPAs.
• The accomplishments of these CPAs seemed to inspire
students to be more motivated academically to succeed.
• Several of the students wanted to become “good role
models” and “recruit more African Americans into the
profession.” Most voiced that the black pioneers paved
the way for them and “now they must continue the path
for tomorrow’s students.”
To conclude the project, at the end of the semester, Dr. Hammond spoke to the class and other accounting majors. The students asked why she decided to write about African Americans,
and what advice she would give to aspiring young “accountants.”
The background she gave regarding her motivation and the writing process of the book, such as scheduling interviews with the
book’s characters, augmented the students’ interest in pursuing
not only accounting, but also their dreams.
THE EXPERIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
Alabama has a long history of slavery and segregation to
overcome. Forty years ago, Governor George Wallace stood in
the university doorway attempting to block the first AfricanAmerican student from registering at the University of Alabama.
The civil rights marches, the Ku Klux Klan, and black church
bombings are all part of that history. Much progress has been
made in ending discrimination and improving race relations
from the terrible decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, at the
University of Alabama, the goal of complete integration remains
illusive as illustrated by the lack of integration by social fraternities and sororities despite all manner of encouragement and
pressure from the university’s administration to do so.
CPA hiring practices in Alabama have been questionable
with respect to recruiting minority students for entry-level staff
positions. The problem seems particularly acute at non-“Big
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Four” firms. The number of black students graduating in accounting has been very small until recently, however, so the issue of discrimination from the employment perspective remains
unclear.
I assigned A White-Collar Profession as a supplementary
textbook in my three sections of tax accounting (first semester
juniors), approximately 90 students, of whom 15% were African
American and 3% were other non-Caucasian. Except for an occasional reminder to read the book, I did nothing else related to
the topic. I gave the students very little guidance except to have
the book read before Thanksgiving. There would be a 30-minute
test, worth 10% of their course grade, given during the class before Thanksgiving. This test would consist of one general discussion question. In addition, students were invited and encouraged
to attend a presentation by the author, Theresa Hammond, who
would speak on the Thursday evening prior to the test. I offered
a two-point bonus (two percent of final grade) for attending,
plus, of course, the promise of greater insight on the upcoming
quiz. I also promised to distribute a handout at the presentation with a list of possible discussion questions to aid and guide
their study (see Table 5). Those students missing the presentation could pick up the question sheet at my office on the following school days.
I selected questions #2, #7, and #8 to ask on the test, a different question for each of my three sections. The results of the
test were excellent. Of 91 students, I gave 85 As, four Bs, and
two Cs. I confess to my apparent grade inflation without embarrassment since the answers were so good.
TABLE 5
Sample Questions Taken From A White-Collar Profession
1)

Which profession has an even worse record than accounting as far as percentage employment of black Americans?

2)

In what ways did Arthur J. Wilson, Jesse B. Blayton, Sr., Mary T. Washington, Lincoln J. Harrison, Walter Harris, Theodora Rutherford and the others
described in the book become CPA heroes?

3)

What barriers to becoming CPAs did blacks face in the 1920s to 1960s?

4)

What barriers to becoming CPAs do blacks face in the 21st Century?

5)

What groups, other than African Americans, have been discriminated
against in becoming CPAs?

6)

What is the book’s conclusion about the CPA profession’s past, present, and
future as to opening its doors to African Americans?
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7)

What cracks in the barriers to becoming a CPA allowed the first blacks
to achieve their goals? [How did these few succeed at accomplishing this
dream?] What were the common keys in the success stories?

8)

Describe the type of accounting practice that black CPA firms operated.
What types of clients did these firms have? What type of work did the firms
perform? Analyze and explain what drove these practices in this direction.

The students’ reaction to the assignment was overwhelming. At the presentation, the students not only had questions but
many, particularly the black students, brought their books for
Professor Hammond to autograph. One very good (white) student confessed to her that this was the first book he had ever
read cover to cover! A (white) female student (from Georgia)
asked me after Hammond’s presentation if next semester we
could have one of the first one hundred black CPAs come and
talk at one of our Beta Alpha Psi meetings. I was floored! I had
to confess to her that I had not even given that idea a thought
myself, nor had I a clue, for the moment, where any of the first
one hundred was living. But I thought it was a wonderful idea.
In addition to the quiz responses, two black students left me
notes telling me how much the book had meant to them. One,
who was struggling in both accounting courses she was taking,
realized that hard work and persistence were the keys to success as demonstrated by the CPAs in the book. The second student told me how moved she was by the struggle of those first
one hundred black CPAs. The book touched her deeply, and she
thanked me for assigning it as part of the course.
At the end of the semester, I suggested that students might
donate A White-Collar Profession to their public or high school
libraries back home. One student volunteered that she had given it to her father to read; he is partner in the Washington, DC
office of one of the “Big Four” CPA firms, an Alabama graduate,
and a loyal supporter of our program.
In the subsequent semester, I assigned the book in my masters-level, tax-planning course.2 The book was again used as supIn the course, I ran pre- and post-test surveys of five questions each which I
hoped would capture the impact of the book on students’ knowledge of the history
of the profession, their willingness to work with and accept those who are different from themselves, and their willingness to overcome obstacles. The history of
the profession question showed the impact of the book. However, the questions
related to the students’ acceptance of others failed to measure change since every
student rated him/herself the maximum on the pre-test survey. Because of how
students rated themselves on the pretest . . . (that each was very willing to work
with people who were from different cultures, religion, race, age, or of gender
than the student), the post-test score did not reflect any improvement.
2
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plementary reading, with a three-page paper due the last week
of the course in which the students explained why they thought
I had assigned this book and what made this book relevant to
the course. This paper represented ten percent of the course
grade. In the tax-planning course, I had 15 students of whom
eight were masters of tax students, six were masters of account
ancy students, and one was getting her Ph.D. in economics. The
papers, with the exception of one, were very thoughtful and insightful. The answers, as I anticipated, were very different since
there was a multitude of reasons to justify using A White-Collar
Profession. The papers reflected that the students had genuinely learned a great deal from the book, raising their awareness of
the history of discrimination within the profession, an issue to
which they confessed of being totally unaware. Despite the “failure” of the pre-test, post-test survey to capture the impact of the
book (see footnote two), the papers the students submitted revealed that much had been learned by reading the book and that
their attitudes had been impacted as well.
DISCUSSION
Accounting educators no doubt agree that diversity is an important and very neglected part of accounting education. They
further recognize that it is difficult to incorporate this important topic into the accounting curriculum. This paper describes
the efforts of various professors to expose business and accounting students to the evolution of diversity issues related to the accounting profession by using A White-Collar Profession [Hammond, 2002].
A White-Collar Profession presents a history of the profession and biographies of the first blacks who overcame huge obstacles to become CPAs. While some find the book disheartening
in that the profession was racist in blocking African-American
entry into the profession, the stories about those first black CPAs
who succeeded are inspirational and uplifting. It is also interesting to see where the profession is today in terms of accepting African Americans into the profession. One view is that the profession has not gone nearly far enough; for example, there are
only a handful of partners in the Big Four firms who have come
from minority groups. Another view would hold that while the
accounting profession has a way to go to be truly open and diverse, it is making progress. Thus, the book is relevant and interesting for presenting an important topic that transcends coverage in accounting textbooks.
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This paper provides a description of the outcomes of assigning the book in various accounting classes at a range of institutions of higher education (see Table 6). This paper also contains
sample questions that are a good resource for professors who
may use the book. These questions can serve as the catalyst for
an out-of-class essay assignment or an in-class exam or quiz. All
of the participants had minimally completed the first principles
course, and thus had some previous knowledge of accounting.
Participants perceived the assignment as valuable and relevant.
Many expressed appreciation for having had their eyes opened
to the events depicted in the book. Many of the Caucasian students at one institution expressed empathy for the pioneers
highlighted in the book; however, their opinions were mixed regarding the fairness of ascribing blame for the discriminatory
behavior of the past. The book seemingly provoked some soulsearching among the African-American male students. Many African-American participants felt a strong sense of pride and were
motivated to work harder. Perhaps most notable is the overt willingness of both the Morehouse and Alabama students to work
with others. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the students’ ability to accept diversity may be correlated with their naïveté about racism in general and the profession in particular.
The Morehouse and John Carroll experiences provide evidence
of this phenomenon. Thus, it is just as important to determine if
their response would differ after learning of the discriminatory
practices reported in the book. In particular, despite past history,
toleration of differences is a way of life to which the participants
are seemingly accustomed and plan to continue. In our view, the
profession should view this revelation as positive, particularly in
the case of African-American males.
We encourage other instructors to consider using this book
in similar ways so that more students would be exposed to the
issues that the book raises and the inspiring stories the book
conveys about the history of the profession. However, we realize
that there may be some concerns about using the book in an accounting course. A possible reason for not using the book could
be a concern about the imposition upon the students’ time. Certainly, time both in and out of class is a precious commodity
with so much material to cover and with outside interests competing. Another concern is the cost of a supplementary text, particularly since the course textbook is already costing students
$100 or more not to mention other costs such as outlines, study
guides, or software materials. At $16.95, we believe the cost is
well worth the price.
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Co-ed

Co-ed

Yes

Private

Semester

Pre/Post- Test

Institution

System

No

10%

In-class Test

Essay

Points

ten days

Yes

Length of Assignment

Three weeks

Semester

Private

No

20% of final exam

No

Yes

Semester

Semester

Public

No

15%

No

Yes

Semester

Semester

Public

Yes

10%

Yes

Yes
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Race
100% African American (29)
99% Caucasian (53)
100% African American (37)
82% Caucasian (73)
				
15% African-A (14)
				  3% Other (3)

Co-ed

Gender

All Male

1) Juniors (90)
2) Masters (14)/Ph.D.(1)

Participants
Sophomores
Juniors
Juniors
				

1) Tax Accounting
2) Tax Planning

Alabama

1) Accounting
2) Masters-Accounting

Intermediate
Cost Accounting
Accounting		

John Carroll

Major
Business
Accounting
Accounting
				

Course
Managerial Principles
		

Morehouse

Summary of Assignment by Institution

TABLE 6
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Perhaps more to the point than these concerns about time
and cost, instructors might be reluctant to utilize the book because of an unwillingness to take chances, to do something different, to take on an unfamiliar topic, to tackle an “uncomfortable” issue, or to deal with the profession in anything but a
glowing light. We believe that effective teaching must go beyond
the technical aspects of the textbook. It should inject questions
without definite answers and cover issues that produce thought
on the part of students. Intellectual honesty requires that academics have students consider the problems of the profession,
as well as its successes. Above all, students represent the profession’s best hope of curing its long-term deficiencies and meeting its future challenges. Our students will be the ones who will
make accounting better than what it is today.
Other concerns about using A White-Collar Profession center
on students’ reaction to the assignment, specifically the book’s
relevance to the subject matter of the course. Again, our own
experience found student reaction to be overwhelmingly favorable. The comments volunteered, oral and written, have been
“thank yous” for this assignment. While not all students reacted
this way, many did, and in such an overwhelmingly positive way,
that we feel concerns about student reaction are unfounded.
A limitation of the study is that the pre-test, post-test methodology was not uniformly used by all professors. As a result,
the statistical measurements regarding the impact of the book
may not be generalized to other groups. However, using A WhiteCollar Profession as a supplementary text in accounting classes offers many ways of exposing students to issues that face the
profession and raises the awareness of diversity in students’
thinking. We report both anecdotal and empirical evidence that
the participants in this study proved more willing to work with
colleagues different from themselves, perhaps so inspired by the
book although there is no way of knowing for sure. We find this
to be extremely encouraging since the majority of the participants are accounting majors. In addition to an increased awareness of the history of the accounting profession, some students
gained a greater appreciation for their accounting course and
the accounting profession.
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APPENDIX 1
Survey Questionnaire: Morehouse College
ACHIEVING YOUR GOAL
The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect information about your perception and knowledge of the accounting profession. Also, some questions relate to
your attitude towards goal seeking achievements in the context of completing
course requirements and overcoming barriers. Please provide thoughtful and
candid responses to each of the questions that follow. Responses do not affect
your grade!! Feel free to make notes in the margin and do not hesitate to ask
questions.
Section I
1. Age _______
						
2. Classification: a. Freshman b. Sophomore c. Junior d. Senior
3. Major: a. Finance b. Accounting c. Marketing e. Management f. Other (specify)____________
4. If your major is other than accounting, did you consider a major in accounting? _____Yes ______ No
5. If your major is other than accounting, would you consider a major in accounting? _____Yes ______ No
6. What school year did you enter college?
7. What year do you plan to graduate? ________________________
Section II.
8. Do you know what CPA stands for?
9. Do you know a CPA?

________ Yes

________ Yes _________ No
_________ No

10. Do you know any African-American CPA’s?
11. Have you ever dropped a class?
					

________ Yes _________ No

________ Yes

_________ No

Section III. Please circle the response that best represents your perception.
12. How many African-American CPAs do you think there are in this country?
a. 10,000 or more
b. < 1,000
c. < 10,000 but greater than 5,000
d. 1,000 - 5,000
13. What % of total CPAs in this country do you think are African-American?
a. 1% to 5%
b. >5% but less than 10%
c. > 10% but less than 25%
d. more than 25%
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Section IV.
14. On a scale of 1 to 10 rank your knowledge of the history of the accounting
profession.
(1 = not knowledgeable   10 = very knowledgeable)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
15. On a scale of 1 to 10 rank your knowledge of the history of blacks in the accounting profession.
(1 = not knowledgeable   10 = very knowledgeable)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
16. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank yourself as to your willingness to work as group
members on teams with members who are different from yourself as to gender, religion, race, and culture.
(1 = not willing – seeks to avoid having members of the team that are
diverse)
(10 = very willing – seeks out opportunity to have diverse members of
the team that are diverse)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
17. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your determination to complete this course
(1 = not very committed, will see if I can pass this course without putting forth a lot of effort)
(10 = very determined – willing to do whatever it takes)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
18. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your appreciation for the importance of this
course
(1 = low appreciation)   (10 = high appreciation)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
19. On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your appreciation for the importance of the accounting profession
(1 = low appreciation)   (10 = high appreciation)
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
Section V.
On a scale of 1 to 10, rank your agreement with the following statements.
1 = do not agree    10 = very much agree
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20. I make up my mind easily.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
21. I make decisions slowly.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
22. I know how it feels to be denied something you really want.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
23. I will probably drop a class before I graduate.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
24. I would consider dropping a class.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
25. I would consider dropping accounting.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
26. I usually get what I ask for the first time I ask.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
27. I would drop a class if: The professor told me that I lacked the skills and
background required.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
28. I would pursue my goal no matter how long it took to achieve it.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
29. I would drop a class if: The workload required for the class was too time
consuming.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
30. I would register for a class even if: The professor was known for being difficult.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
31. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: I did not have any
money.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
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32. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: It took more than 5
years to achieve.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
33. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: The workload required in school was too difficult.
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
34. I would become discouraged from pursuing my goal if: If it took longer than
20 years to achieve.
									
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10
Section VI.
35. Do barriers motivate you (increase your determination to achieve your
goal)?
Yes _______

No _______

36. Do barriers discourage you (decrease your determination to achieve your
goal)?
Yes_______ No________
37. If you wanted to achieve a goal, would it matter how long it took?
Yes ____ No _____

Comments:
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ACCOUNTING TECHNIQUES IN KOREA:
18TH CENTURY ARCHIVAL SAMPLES
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Abstract: Little is known about pre-1900 East Asian accounting techniques. A double-entry method of accounting may date from the 11th
century in Korea, but extant commercial ledgers are no older than
1854. However, extensive accounts of cooperative associations survive
from the early 18th century. The Mun Clan Association accounts are
examined to reveal their organizing principles and accuracy. The accounts demonstrate a highly accurate system that was intermediate
between single-entry and double-entry accounting. While they are not
from a commercial house, the accounts display sophisticated bookkeeping techniques designed to maximize rationality within a Confucian moral economy.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Academy of Korean Studies (Han’guk
Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guw ŏn)1 has gathered and published
many private records and documents from post-1600 Korea, but
there has been little research on these documents from the perspective of accounting and economic history. This paper examines a double-entry method used in the accounts (1741-1883) of
the (Namp’y ŏng) Mun Clan Association (MCA),2 an organization
that is still active in Chŏlla Province. The MCA is representative
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Anthony Hopwood and Elaine Tan of
Oxford, the Korean Accounting Institute, two anonymous referees, and the editor for comments and suggestions that helped to improve the paper significantly. We also thank the Korea Research Foundation for supporting Seong Ho Jun’s
research.
1
The Korean name was changed in February 2005 to Han’gukhak Chung’ang
Yŏn’guwŏn, retaining the English name Academy of Korean Studies.
2
Please refer to the Glossary (Appendix A) for original script and characters.
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of a major civil-society organization in pre-20th century Korea,
the cooperative, mutual-aid society (kye).
Although a study in accounting history, the research on
which this paper is based had roots in economic history. Information on commodity prices, labor costs, land and rental costs,
and a number of other types of basic data have been collected in
order to build models of Korean economic history. In the course
of exploiting the data, decisions had to be made about their
trustworthiness, leading to an analysis of the accounting principles at work. A high degree of sophistication and accuracy is evident, thus providing confidence in the quality of the extracted
data [Jun and Lewis, 2005, 2006].
The MCA accounts were far more elaborate than simple,
single-entry records. They reveal a complex linkage across several separate commodities used as currency, including unhulled
rice, milled rice, and copper coin. Transactions in the ledgers
were recorded in two different places. Many of the basic principles of the double-entry method are apparent – personification
of accounts, dual entry, integration, and periodicity. All the ledgers contain only real accounts; nominal accounts and profit-orloss statements are absent. A concern for controlling losses is
evident, while a corresponding lack of emphasis on profit-making reflects the dominant ethic, the Confucian “moral economy.”
The paper features, in order, a literature review, a discussion of
the moral economy concept, a description of the MCA ledgers,
and a summary of the findings.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Sinitic world of East Asia is the oldest, continuous civilization on the planet, but very little is known of its accounting practices or economic history. However, accounting historians have attempted to address this lack of knowledge in
recent years. Auyeung [2002, pp. 3, 5-7, 10-12; Auyeung and Ivory, 2003, pp. 9-12] offers an overview of traditional Chinese and
Japanese accounting practices. There are a number of useful
studies on accounting in China [Huh, 1979; Hsu, 1991; Gardella, 1992; Lin, 1992, 2003; Aiken and Lu, 1993, 1998; Chen, 1998;
Gao and Handley-Schachler, 2003] and several on Japan [Nishikawa, 1956, 1977; McKinnon, 1994; Nisikawa, 1994; Someya,
1996]. There is at least one study on Korea [Yun, 1977]. It can
be argued that most of these efforts suffer from insufficient detailed evidence to explain traditional usages before the adoption
of western methods. An exception is Aiken and Lu [1998]. Many
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studies ignore historical or interpretative problems, though
again, there are welcome exceptions [Gardella, 1992; Aiken and
Lu, 1993, 1998; Chen, 1998; Auyeung, 2002; Auyeung and Ivory,
2003]. All previous studies are primarily concerned with governmental practices or commercial establishments.
Commercial activity in East Asia has a long history, but premodern Korean mercantile records are few. In fact, there are no
known surviving commercial accounts dated earlier than the
mid-19th century. Nevertheless, it is often asserted that Korean merchant houses in Kaesŏng City traded with China and Arabia and developed, as early as the mid-Kory ŏ period (11th-13th
centuries), a double-entry method known as the sagae Songdo ch`ibubŏp (four-sided Kaesŏng ledger method). Information
on the system is available in Korean [Hyŏn, 1916; Hong, 1962;
Kang, 1978; Yun, 1978, 1984; Cho, 2000], Japanese [Zenshō,
1968; Yoshida, 1988,3 1999], and outlined in English [Yun,
1977]. The system is “four-sided” because it recorded the receiver’s name, the giver’s name, the commodity or cash received, and
the commodity or cash disbursed. Fundamentally, the method
required a dual entry for each transaction.
The four-sided method may have been centuries old, but direct evidence for it is more recent so that its “origins” remain
a matter for speculation [Yoshida, 1988, pp. 147-150]. Yoshida
[1988, pp. 137-140; 1999, p. 73] points out that all studies rely
primarily on a few privately obtained account books, a 1916 accounting primer, and early 20th century ledgers (1898-1906)
kept by the Taehan Ch’ ŏn’il Bank in Seoul.4 Yoshida [1999, p.
68] notes that some privately obtained account books held at
the Kobe University Library concern a Kaesŏng merchant dating back to 1854. None of these documents can confirm the alleged mid-Koryŏ origins of the method. The 1916 primer and
the ledgers from 1898-1906 have been analyzed in detail, but the
older books are not well known and offer no direct evidence of a
method in general use predating the opening of Korean ports to
modern trade in 1876.
The 1916 primer deserves further explanation. By the late
19th and early 20th centuries, there was widespread dislocation as Korean society lurched headlong into the international
3
Yoshida [1988, pp. 133-134] offers an extensive review of Japanese scholarship on this issue.
4
The Taehan Ch’ŏn’il Bank was founded in January 1899. It has been known
by many names; e.g., Ch ōsen Sangyō Bank (1911), Han’guk Sang’ŏp Bank
(1950), combined with Han’il Bank (1998), Han’pit Bank (1999), absorbed by
P’yŏnghwa Bank (2001), and Uri (Woori) Bank (2002).
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market economy. Because the double-entry methods of the West
had not yet penetrated Korean commerce and because there
was general disarray in the Korean accounting world, a stand
ard method was sorely needed.5 In 1916, Hyŏn consulted with
two Kaesŏng merchants and authored a primer describing their
four-sided ledger method. Hyŏn’s primer outlines an indigenous, double-entry method in which he defines terms and offers examples. There are modern elements in the primer, such
as the use of Japanese terms [Yoshida, 1988, p. 139], the use of
yen and zeni (Japanese monetary denominations), and the use
of the zero as a place marker. Moreover, the question of Chinese
influence deserves consideration. The presentation of accounts
on the pages of the 19th century Korean commercial ledgers
is similar to the style in the illustrations that accompany this
paper. Because entries are not made in a similar fashion to Chinese entries with a single page divided into top and bottom [Aiken and Lu, 1998, pp. 228, 232], and because the terminology is
completely different, it seems that the Korean methods were not
derived from Chinese accounting. Nevertheless, there are striking similarities to the Chinese Lóngmén bookkeeping system, a
prime topic for future investigation.
Although we have Hyŏn’s exposition of this indigenous practice, the problem remains that there are few available specimens of accounts that predate the 1850s that can confirm the
general use of the method. Zenshō [1968, p. 119] reports that,
in 1921, when he was conducting a study of Korean accounting
for the Japanese colonial authorities, he saw account books in a
library in Kaesŏng City dating from the 1770s that used a foursided ledger method, but he was only able to obtain books from
the Gūanxù period (1875-1908) for his personal collection and
analysis. In addition, a North Korean researcher [Hong, 1962]
has investigated accounts from at least 1798, which are part of
the Kaes ŏng City Museum archives [Hong, 1962, p. 58; Yoshida, 1988, p. 155, note 44]. Hong [1962, pp. 54, 59] also refers
to  accounts from the early 1820s in the Kaesŏng University of
Politics and Economics (Songdo Chŏngch’i Kyŏngje Taehak).
These account books may still be extant in Kaesŏng (presently
in North Korea), but it has not yet been possible to gain access,
much less to verify their existence.
The extant accounts of commercial and banking organiza5
The period from 1876 to 1910 or 1920 in Korea may offer a parallel case
for the Weberian analysis of late Qing Chinese accounting by Auyeung and Ivory
[2003] comparing “formal” and “substantive” rationalities.
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tions from the mid-to-late 19th century are reputed to be based
on a dual-entry system, but Yoshida [1999, p. 72] merely says
that the 1854 debit and credit ledgers in Kobe University Library
are “sister ledgers” (shimai chōbo) and that they alternately record debits and credits for the same period. Yoshida does not
supply sufficient detail to confirm the method used, and we have
not been able to examine these books ourselves. While there are
questions about the principles underlying the system, the current understanding is represented by Hong [1962, pp. 57-58],
Zenshō [1968, p. 119], Kang [1978, p. 89], Yun [1978, p. 99,
1984, p. i], and Yi [2001, p. 3], who argue that the four-sided ledger system is comparable to the Venetian “double-entry” system,
is possibly older, and perhaps even more elegant.
On the other hand, Cho [2000, pp. 300-302] argues that the
extant materials do not justify describing the system as double
entry. He doubts that such a sophisticated system was possible
in East Asia where Arabic numerals were not used and the Chinese script lacked the zero. Yoshida withholds judgment on the
principles at work and objects to Korean claims to the “world’s
oldest double-entry method” when based on evidence no older
than 1854.
Promoters of such claims often link their assertions to developmental economic models arguing for the indigenous appearance of capitalism in Korea [Hong, 1962, pp. 50, 54-57].
Yoshida [1999, p. 74] correctly criticizes the conflation of a supposedly medieval dual-entry method with arguments about the
early appearance of capitalism in Korea. Linking sophisticated accounting systems in East Asia to capitalism, something
that is ill-defined at best for these different historical and social  orders, does no more than echo the host of 19th and 20th
century claims for European exceptionalism in developing capitalism based on double-entry accounting [Weber, 1927, p. 275;
Spengler, 1928, p. 490; Braudel, 1983, p. 573; Gardella, 1992, pp.
317-319].
Nevertheless, the system described in Hyŏn’s 1916 primer
and the practices that appear in surviving ledgers certainly present us with a number of questions about accounting method.
In this paper, we will not discuss the method outlined in Hyŏn’s
primer because there is the possibility that it was influenced by
Japanese systems and does not reflect traditional methods. In
order to confirm the existence of an indigenous Korean system
and to ascertain its principles, it is necessary to identify older
examples from various organizations, both commercial institutions and non-commercial establishments. This paper examines
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a case that clearly predates direct Korean contact with the West
or with the West as mediated by Japan from 1876.
The ledgers of the MCA represent some of the oldest accounting books available. They are the accounting records of a
non-profit, cooperative association. The shared terminology between Hyŏn’s 1916 text, the MCA ledgers, and other similar material also recently made available6 is striking and suggests the
widespread use of a traditional style of accounting. The predominance of the accounts of non-profit organizations corroborates qualitative information on the general attitudes of pre20th century Koreans. Merchant houses were socially inferior
and treated with suspicion. By contrast, cooperative, non-profit
organizations were socially acceptable, commonplace, and free
of government control. Their accounts have been carefully preserved for centuries.7
MORAL ECONOMY
The dynamic between accounting methods and the political and socio-economic environment has been explored by
Loft [1986], Hopwood [1987], Hopwood and Miller [1994], and
others for Britain, and by Aiken and Lu [1993, 1998], Chen
[1998], Bloom and Solotko [2003], and others for China. The
notion that accounting methods are merely an inert technology
is quite defunct. In pre-1876 Korea, the prejudice against commercial activities and the social acceptance of ubiquitous cooperative associations were aspects of a socio-economic ethic
that we refer to as the “moral economy” of pre-modern Korea.
Our purpose in this paper is to analyze an indigenous Korean,
double-entry method, not to offer deterministic cultural explanations for its use. However, we find that the concept of moral economy is useful in explaining significant parts of the content of the accounts presented below and of the method applied.
We cannot yet show how the method shaped organizational and
societal change since our sample is too narrow, but we can show
how the method clearly responded to societal concerns.
6
There are similar data available from the Haenam Yun clan (1846-1882),
also from Chŏlla Province, and from the Yongsan Sŏwŏn (Yongsan Academy,
1700-1705) in Kyŏngsang Province. For the Haenam Yun clan, see Han’guk
Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn‘guwŏn (ed.) [no date], library microfilm no. 35-003212
and no. 35-003213. For the Yongsan Sŏwŏn, see Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa
Yŏn’guwŏn (ed.) [2000, pp. 721-809].
7
Clan account books in China have been mined as rich sources for the history of prices but not yet analyzed for their accounting method. For example, rice
prices from clan records for 1684 to 1802 have been published by Tanaka [1986].
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Many scholars have outlined moral economies in other historical settings [Polyani, 1944; Wolf, 1969; Scott, 1976; North,
1977; Popkin, 1979; Thompson, 1993], but few have examined
the concept’s applicability to China, much less Korea. Certainly,
in Korea (and northeast China), the dominant moral ethic (Confucianism) was an ideological construction that fit an agricultural economy as practiced in a volatile ecological zone plagued
by severe winters and devastating summer flooding. Unlike the
north China plain, Korea is very mountainous and had no comprehensive state-run irrigation works, so a “hydraulic society”
with extensive centralized powers did not arise [Wittfogel, 1957].
The political philosophy of Confucianism, particularly the NeoConfucianism that appeared from the 13th century, was the systematic exposition of a moral economy and was well suited to
Korean environmental constraints. It preached a social contract
of localized mutual interdependence, ultimate government responsibility for subsistence, and interpersonal relations based
on sincerity and clarity with fair and accurate accounting in
transactions. These are a few of the practical reasons why Confucianism excoriated commerce. Gao and Handley-Schachler
[2003, pp. 49-50] point out the overlap between Confucianism
and Buddhism in their distrust of the profit motive. To a Confucian, profit pitted individuals against the collective. To a Buddhist, profit led to the illusion of material desire and the perpetuation of suffering. Of course, such normative principles did not
preclude a concern with cost and profit in production [Ji, 2003];
yet, the pursuit of profit was a stigmatized activity.
Indications of the concerns and practices of a Confucian
moral economy can be glimpsed in the MCA accounts – relief
for economically weaker members, insurance for all, and no
apparent concern with profit. In other words, the 18th century context for the books examined below is one in which local
society was deeply imbued with cooperative principles, nearly
every individual was part of a web of cooperatives, and commerce was a socially despised activity. However, the disparagement of commercial activities did not mean the absence of ra
tional, accurate accounting. Non-commercial, non-governmental
institutions were commonplace, and many of these were organizationally complex and concerned with maintaining, expanding,
and bequeathing corporate assets.
To determine what accounting system was in general use
in Korea or even what passed for rationality in connection with
economic matters, it makes little sense to focus on fringe activities practiced by commercial organizations that operated
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from socially inferior positions. Nonetheless, Western scholarship on Sinitic civilization (China, Korea, and Japan) has long
been dominated by teleologies that assume social and historical change arises from commercial activities and is inherently
progressive. Both Marxists and Weberians share this bias. While
Marxists refer to the “sprouts of capitalism” in a feudal society
[Ji, 2003. p. 73], Weberians seek out “cultural impediments to
overseas innovations” [Aiken and Lu, 1998, p. 221].
The Western, economic-determinist approach to accounting has resulted in by-passing the larger body of accounting
practices common to non-profit cooperative societies. The very
strengths of the traditional Confucian societies have long been
portrayed as impediments. For example, Auyeung [2002, p. 14]
lists the Chinese obstructions to the rapid adoption of Western accounting techniques as “centralized political power, a society resistant to change, an anti-merchant mentality and narrow-based learning.” “Rational” is a term reserved for Protestant
societies [Auyeung and Ivory, 2003, p. 19]. The assumption is,
all choices are equal; the mystery is, why did Confucian socie
ties fail to make the rational choice and emulate Europe? The
irony is, Japan and even Europe in the 19th century were in the
throes of transforming feudal chaos into functioning structures
that would offer stability and the power to mobilize resources
and labor. Developments such as centralized governments, socie
ties able to manage change and produce stability, standardized
education, and sufficient state power to control and tax merchants had already taken place in China and Korea. By casting
Sinitic tradition in a negative light for not having moved a socially despised fringe ethic to center stage, the West has been
blinded to the actual rationality at work directed to solving immediate needs. Here we reference “moral economy” to introduce
the dominant ethic as a rational response to circumstances and
to strip away the negative images favored by Western academics
for more than a century. In our concluding remarks, we will return to the main components of this moral economy to interpret
the activities revealed in the MCA books and to explain why the
profit motive was missing.
A WORKING DEFINITION OF
DOUBLE-ENTRY ACCOUNTING
One task of this paper is to determine whether the books
of the MCA were kept in a double-entry fashion or something
closely approximating it. For this, we will need to have a workPublished by eGrove, 2006
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ing definition of double-entry accounting as a guide. The following notes do not presume to offer an exhaustive definition, but
do identify a few principles from more well-known historical
studies on the development of European accounting practices.
De Roover [1956, p. 114] specified certain minimum requirements for an accounting system to qualify as double entry:
. . . there is no double-entry bookkeeping without the observance of certain strict rules. A necessary prerequisite
is that all transactions be recorded twice, once on the
debit and once on the credit side. If this requirement
is not fulfilled, there is, by definition, no double entry.
The principle also involves the existence of an integrated system of accounts, both real and nominal, so that
the books will balance in the end, record changes in the
owner’s equity and permit the determination of profit or
loss.
In addition to a ledger that records entries twice, there must be
ledgers for real and nominal accounts, a demonstration of balance, and the possibility of determining profit or loss. In striking
a balance, there should be no surplus or loss since this would indicate a simple deduction of liabilities from assets [de Roover,
1956, p. 128]. Other evidence is also desirable – day books and
journals that post entries to a ledger, some tracing of accounts
for expenses (or transaction costs), a capital account, and a balance sheet [de Roover, 1956, pp. 125, 132, 141].
To be called double-entry bookkeeping, Yamey prefers to
see a consistent entry for each transaction in two different places, a capital account, and a profit-or-loss account [Littleton
and Yamey, 1956, pp. 6-8; Yamey, 1975, p. 722]. More recently, Yamey seems willing to reduce his requirement to dual entry
and now agrees with Lane, who wrote, “as a practical matter, in
research, [the student] may regard any accounts with duality of
entry as being an elementary form of double-entry” [Lane, 1977,
p. 187; Yamey, 1992, p. 706]. Recording transactions in two different places allows balancing, and if the balances of various
sub-accounts are fed into a general ledger, a capital account and
a profit-or-loss account can be easily drawn up. The use of accounting periods and a single monetary unit might be added to
these requirements [Nobes, 1994. p. 246].
We will demonstrate that the accounts for the MCA recorded every entry that crossed ledgers in two different places (although not every transaction within ledgers). There was in evidence an integrated system of accounts (although all accounts
were real accounts), accounting for expenses (transaction and
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wastage costs), defined accounting periods (the agricultural
cycle), and balanced books. We will discuss personification (independent accounts trading back and forth and independently recording their trades) as the principle underlying and unifying the MCA accounts. The absence of nominal accounts and
profit-or-loss statements will be explained by invoking the societal ethics of the moral economy, the context in which these accounts were produced. Before examining the accounts, we will
briefly introduce the provenance of our sources.
VILLAGE AND CLAN ASSOCIATIONS
While commercial establishments were rare, mutual assist
ance associations (kye) were common in late Chos ŏn Korea
(1598-1910). Individual investors pooled resources and then appointed stewards (yusa) to carry out their aims. The associations
usually had three objectives. The first was to act in the public interest, to provide funds for public works, education, and the relief of the poor. The second aim was insurance and mutual aid,
providing for marriage costs (honin-kye), funeral costs (sangkye), and sacrificial rites (chesa-kye). The third aim was investment financing, providing for tree planting (song-kye), irrigation
(po-kye), and for the lease of oxen and ploughs (nong’u-kye) [Shikata, 1976, p. 71].8 The MCA engaged in all these activities and
more.
BOOKKEEPING PRACTICES OF THE MUN CLAN
The account books or yonghagi are among the most important archives of the MCA. Six account books covering the period from 1741 to 1927 relating to the main clan association and
four account books from 1819 to 1881 concerning a branch clan
association are available.9 The form of Vol. 1 (1741-1765) differs
from all the later volumes. It began as a simple record, but by
the 1760s, it had assumed a complex form that became the pattern for all later volumes. Vols. 2-6 contain elaborate accounts
that record receipts and expenses in a basic dual-entry form.

8
For a description of an 18th century Chinese financial cooperative scheme,
see Reiss et al. [1996].
9
Main Clan: Vol. 1 (1741-1765); Vol. 2 (1779-1805); Vol. 3 (1806-1816); Vol. 4
(1843-1849); Vol. 5 (1850-1871); Vol. 6 (1884-1928); Collateral Clan: Vol. 1 (18191826); Vol. 2 (1827-1841); Vol. 3 (1845-1863); and Vol. 4 (1864-1881). All of these
are photolithographically reproduced in Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guwŏn
(ed.), 1995.
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The increasing sophistication of recording after Vol. 1 was likely
caused by the growth in the financial scale of the MCA.
Rural Korea in the 18th century was not highly monetized;
thus, money was a complex matter. The first use of copper coins
(from 1706) appears in a village association record of major local events (1667-1984) [Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guwŏn
(ed.), 1955, pp. 217-227]. This record appeared 28 years after the
central government had begun in earnest to mint metallic coins
(1678). These coins were known as sangp’yŏng t’ongbo (“evernormal circulating treasure”). Mention of these coins indicates
that metallic currency was quickly adopted in the countryside
of southwest Korea in a context where pre-industrial agrarian
change was slow. From studies of northern China, Huang [1985,
p. 47] suggests that it took at least three generations before “secular” change (e.g., commercialization and handicrafts development) was apparent, but in southwest Korea, it seems to have
taken about a generation for coinage to facilitate exchange practices.
Despite the spread of coinage, accounts were never expressed in a single currency. In fact, receipts and expenses
were denominated in three currencies – unhulled rice, minted copper-bronze coins, and milled rice. The rice payments
can be considered payments in kind, but they were so universal and standardized that they actually served as money. Unhulled and milled rice functioned as “rice money,” consumable
and storable specie with a natural loss value. Copper cash was
more  stable. Introduced widely from 1678, its value generally remained steady until 1866, at which time the government issued a multi-denominational coin with a face value one hundred
times the old coin. Chinese money was also imported to Korea
at the end of the 19th century when, as per Gresham’s law, the
older, higher-value coins were withdrawn from circulation. Inflation and chaos resulted and lasted into the 1890s when foreign currencies (Mexican and Japanese) began to circulate with
new Korean government issues. Financial and economic stability did not begin to re-appear until 1904 when Japanese policies
imposed order [Pak, 1969, pp. 30-91, 116-145; Palais, 1996, pp.
855-876, 924-1001]. Strangely, the MCA accounts during the late
19th and  early 20th centuries do not show the introduction of
the Japanese yen until early 1928 (at the very end of Vol. 6). Until then, the accounts continue to use the old character for copper cash or yang. The consistency in the unit of currency probably indicates a desire to maintain accounting consistency. Since
Japanese currency was imposed shortly after the annexation of
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Korea in 1910, it evidently took about a generation to adopt the
new coinage.
The following subsections discuss five separate bookkeeping
concepts and methods related to the clan accounts. These topics will be illustrated with exhibits and tables drawn from the
source materials.
Developments in the Mechanics of Bookkeeping: Writing in premodern Korea was in the East Asian vertical style, top to bottom
and right to left. Not surprisingly, the account books of the MCA
were written in this fashion. Account books in double-entry format must have a method to distinguish verbally and visually between debits and credits. Littleton [1956, pp. 232-233] discusses
the development of journal nomenclature and form in Europe.
European accountants developed technical vocabulary and eventually a visual vocabulary of indentation at least by the middle of
the 19th century.10 By the 18th century, the accountants for the
MCA were deploying indentation, special terms, and word order
as their technical apparatus.
At first, two different types of written characters, ordinary and large, were employed to facilitate classification, together with an indentation technique. The large character had
two usages, marking years and accounts. In the 1741 accounts,
large characters marked the year, rental income, and “remaining” cash or rice on hand (see Exhibit 1). By 1744, the use of
large characters had disappeared, and the reporting period had
changed from an annual report in the twelfth month to biannual
reports in spring and autumn.
The most important distinction was between debits and
credits, which came to be indicated by special terms, yu (留)
and then nae (內). In the 1741 account (Exhibit 1, indicated by
C), we can see yu, which means “remaining [assets].” In Exhibit 1, upper and lower sheets, yu indicates old grain kept in storage. In the following year, yu was disappearing and nae was beginning to appear. Within the decade, nae became the standard
term with the clear meaning of “total income or assets from
10
Littleton [1956, p. 233] describes the process as follows: “Practice has
passed from one definite stage to another: 1. a time of no journal entries, when
the full statement of the transaction was probably entered directly in the two
ledger accounts concerned; 2. a period (say 1430 to 1550) with a highly technical
form of journal entry preparatory to the record in the ledger; 3. a long interval in
which the journal entry expressed more or less fully a complete thought; and 4.
the modern period – now quite technical in form again – when the focus is the
accurate sorting of accounting units.”
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which expenditures” would be deducted. Exhibit 2 shows that
nae appears in the 1793 accounts at the end of the second column from the far right in the top of the illustration and again
at the end of the third column from the far left (indicated with
G). Debits were recorded to the right of nae and credits to the
left. This use of the term nae to divide expenditures from assets
was not unusual in East Asia. It was used extensively in Japanese (Tsushima) trade ledgers from the Tokugawa period. Hyŏn’s
work [1916, p. 25], explaining the methods of the Kaesŏng merchants, depicts nae playing the same role.
From as early as the 1740s, the MCA accounts used word
order (whether words or numbers came first) to indicate the difference between debits and credits. In Exhibit 2, words begin
all debit entries and numbers begin all credit entries. This word
order was consistently applied from the mid-1750s. Words followed by numbers indicated a positive entry (income) and numbers followed by words signalled a negative entry (payment).
For spring accounts, the debit entries all begin with “balance
brought forward (from the previous year)” (chŏnsu or chŏn as illustrated in Exhibit 2, indicated by F, first appearance 1745), but
autumn debit entries often begin with “remaining” (yu), as in
“remaining from the previous accounting period.”
Also, from the mid-1750s, entries for expenditures carried
a final character, ha. For example, in Exhibit 2 (indicated by H),
after the columns that end in nae, all expenditure entries end in
ha, except final entries that express “natural loss” (ch`uk, indicated by E). From 1755, subtotals were marked off at the end of
sections by the term isang (Exhibit 2, indicated by J), but the use
is inconsistent until the records resume from 1779, following a
gap of 14 years.11
Although the terms nae and ha appear early to distinguish
debits from credits, we do not find extensive indentation until
much later. The technique of indentation was developed by the
19th century in English accounting and indicated a separation
between debits and credits [Littleton, 1956, p. 232]. Littleton
points out that the custom was to indent credits below debits. In
Exhibit 1, we can see some experimentation with  indentation,
11
Other technical terms that do not appear here should be born in mind. For
example, pong or sang meant receipt, kŭp or ha (the ha that is mentioned above)
meant expenditure, ip or nae2 meant incoming. This nae2 is a different character
from the nae discussed above and is in the glossary as nae2. Finally, ch’ul or kŏ
meant outgoing. These terms are explained in Hyŏn’s primer [1916, pp. 18-26].
They all seem to have had native Korean pronunciations (idu), but we have given them their common Sinitic pronunciation.
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EXHIBIT 1
Mun Clan Ledger (Yonghagi, two folio sheets), 1741
B

A

D

C
C

B

C

E

C

Source: Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Y ŏn’guw ŏn (eds.) (1995), Komunsŏ
chipsŏng vol. 21 (Collection of documents, vol. 21) (Sŏngnam: Han’guk chŏngsin
munhwa yŏn’guw ŏn), pp. 576-577.
NB: A: year (1741); B: income (畓); C: remaining (留); D: ledger ([別有司]秩);
E: natural loss (縮).
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EXHIBIT 2
Mun Head Clan Ledger (Yonghagi, two folio sheets)
Unhulled rice (春租秩), Milled Rice (米秩), and the
Beginning of Copper Cash (錢秩), Spring 1793
I

F

Milled rice

Unhulled

rice

F

D

G

H

H

E

G

H

Copper

D

Milled rice

J

E

Source: Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Y ŏn’guw ŏn (eds.) (1995), Komunsŏ
chipsŏng vol. 21 (Collection of documents, vol. 21) (Sŏngnam: Han’guk chŏngsin
munhwa yŏn’guw ŏn), p. 638.
NB: D: ledger (秩); E: natural loss (縮); F: balance brought forward (傳受);
G: from this (total income) (內); H: expenditure (下); I: milled rice (米); J: subtotal (已上).

but consistency does not appear until 1785. Exhibit 2 for the
1793 accounts shows an indentation style that remained consistent for the next century or more with debit-entry columns
beginning higher on the page than credit-entry columns. In
short, by the 1780s, the above techniques produced pages that
textually and visually showed the relationships between entries.
Personal Accounts and a Division of Administration: Yamey offers four possibilities for the origins of double-entry bookkeeping (DEB). Perhaps it was the work of a single gifted inventor
or a triumph of the mercantile ingenuity of the Renaissance.
A third possibility is that DEB was an accidental technical dehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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velopment from simpler forms that evolved through a process
of accretion and adaptation. The fourth possibility is that DEB
was a response to “new or growing business needs not satisfied by earlier methods of record-keeping” [Littleton and Yamey,
1956, p. 2]. The differences between the 1741 and the 1793 accounts kept by the head clan (taejong-kye) of the Mun Clan indicate that, in this case, techniques grew by a gradual process of
accretion and adaptation that employed customary techniques
already in use. In the earliest records from 1741, items were already being grouped under appropriate headings, indicating a
gestation of accounting methods. By the 1760s, accounts had
been separated into their own ledgers.
The books kept between 1819 and 1883 by a branch Mun
Clan (sojong-kye) show no evolution and display the same sophisticated form perfected by 1793 in the head clan accounts.
However, the branch clan accounts display different emphases
from those of the head clan. The head and branch clan books
show a division of administration. In particular, the branch
clan’s books contain personal accounts. Personal accounts occasionally appear in the head clan accounts in connection with
memorial rites (filial piety), bad debts, and emergencies, but
they exist routinely throughout the branch clan records for funerals and expenditures for seed and tillage. The fact that individual or household names were attached to transactions as
well as insurance payments is a significant refinement over the
head clan accounts. Table 1 contains an extract from the branch
clan accounts and presents the unhulled rice ledger for 1819.
Lines 10-19, 22-24, and 33 and 36 are all personal accounts with
names indicated in bold.
TABLE 1
Original Text and Translation for
Unhulled Rice ch’unjo (春租)
Spring Period (Branch Clan), 1819
Line

Original text

Translation

己卯春

1819 spring
carried down [from previous fiscal
year]
Song-kye [another association] rite
cost
Chang`am [village association] rite
cost
Warehouse
Remuneration
keeper
Annual production
a)
cost
Seed according to
precedent

1
2

傳受租七十三石十八斗八升三合

3

一石十五斗松溪祭債下

4

一石十斗場巖祭債下

5
6
7

二石私乃
五斗庫基所耕
庫直
五斗例給種子
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8
9
10

十一斗捧上廳盖草
七斗庫舍盖草
五斗例給種子
再哲

11

一石私乃

12

五斗例給種子

13

十四斗四升光大畓七斗落半所
耕
次先

14

大元

六斗大草畓二斗落半耕
冷泉宅

Thatch Posang house
Thatch warehouse
Seed according to precedent
Chae Ch’ŏl
Remuneration
seed according to
Tae Wŏn
precedent

69
11
7
5
20
5

Kwangdae paddy 7 turak half
annual production cost
Ch’a Sŏn

14

Taech’o paddy 2 turak half annual
production cost
Naeng Ch’ŏn House

6

15

六斗二升甬洞畓三斗落半所
萬貴

Yongdong paddy 3 turak half annual
production cost
Mangwi

6.2

16

四斗堂洞畓三斗落半所耕
興得

Tangdong paddy 3 turak half annual
production cost
Hŭng Dŏk

4

17

四斗甬洞畓三斗落半所耕
肖伊

18
19
20
21

四斗東亭畓四斗落種子
小八仙
五斗所土畓四斗落種子推移
秋捧次
望湖宅

27
28
29

5

十三斗八合石朴畓四斗落半所
國山宅

Sŏkbak paddy 4 turak half annual
production cost
Kuk San House

13.08

五斗孝悌畓堰水役粮

Food costs for labour when
irrigating Hyoje paddy
Hwa Pang House

5

億伊

花方宅

24

26

4

10

十斗山直所耕

22

25

4

Food costs for labour when building
a dam for flood prevention
Grave keeper’s annual production
cost
Kwangdae paddy half annual
production cost
Ōk Yi

二斗同防川役粮

五斗光大畓半所耕

23

Yongdong paddy 3 turak half annual
production cost
So Yi
Tongjung paddy 4 turak seed
So P’al Sŏn
Sot’o paddy 4 turak seed loan to be
repaid within autumn harvest time
Mangho House

2

5

二石作錢三兩
七石作米五十二斗五升白七斗
五升例

Loan to warehouse manager to be
repaid within autumn harvest time
Traded 2 sŏk for [cash] 3 yang
Milled 7 sŏk [unhulled rice into] 52
tu 5 sŭng hulled rice at a rate [of
1 sŏk unhulled rice yields hulled]
white rice 7 tu 5 sŭng

一石書徒求請

Students’ request

七斗一升三合作錢五錢荒

Traded 7 tu 1 sŭng 3 hop for cash 5
chŏn [grain in a year of dearth]

7.13

五石作米四十斗八斗例

Milled 5 sŏk 40 tu [unhulled
rice] into 40 tu at a rate [of 1 sŏk
unhulled rice yields hulled rice] 8 tu

100

一石十斗庫使推移秋捧次

30

10
40
140
20

31

一斗省墓粮下

Foodstuffs to visit ancestral graves

1

32

十石十一斗八升錢十六兩九錢
四分一兩六錢例

Traded 10 sŏk 11 tu 8 sung for cash
16 yang 9 chŏn 4 pun at a rate [of 1
sŏk =] 1 yang 6 chŏn

211.8
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十斗文必勳氏嚴親初喪賻

Donation for Mun P’ilhun’s
parents’ funeral expenses

十斗永保亭求請
三石門契別廳求請

Request for Yongbo pavilion
Request for clan association’s
auxiliary building

十斗文壽澤氏慈夫人初喪賻下

Donation for Mun Sut’aek’s
compassionate wife’s funeral
expenses

36
37

38
39

十三斗二升五合作米三斗三升

Milled 13 tu 2 sŭng 5 hop [unhulled
rice into hulled rice] 3 tu 3 sŭng

三石作米二十斗一升六斗七
升例

Milled 3 sŏk [unhulled rice into] 20
tu 1 sŭng hulled rice at rate [of 1
sŏk unhulled rice yields hulled rice]
6 tu 7 sŭng
Deducted for auxiliary building

二十一石別廳除

43

60
10
13.25

60
420
60

一石六斗九升七合縮

1 sŏk 6 tu 9 sŭng 7 hop natural loss

26.97

已上用七十三石一斗八升三合

Above expenditures total 73 sŏk 1
tu 8 sŭng 3 hop

十七斗留

17 tu remainder

40

42

10

Milled [grain in a year of dearth] 3
sŏk [unhulled rice into] 21 tu hulled
rice at rate [of 1 sŏk unhulled rice
yields hulled rice] 7 tu

荒 三石作米二十一斗 七斗例

41

10

1461.83
17

Source: Han’guk Ch ŏngsin Munhwa Y ŏn’guw ŏn (eds.) (1995), Komuns ŏ
chipsŏng vol. 22 (Collection of documents, vol. 22) S ŏngnam: Han’guk chŏngsin
munhwa yŏn’guw ŏn), pp. 5-6.
a)
Sogyŏng is translated here as “annual production cost.” The meaning of
the term sogyŏng is not yet clear. Pak [1999, pp. 54, 313-314] argues that this
term refers to taxation, although the usual tax indicators referred to land area
(kyŏl, turak, etc). The Association was not liable for taxation; the tenant was, so
we would not expect to see notations for taxation in the Association’s accounts.
Based on its appearance continually throughout the accounts for the Mun clan
as a credit, the term seems to refer to expenditures for labor (oxen and plowing
to prepare the land and lay seed), but may have included a tax subsidy. In the
1741 accounts and in lines 6 and 7 above, we can see sogyŏng and seed costs as
separate items, listed side-by-side, so sogyŏng was not a seeding cost. This sort
of item was quite common in initial payments from the unhulled rice ledger. In
lines 13-17 and 22-23, we see pan sogyŏng, meaning a payment of half of the usual cost of sogyŏng. Presumably, the tenant was responsible for the remaining
half.

These personal accounts link communal and private
c oncerns. The associations kept such elaborate records because
they dealt with joint common property, but the personal accounts demonstrate that individual liability was the norm. Individual names indicate that the village community was not a
faceless collective, a commune; rather, its economic stability relied on individual investors and individual responsibility. Goody
[1996, p. 7] links individualism and the necessity for accurate
accounting.
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Individual household responsibility was at the base of production, a fact that becomes apparent when comparing the
structure of payments by the head clan (Table 2) with those of
the branch clan (Table 3).
Head clan expenditures focus on obtaining copper coins (to
purchase specialized items), milling unhulled rice, paying out
dividends, and extending funds for ancestral rites, all expenditures that impacted the entire community. Their prominence
indicates that the head clan’s overarching concern was for the
greater community. Branch clan expenditures were more evenly
spread over a variety of local, immediate concerns. There were
significant productive payments (seeding and tillage costs within personal accounts), but the largest group of expenditures was
for unproductive activities, such as students, education, charity,
and public buildings.
The differences between the structure of the head clan expenditures and those for the branch clan indicate that the
branch clan formed the basic unit of production and supplied
most social welfare. The head clan’s function was to manage
the external relations that affected all members of the MCA.
There was clearly a tiered aspect to the management of the village economy highlighted by the fact that personal accounts
were mostly to be found in the branch clan’s records. The size of
the unproductive payments also indicates that surpluses existed
which allowed the majority of village members to escape subsist
ence crises during the 18th and early 19th centuries.
Transaction Costs and Natural Loss: The accounts of the MCA do
not contain explicit transaction costs. What we see is the term
ch`uk (Exhibits 1 and 2, indicated by E), translated as “natural
loss.” We hypothecate that this term indicated the natural loss
of grains to vermin and rot (wastage), as well as the transaction
costs involved in milling unhulled rice into white rice. Ch`uk
was always present in unhulled rice accounts and often present in milled rice accounts, but was not seen in other accounts.
Moreover, ch`uk entries were not cross-listed and appeared only
as a reduction in stocks. While no cross-listing might support an
argument against the designation “double entry,” the presence of
these careful entries indicates great concern for the comprehensive and consistent calculation of balance. For example, Exhibit
1 (E: natural loss) records 4 sŭng as a “natural loss.” The difference between income and outgo was 4 sŭng, but there is no explanation for the deficit, except the term ch`uk, which basically means “shrink” or “shortfall.” Because no rice was milled, we
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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0 tu

841 tu
99.9 per
cent

210 tu
25 per
cent

Dividends Milled
to membership

106 tu
12.6 per
4 per cent
cent

35 tu

Land
accounts
(seeding,
tillage)
319.2 tu
38 per
cent

Traded
for
copper
coins
68 tu
8.1 per
cent
0 per cent

0 tu

Ancestral Carry over
rites and autumn
grave
upkeep

6.2 per cent

52 tu

4.7 per cent

39.8 tu

Students,
Natural loss
education,
charity, public
bldgs.

11 tu
1.3 per
cent

Labour for
irrigation
repairs

176.68 tu

1478.83 tu

0 tu

Dividends
to
membership

0 per cent 0 per cent

0 tu

Land
accounts
(seeding,
tillage)

17.00 tu
1.15 per
cent

Ancestral Carry over
rites and autumn
grave
upkeep

373.25 tu 258.93 tu 96.00 tu

Traded
for
copper
coins

25.24 per 17.51 per 6.49 per
cent
cent
cent

Milled

26.97 tu
35.84 per cent 1.82 per cent

530 tu

Students,
Natural loss
education,
charity, public
bldgs.

0 per cent

0 tu

Labour for
irrigation
repairs

Source: Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guw ŏn (eds.) (1995), Komunsŏ chipsŏng Vol. 22 (Collection of documents, Vol. 22) (Sŏngnam:
Han’guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’guw ŏn), pp. 5-11.

11.95 per
100 per cent
cent

Personal
accounts
(seeding,
tillage)

Balance
brought
down from
1818

The Structure of Branch Clan Expenditures of Unhulled Rice (Spring 1819)

72

TABLE 3

Source: Han’guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guw ŏn (eds.) (1995), Komunsŏ chipsŏng Vol. 21 (Collection of documents, Vol. 21) (Sŏngnam:
Han’guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’guw ŏn), p. 638.

0 per cent

Personal
accounts
(seeding,
tillage)

Balance
brought
down from
1792

The Structure of Head Clan Expenditures of Unhulled Rice (Spring 1793)
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believe that this “shortfall” was a natural loss due to water and
rats. From 1765, ch`uk became a regular feature in the accounts.
In the unhulled rice ledger for spring 1793 (Exhibit 2), both
“natural loss” (E) and the milling cost of unhulled rice appear
(I). Most likely, this natural loss consisted of both real loss and
transaction costs. Transactions with rice and the cost of milling almost always went in tandem. Traditionally in rural village
markets, there was a toejaeng-i, who measured and milled grain
for a commission [Kim, 1977, pp. 299-300]. In the milled rice
accounts, there is another natural loss, probably due to rats and
water. This loss would not have reflected any further transaction
costs after milling, so these costs are most likely due to wastage.
With our small sample, we can only catch a glimpse of what
might have been the relative size of natural losses and transaction costs. Table 4 presents examples extracted from the accounts for 1741 and 1793-1795.
Natural loss from vermin and rot probably ranged from 0.4
to 0.9%, while transaction costs may be estimated at 3.7 to 4.5%.
The high cost for spring 1795 (4.9%) may be attributed to the
poor crop of the previous autumn.
An awareness of transaction costs indicates an appreciation
for total cost accuracy. Even more minute transaction costs appear as the cost of the paper to record a land sale in the copper
cash ledger for 1793 (not shown). Implicit transaction costs appear elsewhere in the form of travel expenses to conduct transactions in distant places or to visit government offices.
TABLE 4
Natural Loss and Transaction Ratios
Ledger
1741
1793 spring
Unhulled
1793 spring
Milled
1794 spring
Unhulled
1795 spring
Unhulled

ch`uk (縮) ratio
0.9 per cent
4.7 per cent
0.4 per cent
4.1 per cent
3.2 per cent
4.9 per centa)

1795 spring
Milled

0.4 per cent

Natural loss / Transaction
Natural loss
Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 4.3 per cent?)
Natural loss
Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 3.7 per cent?)
Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 2.8 per cent?)
Natural loss + Transaction
(pure Transaction: 4.5 per cent?)
Natural loss

Includes 9 tu as “lost”.
Source: same as Tables 1 and 2.

a)
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Transaction costs in Chos ŏn Korea were widely recognized.
Because rice was an important commodity, even functioning as
money, the Chos ŏn state had to be able to detect deviations from
rules and customs in order to regulate compliance. Many transaction costs involved in creating and maintaining institutions to
regulate rice transactions defy our explanation, but it should be
noted that the central government was greatly concerned with
eliminating non-standard and excessive exactions on the peasantry. To control this abuse, King Sukjong in 1715 established a
standard shape that was not the ordinary simple box but a trapezoid. An ordinary, wide-mouth box allowed the abuse of “heaping measures,” whereas a trapezoid, with its narrow mouth,
wider bottom, and taller body, helped ensure every measure’s exactness and limited “heaping measures” that could be raked off
to the official’s private benefit.12
Personification or a Simple Division of Accounts?:
The attribution of a living, independent personality to
accounts must have had its roots in the very earliest
forms of bookkeeping [Jackson, 1956, p. 295].
According to Jackson, the teaching of accounting in England from the 17th to the late 19th century developed from the
rote application of procedural rules to a rational application of
judgment based on the concept of personified accounts. Doubleentry accounting necessitates the separate establishment of independent accounts (e.g., capital, goods, bills receivable, bills
payable, cash, etc.) that swap entries back and forth depending on how one wishes to classify the entry. When a transaction
occurs between accounts, it is recorded in both account books
as either received (to be in debt to another account or debit) or
paid out (to be owed by another account or to be in credit). In
other words, by personifying each set of accounts in their separate ledgers, complex accounts could be easily handled and errors detected by comparing the entries and totals in the various ledgers. When all amounts and ledgers are reconciled, the
books are balanced. If not, then the accountant or auditor has
to search for the error. After surveying pedagogical texts from
the early 17th to the late 19th century, Jackson [1956, p. 296]
points out that “the practice of explaining the entries to be made
in the ledger by means of personifying the accounts is found in
12
King Sukjong issued an order in 1715 to the Board of Taxation that trapezoid measures should be distributed nationally. See Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe
(ed.), 1955-1963, Sukjong sillok pogwŏl chŏngo 56:1a [1715/02/08 ( ŭlhae)].

Published by eGrove, 2006

83

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
Jun and Lewis: Accounting Techniques in Korea

75

the very earliest British texts and must be closely linked with the
very origin of the system of bookkeeping.”
The MCA account books (yonghagi) may have been an early example of personification. The first volume of the yonghagi
runs from 1741 to 1765, and by the spring of 1765, the previous
autumn’s unhulled rice remainder was carried down to begin a
new integrated account structure with separate ledgers marked
off by the term chil (Exhibit 2, indicated by D). Up to the 1760s,
however, the use of chil to mark categories was irregular. For example, the ledger for 1741 combined unhulled rice and copper
cash accounts, but the copper cash accounts were grouped under a heading (pyŏl yusa chil) that meant “[items] specially managed by the bursar” (Exhibit 1, indicated by D). Pyŏl means special; yusa means the bursar for the clan association, a title that
is still used today; and chil means order, system, or regularity
if read as a Chinese character. When read in a Korean linguistic context, chil was a suffix that indicated something had taken
on human characteristics and would act out a certain role. Chil
became the standard suffix that marked out an entire and
independent ledger, which had to be reconciled with all other ledgers to achieve a balance. In 1741, the separation had not
yet occurred. As time passed, specific commodities, particularly
milled rice, yeast cakes, and barley, as well as copper cash, were
given their own ledgers with debit and credit transactions as if
they were living persons.13 Since these items came to be seen as
agents themselves, references to the bursar (yusa) disappeared,
leaving only the suffix chil. The ledgers, indicated by chil, became stewards, acting on behalf of the owner, and traded assets
among themselves and outsiders.
In the spring accounts for 1756, we see the first appearance
of the technical term chil to mark off the part of the accounts
devoted to copper cash (ch ŏn-chil). In 1762, chil is first used to
mark off the accounts devoted to milled rice (mi-chil), and it is
from this time that a stable personification system that continued until the late 19th or early 20th centuries was in evidence.
By the 1793 ledgers, such transactions were extracted from day
books and journals and put into their own ledgers, with chil attached as a suffix to identify milled rice, copper cash, barley, and
yeast cakes.
13
Chil and its use to personify accounts was also described in this way by
Hyŏn [1916, pp. 6, 20] when he reported on the methods reputedly handed down
from the 13th century and still in use by Kaesŏng merchants in the early 20th
century.
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The special role of the unhulled rice ledger requires clarification because in Exhibit 2 from the MCA records for 1793 this
ledger does not bear the suffix chil, while in other contemporary books it does. Ordinarily the unhulled rice ledger was like
any other ledger, but it had a particular status because it contained the main income producing accounts. Unhulled rice was
the money that grew from the ground and bought copper cash,
yeast cakes, and even barley. Unhulled rice likewise bought or
was processed into milled rice to obtain yet a different commodity, an edible commodity, so it is not surprising that the MCA accorded it a special ledger.
In the 1793 example, we can see the full development of independent, personified accounts.14 By 1793, chil had been elevated to act as the title suffix for all ledgers, except unhulled rice.
The sequence of ledgers was standardized by the 1760s. In the
spring, the ledger sequence was unhulled rice (cho), milled rice
(mi-chil), and copper cash (ch ŏn-chil). In the autumn, the order
was unhulled rice, milled rice, copper cash, barley (mongmaekchil), and yeast cakes (kokja-chil).
The autumn accounts were closed for the year as indicated
by the signatures of the bursar and the auditor attesting to the
accuracy of the ledger. The auditor was always someone from
outside the MCA, indeed from outside the village, invited to provide objectivity. Independent auditing insured accuracy and
transparency; trust was the result.
The foregoing discussion begs the question of whether the
ledgers reflected personification or simply a division of accounts.
What survives today are separate, independent ledgers, not day
books or journals. Transaction entries usually were undated but
were not randomly entered. Similar entries were grouped together, indicating that there must have been day books or journals. More importantly, the extant ledgers form a framework
of bilateral transactions. Although transactions across ledgers
were subject to exchange rates or transaction costs, transactions
did occur. These transactions were always recorded twice, once
in the issuing ledger (negative) and once in the receiving ledger (positive). Because the various ledgers traded among themselves, it may be concluded that they acted as personified agents
and transcended a mere division of accounts.
Nominal Accounts: The MCA ledgers do not include a profit14
The accounts for 1793 are used because the document is free of damage
and clear.
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or-loss ledger (iik-chil). We can conjecture that the MCA knew
of such a practice but seemed to have had no need to calculate
profit. Hy ŏn’s 1916 primer, based on the traditional practices
explained to him by two Kaesŏng merchants, lists four ledgers
necessary to reach a final balance and to determine profit or loss
– liabilities (kŭpch’a-chil), assets (pongch’a-chil), profit (iik-chil),
and loss (sobi-chil). The 1916 text clearly outlines a double-entry
style with the final calculation of profit or loss in a nominal ledger. The MCA ledgers also contained expenditures, receipts, and
losses (transaction costs and natural loss), but no profit ledger. The reasons were probably multiple, but fundamentally derived from the difference between mercantile and agricultural
needs. The clan association, insensitive to profit, was sensitive to
loss. The MCA was interested in expanding its land holdings, repairing its buildings, entertaining its guests, and providing for
its membership. Copper cash was but one of three commodities that could obtain or satisfy these needs. Like modern, nonprofit, cooperative societies, the only concerns of the association
were to meet the needs of the membership and to prevent losses.
The MCA had no need of a purely nominal, profit ledger; all the
MCA ledgers were real accounts with no separate nominal accounts.
The Bookkeeping System: Linked Single-Entry in a Double-Entry
Framework: Until now, aspects of the bookkeeping in the clan
accounts exhibited certain characteristics that approximated
double-entry accounting – certain mechanical innovations (vocabulary and appearance) that separated debit and  credit entries, the presence of personal accounts, the recognition of
transaction costs and natural loss, and the personification of accounts. Ultimately, however, all of these features are merely aspects of form. It is now necessary to explain the accounting periods used and the overall integration of the accounts.
From 1741 to 1744, the MCA’s accounting period was one
full year. From 1744, the accounts broke the year (lunar twelfth
month to lunar twelfth month) in half. The first half (“spring”)
opened the fiscal year and extended to the harvest, roughly between the sixth to eighth months. The second half (“autumn”)
stretched from the harvest to the closing of the fiscal year in the
spring, thus creating two accounting periods. The development
of two accounts periods in a single year necessitated the innovation of a special term to indicate “balance brought forward.” Our
example (Exhibit 2) of accounts for the spring of the year 1793
starts with the term ch ŏnsu (Exhibit 2, indicated by F), which
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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literally means the “unhulled rice balance brought forward from
the last account to open the new account.” This term designated
the starting balance and brought forward the closing entry obtained from the previous ledger cycle.
The ledgers possessed elaborate technical aspects as all
cross-ledger transactions were recorded twice. All ledgers were
records of real accounts, with expenditures from them simply deducted from their own capitalization values. Thus, the
accounts were not double entry; in fact, they have every appearance of an elaborate set of single-entry accounts linked together
to allow cross-referencing and balancing. However, an elaborate
single-entry system can closely resemble a double-entry system.
Aiken and Lu [1998, p. 230] describe the Chinese Three Feet
bookkeeping system as “intermediate” between single and double entry. They point out that this method used double entry for
non-silver transactions in which commodities were first converted to silver that was subsequently spent. The silver was recorded
twice, once as a receipt from a commodity conversion and once
as a disbursement for an expenditure. The MCA accounts are
filled with similar examples.
Although the MCA accounts may have been somewhere between single entry and double entry, there was a keen concern
with accuracy. One great advantage of double entry is the identification of error. The fact that corrections of errors can be found
in the MCA books demonstrates that they were meticulously recorded. Since errors in pre-modern and modern account books
in Western Europe are common,15 their presence here is not unusual, but, compared to other contemporary books, surprisingly few errors have been found in the MCA ledgers. The errors
that did appear were often related to outstanding rent or grains
borrowed; only occasionally were mistakes made in recording. When a mistake was discovered, notes were added around
the entry in the ledger to indicate that it was an error and to explain the ramifications of the error on other ledgers. Such entries demonstrate that the ledgers were not just a list of payments, but rather the pinnacle of an elaborate set of integrated
day books and journals. In short, what the records represent is
an equity account ledger. Table 5 shows that the incidence of error between 1781 and 1808 for the conversion of rice to copper cash was 2.7%. Between 1846 and 1882, the nearby Haenam
15
“. . . medieval [European] balance sheets do not always balance, because
the bookkeeper was either unsuccessful or neglectful in tracing and correcting
small differences” [de Roover, 1956, pp. 114-115].
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Yun Clan books produced an error rate of 12%, indicating that
the Mun Clan was more meticulous in its bookkeeping [Han’guk
Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn’guwŏn, no publication date].
TABLE 5
Error in the Mun Head Clan Account Books for the Period
1781-1808
line year season

1

1781 spring

tu (a)/
decimal
sŏk

total correctly calculated actual record error
yang
for 1 sŏk
(per sŏk or (e = c - d)
(b)
(c = total yang/
per 20 tu)
decimal sŏk
67.65
1.65
1.65
0.00

820.00/
41 sŏk
2 1781 autumn 63.20/
6.00
1.90
1.90
0.00
3.16 sŏk
a)
8 1783 spring
66.00/ 10.70
3.24
3.3 sŏk
b)
22 1786 autumn 26.00/
4.60
3.54
1.3 sŏk
50 1793 spring 319.20/ 58.10
3.64
3.70
0.06
15.96 sŏk
b)
57 1796 spring
96.00/ 11.52
2.40
4.8 sŏk
58 1796 spring
85.00/ 11.70
2.75
2.70
0.05
4.25 sŏk
98 1808 spring 345.00/ 29.32
1.70
1.70
0.00
17.25 sŏk
99 1808 spring 180.00/ 15.30
1.70
1.70
0.00
9 sŏk
100 1808 spring 320.00/ 28.80
1.80
1.80
0.00
16 sŏk
101 1808 autumn 300.00/ 25.50
1.70
1.70
0.00
15 sŏk
Error rate = 2.7 per cent (2/73) [1781-1808]
the number of errors = 2, the number of total records of ‘per market price’ = 73
“per market price” is hard to discern due to corruption of the document
no marking of per market price
Source: see text.

a)

b)

The MCA accounts were linked together. Since all trans
actions were not entered twice, the system was not perfect
double entry, but because all cross-ledger transactions were recorded twice, the fundamental principle of dual entry for the
purpose of cross-referencing was clearly in evidence. Dual
entries allow the easy tracking of assets and ease the preparation
of trial balances. The fact that errors were found, corrected, and
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referred back to other books testifies to the complexity and accuracy of the system. We must keep in mind that these were the accounts of an agricultural cooperative, an organization that produced and traded in commodities. If the organization had more
complicated assets or if the volume of transactions had been
greater, then the accounts might well have developed into a fullblown, double-entry system with nominal accounts. Although
we do not yet have mercantile books from before the 1850s, we
can see a traditional, dual-entry, indigenous Korean accounting
system at work in the books of clan associations from the mid18th century.
CONCLUSION: THE MAXIMIZATION OF UTILITY IN A
MORAL ECONOMY
Our discussion of the MCA accounts raises two points.
First, the fact that the accounts were kept by a clan association
acting as an agricultural cooperative demonstrates that there
was no necessary relationship between sophisticated accounting techniques and commercialism. Efficient bookkeeping was
undoubtedly conducive to commercial success, but it was also a
useful practice within the Korean moral economy. It was a technology that was applied in both contexts precisely because it
was rational and efficient.
Second, the primary purpose of the MCA was mutual support, not profit. This would explain the absence of an integrated
profit-or-loss balance. The goal was guaranteed subsistence for
all members of the association, and the management of an asset pool that would function to maintain a stable community. If
everyone had sufficient food, if there was sufficient surplus for
communal needs, and if the surplus could stretch to the expression of social ideals (in particular, the ideal of filial piety), then
social stability was achievable. Significant expenditures were
made for projects best understood as “for the common good.”16
Loans and expenditures that might be called a form of social
welfare, even a redistribution of wealth, were extended in hopes

For example, expenditures for spring sacrifices (Exhibit 1, lower sheet, column 4 from right), a house for the grave keeper and irrigation repairs (Exhibit 2,
upper sheet, columns 7-9 from right), sacrifices to the mountain god (Exhibit 2,
lower sheet, column 16 from right); Table 1, spring 1819: unhulled rice, lines 3, 4
and 9, 28, 31, 34, 35, 39, and the categories of “land accounts,” “dividends,” and
“labor for irrigation repairs” in Tables 2 and 3.
16
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of enhancing communal survival and reciprocity.17 Confucian
ideology in 18th century Korea rested on personal responsibility but decried personal profit and enshrined community. We find
plentiful evidence in these ledgers of extensive economic commitment to this ideal.
In the MCA accounts, there were numerous expenditures for
ceremonies that directly related to the dominant social ideology
of filial piety as a key pillar of social stability.18 The performance
of filial duties satisfied three needs. First, there was the need
for personal emotional expression towards forebears. Second,
the education of the young in the principle would eventually instill the responsibility for providing social welfare for the elderly,
even the dead. Filial piety was the inter-generational social contract. Third, a filial son would attract community approval as a
trustworthy and upstanding member of society. Offer [1997, pp.
450-452] reminds us that Adam Smith stated the purpose of economic activity: “ . . . to be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation.” The
pursuit of wealth beyond survival was the “pursuit of regard.”
“The intrinsic benefits of social and personal interaction” or “the
satisfactions of regard” are a human propensity perhaps stronger than the propensity to “truck, barter, and exchange.” Material welfare, then, was not the sum total of human desire.
The 18th century Korean moral economy put little value on
speculation and strove for a surplus that could be used to benefit community solidarity through public displays of communal  ideals.19 Lest we risk a descent into romanticism, let us recall that a key element of community solidarity in the southern
rice bowl was the maintenance of irrigation facilities.20 Since
the members of the association were consumers as well as producers, their ethics were radically different from those of commercial concerns. They were risk-averse in their pursuit of subsistence and concerned with community rather than personal
17
For example, expenditures for general distribution (dividends? Exhibit 2,
upper sheet, column 11 from left), support of needy dependents (Exhibit 2, upper sheet, columns 1 and 2 from left and lower sheet, columns 1 and 4 from
right); Table 1, spring 1819: unhulled rice, lines 10-19, 22-24, and the category of
“students, education, charity, public buildings” in Tables 2 and 3.
18
For example, expenditures for ancestral memorial rites (Exhibit 2, upper
sheet, columns 10-19 from right, and lower sheet, columns 5-15 and 17-28 from
right).
19
Speculation would appear in the wider society in the 19th century, but
that is another story related to the collapse of the social contract [Jun and Lewis, 2005].
20
For example, Exhibit 2, upper sheet, columns 8-9 from right.
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surplus. In the words of Scott [1976, p. 4], “the peasant household has little scope for the profit maximization calculus of traditional neoclassical economics. Typically, the peasant cultivator
seeks to avoid the failure that will ruin him rather than attempting a big, but risky, killing.”
To generate subsistence and then surplus required sophisticated technologies to monitor community assets. Without efficient and honest oversight, accounts became corrupted, the
social fabric frayed, and the membership, including the account
ants, ran the risk of starvation. Therefore, incoming and outgoing goods and money were strictly and rationally audited
according to rules determined at the general meetings of the association. The communal value put on honest bookkeeping can
be seen in the observance of similar customs in widely differing
communities. Certain colleges at Oxford and Cambridge brewed
a special “audit ale” to be consumed on the day accounts were
audited and merchant accounts settled. Regardless of the effect on accuracy and efficiency, the purpose of the custom was
to celebrate a shared, communal economy. A similar custom
was practiced on auditing day in Chang`am village when wine
was ritually served. The Chang`am Village Association and the
MCA had an equivalent to audit ale called ch ŏnyosi-chu (“audit
wine”), known to us because it was carefully recorded as an expenditure.
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sŏrim).
Jackson, J. (1956), “The History of Methods of Exposition of Double-Entry Bookkeeping in England,” in Littleton, A. and Yamey, B. (eds.) (1956), Studies in
the History of Accounting (London: Sweet and Maxwell): 288-312.
Ji, X. (2003), “Concepts of Cost and Profit in Chinese Agricultural Treatises: with
Special Reference to Shengshi Nongshu and Pu Nongshu in the Seventeenth
Century,” Accounting, Business & Financial History, Vol. 13, No. 1: 69-81.
Jun, S. and Lewis, J. (2005), “Why did Korea Fail to Modernize? Views from
Economic and Environmental Histories,” working paper, Wolfson College,
Oxford.
Jun, S. and Lewis, J. (2006), “Wages, Rents, and Interest Rates in Southern Korea, 1700 -1900,” Research in Economic History, forthcoming, Vol. 24.
Kang, M. (1978), “Merchants of Kaesong,” in Chun, S. (ed.), Economic Life in
Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Foundation): 88-119.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23

92

et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2006, Vol. 33, no. 1
84

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006

Kim, S. (1977), Han’guk nongch’on sijang ŭi chedo wa kinŭng yŏn’gu (A Study of
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APPENDIX A
Glossary of Terms

chesa-kye (祭祀契) association for rituals
chil (秩) ledger
cho (租) unhulled rice
Chŏlla province (全羅)
chŏn (錢) copper cash unit composed of ten pun
chŏn-chil (錢秩) copper cash ledger
chŏnsu (傳受) balance brought forward
chŏnyŏsi-chu (傳與時酒) audit wine
ch`uk (縮) natural loss and transaction cost
ch’ul (出) outgoing
ha (下) expenditure
honin-kye (婚姻契) marriage association
hop (合) smallest dry measure
idu (吏讀) use of Chinese characters to write native Korean words
iik-chil (利益) profit ledger
isang (已上) subtotal
ip (入) incoming
kŏ (去) outgoing
kokja-chil (曲子秩) yeast cake ledger
kŭp (給) expenditure
kŭpch’a-chil (給次秩) liabilities ledger
kye (契) mutual assistance association
kyŏl (結) land measure by production output
Lóngmén bookkeeping (龍門) Chinese style from mid-17th century
mi (米) milled rice
mi-chil (米秩) milled rice ledger
mongmaek-chil (木麥秩) barley
nae (內) from this (total income or assets)
nae2 (來) incoming
Namp’yŏng Mun clan (南平文氏)
nong’u-kye (農牛契) oxen-leasing association
pan sogyŏng (半所耕) half annual production cost
po-kye (洑契) irrigation association
pong (捧) receipt
pongch’a-chil (捧次秩) assets ledger
pun (分) smallest cash unit
pyŏl yusa-chil (別有司秩) ledger of items specially handled by a bursar
sagae Songdo ch’ibubŏp (四介松都治簿法) term used by modern historians to refer to the accounting system used by Kaesŏng merchants
sang (上) receipt
sang-kye (喪契) funeral association
sangp’yŏng t’ongbo (常平通寶) Korean copper cash coins
shimai chōbo (姉妹帳簿) ‘sister ledgers’
sobi-chil (消費秩) loss ledger
sogyŏng (所耕) annual production cost
sojong-kye (小宗契) association of the branch or branch clan
sŏk (石=섬 sŏm) dry measure composed of 20 or 15 tu
song-kye (松契) tree-planting association
sŭng (升=되 twe) dry measure composed of ten hop
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toejaeng-i (되쟁이:升手) village grain handler
taejong-kye (大宗契) association of the head clan
tong-kye (洞契) village association
tu (斗=말 mal) dry measure composed of ten sŭng
turak (斗落) land measure by amount of seed required
yang (兩) copper cash unit composed of ten ch ŏn
yen (円 or 圓) modern Japanese currency
Yŏng`am (靈巖) place name
yonghagi (用下記) account ledgers
Yongsan Sŏwŏn (龍山書院) name of a private academy
yu (留) remaining assets
yusa (有司) bursar
zeni (銭) modern Japanese currency, subunit of yen
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18th Annual Conference on
Accounting, Business & Financial History
at Cardiff Business School 14-15 September 2006
Announcement of Conference and Call for Papers
Guest Speakers – Josephine Maltby & Janette Rutterford
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of accounting, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and discussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to fully developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approximately
40 minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile
feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of international, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF14 3UX,
UK, from lunchtime on Thursday, 14 September 2006 to mid-afternoon on Friday, 15 September 2006.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on
Thursday and accommodation) is £130.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the conference should send an abstract of their paper (not exceeding one page) by
31 May 2006 to:
Debbie Harris, Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5730 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419 Email. HarrisDL@cardiff.ac.uk
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference organisers’ decision on 30 June 2006.
Sponsored by:
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AMERICA’S RAILROAD DEPRECIATION
DEBATE, 1907 TO 1913: A STUDY OF
DIVERGENCE IN EARLY 20th CENTURY
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Abstract: In June 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
released new reporting rules that would require railroads to change
from betterment to depreciation accounting for equipment. The new
rules set off a firestorm of protest because the railroads felt they were
already recognizing physical depreciation through the current system.
The ICC, however, was looking at the concept of economic depreciation to match the cost of equipment with revenue over the life of the
asset in much the same way that industry was beginning to account
for its fixed assets. Such economic depreciation, it was felt, would
give the rate-setting ICC more stable reported incomes to determine
return on assets and the investing public a better feel for the results of
railroad operations. The debate began in a cordial fashion but deteriorated into bitter name-calling, civil disobedience, and litigation that
challenged both the accounting rules and the authority of the ICC to
issue and require them. The ICC partially won the debate, yet railroads were able to keep betterment accounting for track structures
another 70 years before the full convergence of industry and railroad
accounting standards occurred.

INTRODUCTION
After nearly 20 years of ineffective railroad regulation by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the U.S. Congress
in 1906 passed the Hepburn Amendment to clarify several Supreme Court decisions and to force the railroad industry to publish its rate schedules. The new act also gave the ICC legal authority to set “fair and reasonable” rail tariffs and rates. The law
authorized the ICC to develop uniform accounting procedures
for railroads to meet this new mandate. The ICC quickly issued
new accounting and financial reporting rules for all railroads
that came under its jurisdiction. Though the rules were similar
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the former editor Stephen Walker,
two anonymous reviewers, the current editor Richard Fleischman, and Melinda
Hyche for her meticulous editing of the final draft.
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to the ones issued in 1894 and largely ignored by the industry,
the railroads were now required to recognize a depreciation expense and a corresponding reserve for their “non-permanent”
fixed assets – rail equipment. Protests quickly erupted over the
new rules and a fiery debate ensued between the railroad’s traditional concept of “physical depreciation” and the ICC’s application of a new theory called “economic depreciation.” Though
the debate solidified the ICC’s authority to issue and require specific accounting rules, it eventually compromised and allowed
betterment accounting for track and way structures, a compromise that would result in divergent accounting standards between railroads and industry for the next 70 years.
This paper tracks the debate over these depreciation issues
from their inception in 1907 to the final disposition by the Supreme Court in 1913. The debate is well documented through
the records of the ICC and related articles published in the national press like the Wall Street Journal (the Journal), the New
York Times (the Times), and the railroad industry’s own publication, the Railway Age Gazette (the Gazette). Prominent public accountants also weighed into the debate on both sides of
the issue, indicating an unsettled debate within the profession
over the course of the modernization of accounting principles
in the U.S. in the early 20th century. Though each source has
its own biases, taken together, they give a sense of the passion
on both sides of America’s great railroad depreciation debate.
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
In 1902, the newly constituted U.S. Steel Company developed innovative financial reporting procedures that included recognition of depreciation charges on fixed assets. Though
the concept of physical depreciation of fixed assets had been
recognized for nearly three quarters of a century, according to
Younkins and Flesher [1984, p. 257], the U.S. Steel disclosures
were unique among contemporary firms because they reported
depreciation as a separate expense on the income statement.
Such an innovation helped to institutionalize the concept of
economic depreciation and paved the way for the modern accrual accounting standards currently in use a century later. Because of its mission to control rail rates through the analysis of
accounting and other operational data, such an innovation in

First published in 1856, the Railroad Gazette absorbed a smaller competitor called the Railway Age and changed its name to Railway Age in January 1908,
with a further name change in July 1908 to the Railway Age Gazette.
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 ccounting could hardly have missed the attention of the couna
try’s primary railroad regulatory agency, the ICC, and its longtime chief statistician, Professor Henry Carter Adams.
The Desire for a Uniform Railroad Accounting Policy: Since the
inception of the ICC in 1887, Henry Adams had attempted to
standardize railroad reporting in the U.S., using Section 20 of
the Interstate Commerce Act as his authority. The section read,
in part, “the Commission may . . . the purposes of the act, prescribe a period of time within which all common carriers subject to the provisions of this Act shall have, a uniform system
of accounts and the manner in which such accounts should be
kept.”
His first attempt to create uniform accounting rules was in
1894, when the ICC issued Classifications of Operating Expenses to guide railroads in their data-reporting requirements. The
requirements included modern double-entry accounting practices; however, its modified accrual nature left a limited articulation between the balance sheet and income statement (actually
a profit and loss account). Though the American Association of
Railroad Accounting Officers (AARAO) was instrumental in developing the pamphlet, the reporting requirements went largely
ignored by other regulators and the industry. First, the ICC-instituted National Association of Railroad Commissioners (NARC)
balked at their usage because state commissioners felt that the
new accounting rules would hinder their ability to control rail
rates within their respective jurisdictions. This process led to
multiple and conflicting accounting procedures across state jurisdictions that caused confusion among the railroads, leading
them to resist the new national standards. Finally, legal rulings
and legislative inaction stymied Adams’ goal of a uniform accounting system for all railroads. Though Adams and the ICC
knew that the nation’s railroad reporting practices needed modernization, they could take no action until Congress gave the
ICC further authority.
In the meantime, Adams continued to issue minor revisions and clarifications to the ill-fated Classifications of Operating Expenses to make the reporting process more understandable. The nature of the accounting, however, changed very little

For a review of the development of ICC reporting requirements before 1900,
see Heier [1994, pp. 101-110].
3
Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce, February 4, 1887, amended June 29,
1906, 34 Stat. 584.
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from the 1894 document. The NARC [1905, p. 30] augured a
change when discussing the ICC’s clarification in the definition
of additions, betterments, and improvements for the AARAO.
The clarification read: “Operating Expenses should include all
expenditures necessary to keep up the general standard of efficiency.” The meaning was clear; the expenses currently reported by the railroads regarding fixed asset usage were not sufficient to give a clear picture of rail operations. The railroads,
however, were probably not too concerned with such a course
change because the ICC’s position (both politically and legally)
had not changed, at least not yet.
The Hepburn Amendment: On June 6, 1906, Congress finally acted and passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. The new act also gave the ICC the legal authority
to set fair and reasonable rail tariffs. To meet this new mandate, regulators were authorized to “develop uniform accounting rules, and to prescribe the forms of all accounts, records
and memoranda to be kept by carriers” [ICC, 1907b, p.139]. The
law now empowered the ICC to have rate setting as its primary mission. A uniform accounting system for railroads became
Adams’ focus. As one would imagine, the railroad industry was
not elated over the new legislation as evidenced by an editorial published in the Gazette [January 11, 1907, p. 32]. In a muted and measured tone, the industry expressed the opinion that,
“The new rate law gives the Interstate Commerce Commission
the fullest authority over railroad statistics and accounts, with
the power, not only to prescribe what accounts shall be kept,
but to forbid keeping an unapproved statistic.”
The rail industry had resigned itself to the fact that the ICC
had substantially more power, but it also suggested in the article that slow and deliberate change in reporting requirements
would better serve the traveling public and shippers. Though
protests would soon erupt over required depreciation charges, the rail industry at this point was more concerned with the
ICC’s potential inclusion of “out-side” or non-rail income as part
of tariff rate calculations. Such an inclusion would disrupt the
sensitive rate-of-return formulas that the ICC would be using to
set passenger and freight rates. Regardless of what the changes were going to be, it was clear that the industry was going
to face new accounting rules soon.
During the transition from the amendment’s ratification
and the issuance of new uniform accounting standards, the ICC
again enlisted the help of the AARAO. Professor Adams acted
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as the ICC’s liaison to a newly created Committee of TwentyFive. The ICC’s annual report [1907b, p. 40] indicated: “Conferences [with the AARAO] developed interesting and instructive differences of opinion on many accounting questions. But
it may be said that, with a few exceptions, the results arrived
at were in harmony with a consensus of opinion of a majority of its members.” The annual report did not disclose the nature of the discussions, but changes in accounting procedures
at the large manufacturers, like U.S. Steel, must have been on
the minds of the conferees. Depreciation could well have been
at the top of this list in light of comments from Price Waterhouse’s George O. May [1962, p. 190] who indicated in his memoirs that “in 1906 the straight-line amortization concept of depreciation was in fairly general use in the industrial field.”
The ICC planned to issue new financial reporting rules
for all railroads that came under its jurisdiction by June 1907.
Though the prospective rules were very similar to the ones issued in 1894, the new system would include more accruals that
would increase balance sheet and income statement articulation
similar to modern financial statements. To foster the moderni
zation of railroad reporting, the ICC also focused on the fixed
asset and capital accounts. Like U.S. Steel, the railroads would
probably now, in all likelihood, be required to recognize depreciation expense instead of their traditional manner of accounting for fixed assets called betterment accounting. Succinctly put,
depreciation represented the systematic expensing of fixed asset costs in contrast to the periodic (or irregular) recognition
of expense under betterment accounting.
A Short Explanation of Betterment Accounting: An early discussion of fixed asset accounting and profitability for railroads
came in the 1870s from Albert Fink, the superintendent of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Fink suggested in an addendum to the 1875 L&N annual report [Fink, 1875, pp. 6-7] that
renewal accounts that compared actual repair costs with estimated repair costs to determine annual “due to that year’s
operations” … [and] … “To make the annual reports of a railroad
company of value, the accounts of the company should be so
kept as to show the expenses.” Fink’s methodology would be refined and institutionalized over the next thirty years, and came
to be known simply as “betterment accounting.” The name of
the methodology would evolve into the more theoretically descriptive retirement-replacement-betterment (RRB) accounting,
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [1983,
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Para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, defined
this practice as follows:
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are capitalized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are expensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the
current cost of the part replaced is considered a betterment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
Unlike the use of modern depreciation accounting, which
actually matched fixed asset cost to revenues over a given period, the railroad under betterment accounting did not recoup
the cost of the track until replaced. It could happen in some
years that no charges to current operating expenses from track
usage were matched against revenue if no track was replaced.
By 1907, the methodology described above had been in
widespread use and acted as the basis for reporting the account
balances of the railroad’s two primary fixed asset accounts,
equipment and track structures. As the depreciation debate developed, the ICC would take the position that betterment accounting did not reflect the true cost of a railroad’s operations
because in lean years it would simply not do any replacements
or upgrades, a major safety concern for the ICC. The ICC hoped
that the upcoming depreciation requirements would provide a
more “accurate” rendering of these fixed asset balances through
a more systematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As
the ICC moved towards the rate-of-return basis for evaluating
rail rates, it would become clear to the rail industry that depreciation was at the heart of the evolution of the concept of
“reasonable rates” and “reasonable returns” as articulated by
the 1898 Smyth vs. Ames [169 U.S. 466] decision.
Exhibit 1 below shows a hypothetical comparison of rail returns due to the impact of the new 1907 depreciation charges
on a railroad’s financial results compared with betterment accounting. With betterment accounting intact, the pre-1907 income levels per train mile were lower due to an artificially high
expense ratio. This helped the railroads to either maintain a
lower return ratio and, consequently, higher tariff rates or justify their request for an increase. It was also possible for the
railroads to schedule betterment expenditures to plan or smooth
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annual income levels. This expense timing was the central problem voiced by the ICC in its 1905 annual report. On the other
hand, with the partial accounting for depreciation charges on
equipment, the financial position of the railroad may be improved, leading regulators to construe the higher income levels
as unreasonable. The railroad could then expect a revision of the
rail rates downward to compensate for the “excess income.”
EXHIBIT 1
Estimated Change in Railroad Financial Accounting
Results

Rail Structure Costs
Depreciable Equipment Costs
Total Assets
Revenues
Operating Expenses
Rail Structure Betterments
Equipment Betterments
Depreciation Assume 7.00% X $500,000
Total Expenses
Net Income

Accounting
before 1907
$2,500,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$1,000,000
$2,400,000
$2,200,000
$2,150,000

Accounting
After 1907
$2,500,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$1,000,000
$2,400,000
$2,200,000

$2,750,000

$2,235,000
$2,635,000

$2,250,000

$2,365,000

Train‑Miles

10,000,000

Revenue Per Mile
Costs Per Mile
Income per mile
Return on Assets = Income ÷ Assets

$1210.1000
$1210.0750
$1210.0250
8.33%

$1210.1000
$1210.0635
$1210.0365
12.16%

THE ICC ISSUES NEW REPORTING RULES
The Preliminary Debate over the New Depreciation Rules: With
little fanfare and with even less guidance, the ICC [1907a], on
June 3, 1907, released new accounting rules as an update to
the ICC’s original document, Classifications of Operating Expenses. The first look at the new rules had actually occurred
in April 1907 when the ICC issued Circular No. 5 to detail the

For the effects of the ICC accounting changes on income smoothing, see Sivakumar and Waymire [2003].

The newly required equipment depreciation was highlighted essentially
through the reorganization and renumbering of an official account classification
scheme.
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proposed accounting changes and to give the industry due proc
ess to comment on them before final publication. The Journal
[May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported that a large number of railroads
had indeed commented on the new rules, especially with regard
to depreciation accounting. The written replies to the circular
expressed a wide range of views on the formal depreciation account. According to the article, comments regarding Circular
No. 5 framed the coming issue by saying, “it may be said that
current practice [betterment accounting] allows for depreciation
by including renewals or replacements in operating expense and
consequently railways do not need a formal depreciation account.” The article continued by making the editorial comment
that, “It is at least our opinion [that the ICC] question whether or not this is an appropriate method of procedure.” It was
reported that the railroads felt that “there seems to be no disagreement on the proposition that operating expense should be
charged with the full amount of wear incident to the use of the
property, and that any excess over that amount should be separately charged to income.” These types of comments again signaled the railroad’s coming stance that depreciation was physical in nature and not economic, and reinforced the railroads’
fear that any depreciation account would degrade the balance
of the asset accounts and upset the delicate balance of the return-on-asset ratios.
Even with the preliminary ICC circulars issued in April and
May, it still appears that the railroads may have been caught
off-guard by some of the new depreciation rules, as evidenced
by the silence in the Gazette before June on the process leading up to the promulgation of the new accounting rules. In
fact, an early article in the Gazette [April 19, 1907, p. 507] contained no discussion of depreciation but instead stressed an upcoming rule that would make the railroad’s head accountant a
sworn agent of the government and the issue of non-rail related income being used in the rate-of-return formulas. In an article published after the issuance of the rules, the Gazette [June
21, 1907, pp. 883-884] indicated that the present rules only applied to equipment but that there was a possibility of the application of depreciation rules to track and structures. The article
further explained that such a move would make the accounting for track additions or repairs less flexible than the current

It appears that companion circulars were also issued during 1907 for the
more contentious issue of classification of “additions and betterments” related to
those costs of upgrading permanent fixed assets such as structures and rail beds.
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American system that allowed for management decisions related to the recognition of no capital costs in bad years, a safety
concern to be sure.
According to Barret [1907, p. 486], a competing publication, Railroad World, did express tacit support for the new accounting rules when it wrote, “Hitherto this question has been
thrust aside with scanty apology that due attention to repairs,
renewals and replacements excuses the omission. At its worst,
the omission to make allowance for depreciation leads to unearned payments to capital, to eventual overcapitalization, and
finally to bankruptcy.” Railroad World then expressed concern
that any rate-of-return calculations from the ICC must take into
account depreciation charges or there would be a reduction in
asset values. Although this industry publication was moderately positive about the change to depreciation, it seemed to suggest that the ICC had ulterior safety motives for the change.
Even before the official release of the new accounting rules,
Adams and members of the ICC readied the markets, the public, and especially the railroads for the announcement. For example, the Journal [May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported on the prospective accounting changes, indicating that they “were to be set
up providing for the replacement of property – annual percentages to be left to the carriers.” The same article reported that
the ICC’s aim for the new system of accounts was to “simplify the now complex problem of determining what a railroad is
earning.” Adams was quoted in an interview as saying, “it was
the intention of the commission to draw a clear line between
charges [that] merely made good the actual wear and due tear
or represented depreciations and such as represented by betterments and additions whether the latter is chargeable directly to
income or to capital.” Here the argument went beyond the recognition of depreciation, and moved towards a more modern
differentiation between capital improvements that would be depreciated and operating expenses that would have a direct effect on the earnings of a railroad.
Adams went on to indicate that in the present railroad accounting system, the definitions of such items as repairs, betterments, and additions did not convey a definite meaning,
“hence the necessity of establishing principles of accounting as
will enable the commission to determine whether operating expenses as charged on the company’s books properly represent
the cost of transportation.” In the eyes of the ICC, the railroads
were now charging only “capital improvements” against current
income, which masked the true earnings of the corporation
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 ecause under betterment accounting there was never a recovb
ery of the original cost of the railroad’s equipment through the
income statement until replacement. Adams further explained
the depreciation provision would better allow for the replacement of property before wear and tear finally forces the issue.
Unfortunately, at this point in the interview Adams made a modern theoretical mistake by saying: “Provisions should be made
out of earnings of property during the period of its use to replace it.…The purpose of depreciation is to provide a replacement fund.”
Though it was clear that Adams was moving toward the application of economic depreciation and away from accounting
for the physical depreciation of the railroad equipment, he did
seem to harbor the perspective that depreciation, though noncash in nature, would provide a direct funding source for the
replacement of equipment. Such an idea may have come from
contemporary manufacturers like U.S. Steel, which reported
equipment depreciation with extinguishments of debt. For example, in the 1904 U.S. Steel annual report [p. 11], the company stated: “The appropriation of these funds has been made
with the idea that, thus aided, the Bond Sinking Funds will liquidate the capital investment in the properties at the expiration
of their life.” In addition, the report also mentioned: “These
funds are used to improve, modernize, and strengthen properties.” In the short term, Adams’ early misunderstanding of the
cash nature of depreciation would cause some confusion in the
application of the new rules and overshadow the ICC’s purpose
better to match railroad expenditures with revenue. Finally, the
article also reported that the railroads did not object to the idea
of taking expenditures in excess of wear and tear out of earnings, but they were leery that investors would construe a formal depreciation fund as cash available for dividends.
The rationale for the new ICC accounting rules may have
gone beyond a more uniform accounting system and may have
focused on two other motivations. The first of these may have
been to foster safer railroad operations by actually forcing the
continued replacement of railroad equipment on a scheduled
basis through a change in accounting procedures. A more pernicious consideration may have been the ICC’s desire eventually
to standardize rail tariffs through railroad valuation. This possibility was made evident in a Journal article [May 23, 1907, p.1]
that reported a speech by ICC Commissioner, Charles A. Pouty,
before the National Association of Manufacturers in which he
discussed the ICC’s reasons for changing the regulatory rules.
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First, Pouty indicated that government itself was on trial,
and that regulation must be “sufficiently strong to choke the cry
for national operation.” The concept of federal ownership and
operation of the railroads had become popular as anti-capitalist
views began to spread in the U.S. in the early part of the 19th
century. Though he did not like the idea of government control and felt the private sector the better place to control rail
operations, he did feel that a cabinet-level department of railroads should be set up to oversee rail operations and set national transportation policy. Pouty also explained that the government, and not private individuals, should have over-sight
responsibility in rate setting. This appears to have been a criticism of the federal courts and their intervention in ICC decisions on behalf of private litigants. Most importantly for this
story, Pouty indicated that, “it is probable that the interstate railways should be valued by the national government.” Pouty, the
ICC, and the rail industry knew that valuation needed proper
(and uniform) accounting data. The news report quoted Pouty
as saying: “The popular impression that if the value of our railroads were known it would be easy to adjust rates that a fair
return upon that value and only a fair return would be obtained
is entirely erroneous. The cost of reproduction is but a single factor which enters just value.” Although Pouty never mentioned the subject of the new depreciation rules, he did focus
on a set of criticisms regarding the methods railroads used to
determine and account for the value of their long-term capital.
According to Pouty, railroads could easily hide investments in
the form of stocks and bonds in related and sometimes competing railroads.
In a related Journal article [May 22, 1907, p. 5], Adams
echoed Pouty’s comments when he said: “The valuation of railroads on a scientific basis is quite feasible, but the reasonableness of railroad rates is and must be a matter of human judgment exercised beyond the bounds of mere valuation.” Adams
went on to explain that the individual subjects of railroad capitalization, valuation, and rates are related by giving a convoluted example where income should not be above the amount
needed to maintain operations if it is to be deemed reasonable

It would be nearly 60 years later when the Department of Transportation
was established by an act of Congress on October 15, 1966, with its first official
day of operations on April 1, 1967.

This was a direct reference to the stock manipulation case where E.H. Harriman of the Union Pacific and Rock Island Railroads secretly bought a directly
competing line called the Alton Railroad.
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income by the Commission. In a more modern sense, he then
differentiated between the valuation used to set rates and that
of the market valuation of the railroad securities themselves.
Market valuation he felt did not equate to regulatory valuation
when it came to setting freight and passenger rates.
The popular view in this era was that high railroad market valuations were the result of high and unfair rail tariffs.
Through his example, it appears that Adams saw this controversy differently. He felt that the high market valuations and
high rates were only tangentially related by the fact that the
most profitable railroads also seemed to have the highest market value. In the end, Adams and the ICC would continue to
focus on the return on assets to determine the reasonableness
of tariffs in keeping with legal rulings. Finally, like Pouty, Adams was laying the groundwork for acceptance of the upcoming accounting rule changes. It was clear that physical valuation of the railroads was on the ICC’s agenda, and that the ICC
was going to gather the necessary data on the railroad’s capital
assets needed to complete this task. When asked about progress towards completing the new accounting system, Adams
said: “They have progressed much further than I thought they
would by this time. Operating revenues and operating expense
accounts are practically done and the accountants are pulling
together and mean business.”
After the official release of the new rules the next week,
an article published in the Journal [June 7, 1907, p. 6] highlighted the major accounting changes promulgated by the ICC.
In general, the required revenue and expense items mirrored
those of the 1894 requirements; however, the railroads were
now supposed to report those financial results monthly to the
ICC, presumably so that the ICC could maintain control over
both short-term and long-term tariffs. According to the article,
the major change in accounting regulations for 1907 included
the requirement for a formal provision of depreciation charges
and reserves for all companies covered by the Interstate Commerce Act. This depreciation requirement also differentiated operating expenses and capital improvements by indicating, “The
purpose of these depreciation charges is to have the exact cost

As a side note, in a compromise to get the Hepburn Amendment passed, the
explicit ability of the ICC to value railroad assets directly was not given; however, it was not expressly forbidden either, a point of contention for years. For a review of the political environment surrounding the development of the ICC and
the 1906 Hepburn Amendment, see Miranti [1989].
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of a particular month or a particular year, and thus enable a
correct statement of net revenue from operations.” The article
then explained that the new definitions of betterments and additions will also result in keeping the cost improvements out of
current operating expenses.
The lack of depreciation of track and way structures had
been noted just a week before in the Journal [May 29, 1907,
p. 6], anticipating the new accounting rules. The article quoted
an ICC official who said, “operating expenses must not be burdened with expenditures for additional equipment, tracks, ballast, or additions to the railroad, the purposes of which are to
improve the property operated.” In addition, the official further
divulged: “The chief new feature of these primary accounts is
that a depreciation account, set aside for renewal accounts, has
been supplied for every item of equipment. [However] there is
no depreciation account for way and structures.” The article
then quoted Adams as saying, “it is impossible to arrive at any
final conclusion as to how the rule of depreciation should be
applied to roadbed and buildings, and that the subject will be
specifically investigated during the coming fiscal year.” Adams’
trepidation over any change of betterment accounting rules for
track and way structures would continue in ICC policy making
for years to come due to the ICC’s indecision about just how
to depreciate permanent structures given conflicting theories of
wear and tear and cost matching. The issues would be a focus
of railroad depreciation debates lasting into the early 1980s.
THE REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTING CHANGES
Reactions by Industry through the Railroad Press: As expected,
protests over the new accounting rules were almost immediate but surprisingly cordial. One of the first was an innocuous
attempt by L.F. Loree, president of the Delaware and Hudson
RR, to circulate a petition asking the ICC to postpone the implementation of the accounting rules for one year. He made the
request, “on the grounds that it will make it impossible for railroads to make comparisons in the results of their operations
for the previous year” [the Gazette, 1907, p. 869]. In an era of
pen and ink accounting systems, a better request would have
been for a delay in the implementation of the new rules due
to the short period, approximately four weeks, given the railroads to comply with the new regulations. For the ICC, they
felt the transition, which was scheduled for the post-June 1907
reporting period, actually gave the railroads one year to implehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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ment the new accounting system before the June 1908 reports.
Any delay at this point would have pushed its implementation
back to 1909.
A Times article [June 15, 1907, p.12] provided a better preview of the coming opposition from the railroad industry, reporting that, “efforts are being made by some large railroads
to thwart some of the plans of the [ICC] in the matter of stand
ardizing the accounts of all railroads, and for the establishment
of such form of accounts as will set forth clearly all financial
operations.” Rail industry leaders had supposedly gathered to
discuss the matter and cooperate on a response. As an interesting side note, both the newspaper and the industry must
have misunderstood the new ICC regulations due to an erroneous impression that tracks and roadway were included in the
depreciation order. In a surprising revelation, the article pointed out that the other railroad officials put the blame for the
ICC’s new rules on the Pennsylvania Railroad’s decision to use
depreciation accounting, an interesting comment considering
the Pennsy’s later protests.The rail officials felt that Pennsy’s
move gave the ICC the final impetus to modify its stance on
the emerging depreciation issue. Finally, the rail industry also
saw that the new rules were probably rooted in politics, with
President Roosevelt pushing for the changes. The writer of the
article, however, felt the new accounting rules, “set the true [financial] position of railroads, and enable investors … to determine more easily just what each railroad is doing in the matter of maintaining property and the extent earnings are used
to improve it.” The writer’s last argument may have again signaled the ICC’s hidden safety agenda.
In an attempt to define the industry’s objections to the new
accounting rules, the Gazette began publishing a series of specif
ic articles about the rules. In an article with the combative title
“A Defective Accounting System” [the Gazette, June 21, 1907, pp.
883-884], the industry put forth its early arguments against the
new system. The three-page technical article (its tone though
was that of an editorial) began with an explanation of the proc
ess used to develop the new rules including the participation
by the AARAO, an issue that would spilt railroad officials later. First, the article criticized the way the ICC used the account
ant’s recommendations, which “serves to illustrate how easy it
is for railroad regulation to go astray and make mistakes unless the persons doing the regulating possess the broadest kind
of outlook of the entire situation.” Next, the industry saw the
ICC as a threat due in part to its politicized nature and its lack
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of direct experience in rail operations. Finally, the editorial explained that there were only two purposes for keeping accounts.
The first purpose was to prevent unauthorized expenditures and
the second was to control operations. Essentially, the industry
felt that the new rules applied quite well to the first, but failed
in their attempt to meet the second purpose for four primary
reasons.
First, the railroads rejected the new system based on the
structure of accounts because they feared that the new account
scheme would commingle labor and material costs for both
track and equipment betterments. Next, they went on to point
out that the new account system, “interrupts the continuity of
rail statistics at a time when statistical details are most needed
to point the way to necessary economies and to test the efficiency of operating methods.” This continuity issue would continue
for some time to come. The roads were also against a monthly reporting of depreciation because they felt that such costs
could not be efficiently apportioned on a regular basis because
of the irregular pattern of wear and tear. This issue might have
been mitigated by a compromise to use units-of-usage (probably based on ton-miles) methodology to determine the depreciation charge. This would have allowed railroads that had operational disruptions due to weather or seasonal business history
to deal with equal apportionment problems. Finally, the article
explained that the new rules would handicap rail operations
and analysis because they would not be able to keep accounts
and data not specifically approved by the ICC. This may have
referred to operational measures (e.g., cost per ton-mile) that
the railroads did not want the ICC to see because this may have
lent support to their depreciation theories.
A Journal report [August 20, 1908, p. 5] articulated a similar continuity argument when it said that, “railroads are finding a great deal of trouble in compiling their annual reports
to conform with all the requirements. … Unless they issue two
reports, one after the plan followed in the previous years, and
one under the new accounting system, it will be very difficult
for the humble stockholder to get an idea of what the company has been doing by comparison with last year.” In this same
article, a comptroller at a “large New York railroad” was quoted as saying, “it is useless to make any comparison of figures
under the new rules with those in the old way … you are bound
in the end to get results that are misleading. … We spent a lot
of money and put in a lot of night work, but when the results
were ready, they were not worth a picayune.”
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The problems related to the continuity of rail statistics were
also explained to railroad stockholders in annual reports. For
example, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (Exhibit 2 below)
in its fiscal year 1908 annual report discussed these accounting
changes in a tenor that shows its displeasure with the regulations.
EXHIBIT 2
Note on ICC Accounting Change as
Presented in the 1908 L&N Annual Report
Uniform Accounting System Prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission:
On July 1, 1907, the new system of Accounts prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission became effective. Principle changes caused by the orders of
the Commission were:
1. Elimination of Expenditures for Additions and Betterments from Operating Expenses, and,
2. The inauguration of formal Replacement Accounts for Depreciation and
Renewals of Equipment.
The changes wrought by the new system should be borne in mind when
making comparisons of tables in this year’s reports with those in reports of previous years.
[Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1908, p.13]

In a follow-up editorial to “A Defective Accounting System”
[the Gazette, September 27, 1907, p. 86], the editor pointed out
that the “errors in the new system are on the whole more hurtful than those in the old, and we believe it to be a matter of the
greatest regret that at the time a change is made … a change,
moreover, which works permanent injury to the continuity of
records.” In an historical irony, when betterment accounting
was finally discontinued by the ICC in 1983, the FASB had to
issue a standard (SFAS 73) to deal with continuity of reporting
problems.
Another problem raised by this article centered on a perceived uneven application of the rules. For example, the article noted that a northeastern railroad that is no longer growing
would have a smaller amount of depreciation charges due to a
lower rate of equipment additions. Intuitively this would lead
to less expense, higher income, and a correspondingly higher
rate of return on assets. A higher return would, of course, lead
to a reduction in tariff rates. By comparison, the expanded depreciation charges of a railroad in California that continues to
grow due to migration would have a lower rate of return and,
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thus, get rate relief from the ICC. Such perceived inconsistencies in rate setting, however, had been a regulatory problem at
the ICC since its inception in 1887. The infamous “long haul
vs. short haul” clauses in the original Interstate Commerce Act
that essentially equalized, under the theory of price discrimination, all railroad operations in the country regardless of operational efficiencies. The depreciation charges only exacerbated the problem.
Theoretical Arguments: The Gazette [October 11, 1907, p. 90]
published “Equipment Depreciation and Renewal,” written by
the controller of the Union Pacific, William Mahl. In the article, Mahl seemed to imply that there is no depreciation if the
railroad is constantly upgrading or replacing its equipment.
Making a distinction between physical and economic depreciation, he ends the article by pleading to drop the depreciation
requirements in favor of the old “provision for ‘renewals’ to
represent the current cost of replacing all equipment vacated.”
Mahl point out that, “This change will furnish the Commission
with reliable data about the depreciation which has been carried into the operating expenses of the railroads will enable it
to order adjustments suitable to each case if any such should
be necessary.”
Even with the protests, Adams and the ICC issued more
accounting regulations in January 1908. These focused on the
specific information that the ICC required from railroads every six months, starting in March 1908. The new regulations,
however, did not change track and way structure accounting
nor did they provide guidance on the actual rates a railroad
should use to depreciate its equipment. The one clarification
to the 1907 rules noted that the equipment was to be reported on the balance sheet net of depreciation and that the asset
book value was to be “reduced periodically to the extent of the
depreciation charge.” Under the original 1907 regulations, the
railroads assumed that the depreciation was a current operating expense, but not necessarily a reduction of book value on
the asset. This new regulation unsettled the railroads because
of its impact on the return-on-assets ratio and the public’s perception of railroad over-capitalization due to a depreciation of
equipment that is faster than the payment of bonds.
The Gazette [January 16, 1908, p. 54] reported on this
new set of regulations and others to come. In general, the article  discussed the process by which the ICC modified its rules
and some related changes to income statement and balance
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sheet rules. In an attempt to portray the ICC as an inflexible
and bureaucratic organization, the Gazette reported that, “An
erroneous impression has been created that the [ICC] is disposed to reconsider the propriety of depreciation on equipment
accounts. … In working out the details of such an account the
commission is willing to consider all practical suggestions and
is working with members.” The views of Professor Adams were
unaltered on this subject.
To combat the new regulations, Frederick Delano, the president of Wabash Railroad, wrote his “Notes on the Application
of a Depreciation Charge in Railway Accounting,” which was
published by the Gazette [March 1908, pp. 471-473]. In this article, he criticized the ICC’s depreciation rules on rolling stock
and then warned that the regulators would soon be issuing new
accounting rules regarding fixed structures. Delano wanted to
make his opinion clear to the ICC that depreciation does not
exist in an economic sense, but is solely related to wear and
tear and obsolescence. He wrote: “There is admittedly a depreciation or deterioration … but it is difficult drawing the line between the cost of making good this sort of depreciation and ordinary maintenance.” Further to the point, he observed that, “in
the case of cars depreciation goes on at a rate of 5 percent or 6
percent per year until the car is 60 per cent depreciated of its
original value. Beyond that it is assumed there is no depreciation if maintenance is properly kept up.” This type of deterioration was a concept he called “limited depreciation” because
the property is eventually replaced through the betterment system at which time the costs would be absorbed into current
expenses. He relates these facts to a perceived public controversy regarding the arcane problems of railroad overcapitalization. Essentially, in a long diatribe, Delano felt that the capitalization of American railroads was solid, and used this fact as
evidence of the efficacy of betterment charges. Delano also felt
that the current system was more flexible than the new depreciation system, allowing better decision making by the board of
directors regarding the integrity of the property. This can only
mean that railroad management wanted to retain the right to
decide when and if betterments and replacement occurred.
Delano then criticized the ICC requirements for depreciation as fictitious by explaining: “To put expenditures into
operating accounts that have not been actually made has been
regarded as ‘padding’ accounts. To make a charge of depreciation every month on a purely arbitrary basis, when the money which is charged is not actually spent in replacement is
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 bviously charging against operating expenses something for
o
which no expenditures has been made.”10
It is clear from Delano’s objections that the railroad industry was resisting any rapid change in its accounting methods from largely cash basis to one that necessitates extensive
accruals for matching current expenses with income. In addition, it is also clear from Delano’s comments that industry suspected the ICC’s new rules did have an ulterior safety motive
after he pointed out that the public and stockholders had the
right to know the condition of a railroad’s property. Delano
ended his article by concurring with “A Defective Accounting
System” that the change in accounting would be unevenly applied and mature railroads like Delano’s Wabash would suffer
the most. To counteract the problem, Delano felt that any depreciation charge must be offset by a corresponding adjustment
in the appreciating value of the property. This would have been
even more onerous to the industry because the ICC rate setters
would have probably recognized such appreciation as income
and lowered tariffs correspondingly.
Railway Age [May 1, 1908, p. 623] synthesized the arguments of both Mahl and Delano and indicated that the ICC’s
intentions for the new accounting rules were two-fold. The first
was to charge depreciation over and above current repairs to
operating expenses monthly (economic depreciation). Second,
the ICC’s purpose was to charge this “average life of property”
to the profit or loss or surplus account, essentially the modern
matching principle. The article felt that these were neutral issues when taken separately, but that the industry objected to
them taken in operating expense money that was not spent. A
monthly charge for accruals would, in the industry’s opinion,
make the system too rigid and inflexible and deprive the railroad of the ability to judge when expenditures should be made.
The argument from the editorial was simple, “since the charge
for depreciation is not met with payment of money, it is not an
expense, and since depreciation continues … even though operations cease, it certainly is not an operating expense.” The concepts of modern accruals and matching had not yet taken hold
in the railroad industry. Since it appeared that the ICC was
not going to relent, the article finally suggested a compromise
10
Delano’s arguments may have come from a 30-year-old court case, United
States vs. Kansas Pacific Railway Company [99 U.S. 455]. In this case, the court
disallowed the railroad from using depreciation to determine the amount of net
earnings available to pay back certain government sponsored bonds.
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where there would be a presentation of two forms of operating accounts, “operating expenses other than depreciation” and
“depreciation.”
H.A. Dunn, a partner at Haskins and Sells, made a similar
argument in a letter to Railway Age [May 29, 1908, p. 726], but
he wanted to name the account “expired outlay on productive
plant” (the basic definition of economic depreciation). According to Previts and Merino [1998, p. 219], the founder of Dunn’s
firm, Elijah Watts Sells, was critical of the ICC’s new accounting
rules. He essentially believed that, “depreciation charges should
be sufficient to ensure asset replacements.” Previts and Merino
then explained that Sells and Price Waterhouse partner Arthur
Loews Dickinson argued this based on the assumption that depreciation recognition was the only way that one could prevent
the erosion of capital, an argument closely allied with railroad
executives.
In an April 20, 1908 letter to Adams, Dickinson [1980, pp.
13-14] wrote: “The object of a depreciation is, we take it, to
make a provision for the decreases in value from year to year
by reason of wear and tear, etc., as it accrues instead of as it
is made good.” Dickinson continued by saying that, “It seems
to us that to such a proposition there is an obvious corollary
that renewal expenditures made to arrest Depreciation should
be charged against a Fund created in the years depreciation
accrues, and not against the operating expenses of the year in
which the expenditures are made.” It is clear that Dickinson
had not moved to the concept of economic depreciation, favoring the 30-year-old accounting methodology articulated by Albert Fink.
The opinions of Sells and Dickinson would soon run contrary to that of the accounting profession in general. For example, Arthur Teele [1908, pp. 89-91], an early supporter of the
ICC’s new depreciation rules, indicated, “that I do not think it
is necessary for me to present arguments … as to the necessity
of promptly taking depreciation of capital … for I believe anyone
who gives careful thought will agree to the principle of providing for the loss out of revenues earned in the period the loss is
occurring.” Teele was on the side of matching and economic depreciation. The next year, William Lybrand [1909, pp. 224-227]
took much the same view of the need for depreciation except
he stressed the balance sheet rather than the income statement
because he felt betterment accounting would result in the assets appearing at cost regardless of deteriorated value, wear and
tear, or replacement.
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Later in that year, Adams used the same themes as Teele
and Lybrand in a speech to the annual meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants on October 23, 1908. Adams [1908, p. 381] explained to the audience, “When carried
to its final analysis, the question of formal depreciation charges to operating expenses is simply a question of what constitutes cost of operation and the time when such cost shall be
acknowledged.” He further told the gathering that the new system assumed “the depletion through the use of that asset in
operations creates an item of cost of operation that should be
reflected in the accounts when the fact of this depletion takes
place.” He further pointed out that, “a statement of net revenue made without including this element of cost in operating
expenses, is an erroneous statement.” Adams finished this section of the speech by saying, “an expense arising through the
consumption of property employed in operations ought to be
acknowledged on the accounts with the same scrupulous fidelity as an expense caused by the consumption of labor or material.”
Adams had obviously solidified his conclusions related to
the matching principle and the conservative timing on the recognition of costs. He summed up his feelings on the subject:
“[It is my] proposition, however, that depreciation is a proper
charge to operating expenses [and] is one which is regarded as
an established principle in the science of accounts.” Because
railroad accountants had helped the ICC create these accounts,
it appears that he meant these comments for the consumption
of his opponents, the railroad executives and some of their public auditors.
An Internal Industry Debate: In a front-page article, the Journal
[May 2, 1908, p. 1] weighed into the depreciation argument,
more or less on the side of the railroads. The article detailed
the “modifications” that railroad officials wanted the ICC to
make to the new accounting rules. Many of these changes dealt
with a reduction in the total number of accounts required by
the ICC. Most of these accounts dealt with equipment reporting detail and the corresponding depreciation for each. The argument was that 90% of all operating costs were contained in
these accounts.
The report further explained that railroad officials had
criticized and chastised the railroad accountants (the AARAO
committee) for insufficiently studying the effect that depreciation would have on the bottom line. The railroad officers also
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complained that net operating revenues were down due to the
new rules, although they omitted to explain that there was a
general economic downturn of the American economy at this
time. In the end, the rail executives seemed to want the account
ants to help them in two contradictory ways. First, the account
ants were to report high net income for stock market purposes,
while at the same time reporting low net income for rate-setting
purposes, an error already pointed out by Adams in his valuation example. Even after a year, the railroad officials were still
having problems with ICC definitions of what economic depreciation actually represented, the matching of cost to revenues.
It became clear that debate over depreciation had moved from
an industry/ICC conflict to an internal rail industry debate.
The controller of the Erie Railroad, M.P. Blauvelt, was
one of those executives who criticized the AARAO in an April
29, 1908 speech. Blauvelt said that the AARAO’s Committee of
Twenty-Five “caved in” and “materially altered” its position on
many aspects of the new accounting system to meet Adams’
demands. The speaker then echoed the rail industry’s party line
regarding the new accounting rules by stating that, “to depreciate is to lessen the value” of the equipment [Railway Age, May
15, 1908, p. 81]. C.F. Calvert [1908, p. 230] disputed Blauvelt’s
accusations by explaining that the “loss in value feared” by the
railroad executive should actually be viewed in much the same
way the ICC saw it, as a part of the cost of production.
After chastising the AARAO, Blauvelt then brought a new
dimension to the anti-depreciation argument when he suggested that the ICC might not have the authority to compel railroads to show properly maintained equipment in a state of
depreciation. This was an early indication that if rhetoric and
public opinion would not change the mind of Professor Adams,
then maybe the courts could. The Commission probably foresaw these future arguments from Blauvelt when it wrote in its
1907 annual report [ICC, 1907b, p. 141] that it interpreted the
Act, “as imposing upon it the duty of protecting the integrity
of the net revenue statements published by carriers, and it believes that formal depreciation charges, conservatively administered, are essential for attainment of this end.”
The Gazette [October, 1908, p. 1,050] presented another compromise by urging the ICC to drop depreciation accounting
and require current replacement cost accounting, which it felt
would be an improvement over betterment accounting. The article focused on the fact that no two railroads were alike, and
that any standardized depreciation rates and accounts were not
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feasible. The article went on to address ten more problems with
the new system. Most of these dealt with procedures and theoretical questions like obsolescence and reserve accounts. However, the most prominent was the ICC’s assumption that depreciation charges would better protect the stockholder by making
the charges more standardized and understandable.
Nearly 15 months before, the Times [August 12, 1907, p.
10] had supported this position when it focused on the impact
the new accounting changes had on the stockholder and the
market. The article went on to say, “the new system would enable both the bondholders, and stockholders of the railroad to
better understand the nature and amount of the company’s income.” By contrast, the issue was raised that the new ICC rules
favored railroad accountants and not line operations people.
The argument behind this complaint was unclear, but seemed
to center on the supposed rigidity of the new rules. As noted
previously in the June Gazette article, the railroads were worried that the new rules would preclude the gathering of additional and  specific “non-financial operating data” used for efficient rail operations. This type of managerial accounting data
may have included studies of wear and tear on locomotives,
not the  corresponding economic depreciation as intended by
the ICC.
Problems with the Application of the New Rules: As the reporting period for June 30, 1908 came and went, it was clear that
the railroads were “suffering” under the new rules. The Journal
[October 13, 1908, p. 1] reported that annual reports of the railroads for the first fiscal year since the adoption of new depreciation rules “. . . may not fully justify the present form of such
rules, but they go towards affirming the necessity for some more
uniform and systematic principles for the treatment of equipment maintenance.” The article went on to point out that the
results of the new accounting rules for fiscal 1908 were marked
by an “enormous divergence as between one road and another.”
The Journal felt that these problems revealed “to what extent
each has in the past been a law unto itself not merely as to
meeting the individual idiosyncrasies of its own service, but also
to the ideas concerning the maintenance of the integrity of capital investment.” These comments seem to correspond with the
ICC’s hidden maintenance agenda that would force the roads
to upgrade equipment. In fact, the Journal articles stressed this
point when it opined that the “popular idea of the new rules has
been that they required all roads to increase their maintenance
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charges to cover a more or less imaginary or at best theoretical depreciation not previously provided for.”
Though its editorial policy had been decidedly against the
new rules, the Journal did say it was surprised to find that some
railroads’ costs actually decreased with the new system as Delano and others had predicted. The real reason for the great diversity of operating results was the fact that each railroad had
a free hand in setting its depreciation rates. The Journal awaited future developments: “It remains to be seen whether the
commission will continue to leave the percentage of depreciation to the individual determination of the carriers, or attempt
to fix the percentages for them.” Yet, the Journal’s assessment
was not totally pessimistic: “Thus far this plan seems to work
well and pretty directly toward the ends the commission set out
to accomplish.”
Were the new rules a failure? From the railroad industry’s
perspective, the answer was an unequivocal yes! The tone of
the Journal seemed oddly contradictory when it implied that
that the ICC’s new rules were failing due to the railroad industry’s intransigence and not because of the concept of depreciation itself. Regardless of the reasons, it was clear that the ICC
had a problem on its hands.
A full year before the Journal’s editorial, a Times article [October 3, 1907. p. 13] reported these potential problems this way:
“As matters stand, each road has been left to decide for itself
what percentage it will charge off for depreciation, but all are
obliged to charge off some percentage. There is no uniformity
in making these charges for depreciation.” This article pointed
out that the Rock Island Lines would use a 4% rate for locomotives while the Gould Lines were more conservative with a
corresponding 2% rate. The only guidance on the subject that
came from the ICC was as an introductory letter from Professor
Adams in the 1907 The Classification of Operating Expenses. In
the section entitled “Consideration of Depreciation,” Adams had
indicated that the depreciation charges should be based on the
value of the equipment with a percentage applied to the original cost. Adams went on to say, “the percentage rate required
for depreciation of equipment should be limited to the rate required to replace the price paid” [ICC, 1907a, pp.10-12]. In the
1908 update [ICC, 1908, p. 22] of the rules, Adams expanded
and modified his comments to include a depreciation calculation net of scrap value, and declared that there should be no
depreciation recognized past the equipment’s estimated useful
life. Again, the ICC failed to give guidance on useful lives and
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rates. Adams, in the report, only indicated that the monthly
charge for depreciation should be computed “using a percentage of original or purchase price.”
Inevitably, the decision that allowed rail companies to select individual depreciation methods rather than mandating
a common methodology created a loophole for operating ex
penses reporting. The Times [October 3, 1907, p. 13] noted that
the larger rail systems were seeing a decrease in earnings because of the new depreciation rules. The article then indicated that the railroad community “in principle approved of the
requirements of the commission … but in their practical application, many have found flaws.” Surprisingly, this article also
mentioned that some U.S. railroads were already depreciating
equipment on the books, but this was far from a uniform practice. The article then closed with a prophecy: “One thing the
Interstate Commerce Commission will be asked to do is to reduce these charges to some uniform basis. Meanwhile some of
the roads, which have adopted a percentage of depreciation,
find their net earnings are reduced at a rate, which is very discomforting to the men in charge of finance.” Although this high
rate of depreciation may have resulted in reduced profits in the
short run, its probable long-term result may be to increase tariff rates by showing the ICC that return on investment was not
reasonable since current income is compared to assets whose
values were reduced by depreciation reserves. The only way to
stabilize this trend for the railroad was, of course, the continued replacement of equipment.
In a companion article, the Times [October 15, 1907, p. 10]
reported that some roads were concerned that the new depreciation rules might result in a double counting of expenses because, according to the article, “the commission ruled that in
addition to the charges for depreciation all charges for renewals must be included in operating expenses.” Again, the railroads misunderstood that a charge for depreciation reduced
book value as the expense was recognized. The article concluded by forecasting that, “unless the commission does change,
some railroads will resort to a reduction in the percentages of
depreciation which they have been charging.” The Times [December 30, 1907, p. 10] noted that, “It is doubted … whether
the Commission will be able to decide on any uniform percentage of depreciation.” In essence, the railroads were required to
choose rates that fit their situations, and the Commission had
put off the temptation of standardizing depreciation rates across
the board. The article finishing by saying, “it is admitted on all
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sides that very great care will have to be exercised on the commission in fixing any precise percentage for depreciation charges in order to avoid establishing a standard which would meet
the case of some roads, but either exceed or fall short of the
requirements.”
Revised Reporting Rules: The ICC fought back in January 1908
with the publication of new reporting rules for depreciation,
which included the aforementioned six-month ICC reporting
requirements and a new balance sheet classification showing
equipment at original cost less accumulated depreciation. The
Journal [February 27, 1908, p. 8] reported on this development
indicating that the ICC and Henry Adams had “undertaken an
exhaustive review of the treatment of depreciation charges by
interstate carriers during the six months ending December 31,
1907.” The new reporting rules were, in and of themselves, exhaustive and included “blanks” for listing all equipment and
providing separate valuations and depreciation rates, as well
as the impact per month on income and expenses. The Journal’s article went on to observe that this was a technical issue,
and it took familiarity with the railroad accounting to “appreciate fully the labor involved in answering such a series of questions.” These new rules were not merely clerical in nature because they also included onerous regulations that required the
chief railroad accounting officer to certify the accounting and
depreciation results.11 Finally, the article went on to relate that
a great many railroad companies had determined their depreciation charges, “making an intelligent guess at the average life
of locomotives … charging them accordingly.” The writer added
sympathetically: “It will be no small undertaking to apportion
these charges as minutely as the Commission’s desires.”
The problems over depreciation rates would continue for
many years as indicated in the ICC’s 1913 annual report where
it was noted [p. 39] that depreciation rates for similar equipment varied from 7% per year to zero. The report said that the
rates were due to differences in “policy” and were unrelated to
“physical depreciation.” Although the ICC report provided no
standard for depreciation rates, it did give an example that indicated a 1% charge rate would be unacceptably low as assets
11
In a similar fashion to the Hepburn Amendment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Section 302, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, required that
executives of all publicly held corporations had to sign an affidavit regarding the
accounting procedures used in the financial statements.
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would be overstated and a fictitious surplus created. The example then indicated that a 7% rate was probably too high, leading to an understatement of income and the creation of “secret reserves.” The “manipulation” of depreciation rates was of
concern to the ICC; it planned to rein in these problem reporters. The Commission made it clear to its readers that it had
the power to do so under law, but the tactics of the railroads
themselves were about to change. Since rhetoric and protest had
failed to dislodge the new accounting rules, it was evident that
the tide of power had turned against these once politically powerful railway concerns. They were left with only one recourse
– challenge the new accounting rules directly, first through civil disobedience and then, if necessary, the courts.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPRECIATION RULES
The rail industry, in a brief but combative article in the
Times [March 2, 1908, p. 10], continued to protest the high
cost of the application of the new depreciation rules. The article noted that there had been plenty of grumbling from railroad officers because the ICC had compelled them to include
monthly depreciation charges in operating expenses. It was reported that the politically powerful Pennsylvania Railroad had
gone so far as to refuse to comply with the order. Naturally, the
ICC wished to fortify its position with complete knowledge of
past and present accounting practices.
The Gazette [January 31, 1908, p. 681] confirmed the
Pennsy’s stance on this issue and that of the New York Central
as well. The publication indicated that the railroads, in making
monthly earnings reports to the ICC, declined to sign an ICC
affidavit to that effect. In response, the government proceeded
against these roads for non-compliance by sending a ten-day
notice compelling the roads to sign the affidavit. Earlier in the
debate, the Journal [October 5, 1907, p. 8] had reported that
there was no uniformity among railroads in their planned actions against the new accounting rules. At this point, it was reported that companies like the Pennsylvania Railroad had not
yet made final decisions to defy the accounting and reporting
orders permanently. The railroads’ indecision over litigation
may have had as much to do with the unknown future effect
that depreciation would have in the future financial outcomes
of the companies as to the authority of the orders themselves
because some roads were actually benefiting from the change.
Regardless of the vacillating opinions of the industry, at
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this late date, any legal recourse appeared limited due to a Supreme Court ruling in January 1909 that supported depreciation charges for determining rates in the public utility industry.12 In City of Knoxville vs. Knoxville Water Company [212 U.S.
1], the Court ruled that “a deduction for depreciation from age
and use must be made from the estimated cost of reproducing
a waterworks plant when determining the present value of the
tangible property for the purpose of testing the reasonableness
of the rates fixed by a municipal ordinance.” This ruling indicated that depreciation was a “determinant of, not an allocation
of net income,” rendering invalid the utility’s argument that depreciation was confiscatory in nature.
The possibilities for legal action began to improve when
the Lehigh Valley Railroad announced in the Times [October
18, 1909, p. 13] that it was refusing to recognize the authority of the Commission. In short, their argument was that the
ICC had the authority to promulgate accounting requirements,
but not to force them on the roads. This protest was directed
against the ICC’s final installment of the uniform accounting
regulations in August 1909. These regulations, according to the
report, “restrict(s) the discretion of the directors in the matter
of charges for depreciation of equipment.”13
These issues reported by the Times may have been only
“shadow problems,” while the real issue centered on the new
form of a balance sheet formulated by the ICC that showed
more detail about capital and asset accounts. The formal protest to the ICC from the Lehigh Railroad indicated that the company believed that the accounting orders “assumed an authority which was not intended to be granted to the commission
by Section 20 for the act … and further believes the adoption of
said orders will not before the best interests of the railroad.”
Essentially the railroad felt that the accounting rules were an
unwarranted appropriation of the company’s surplus.
The railroad also contended that those depreciation charges applied to the cost of betterments (repairs) and not the purchase of additional or replacement equipment. It argued that,
“it is not the desire of the [railroad] to enter at this time into
12
Public utilities included water, gas, and power companies which did not
come under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
13
As a side note, the new rules actually gave the railroads more flexibility
in determining what amounts should be capitalized by allowing labor to be expensed under certain conditions. In addition, the ICC relented and combined the
accounting for betterments and additions. This had the effect of streamlining the
number of accounts required.
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any argument with the commission regarding the merit or lack
of merit of the systems of accounting prescribed in the orders
mentioned above, as the statistician of the commission, we understand has been favored in conference with the views of our
representative.” The ICC had apparently listened to the Lehigh’s
complaints but had either dismissed or ignored them. The article went on to comment that while there were no current plans
for litigation, the railroad was thinking “about testing the validity of the orders in law or equity.” It should be noted here that
the railroad, in its discussion, moved from mentioning Adams’
name to the more pejorative “statistician of the commission.”
The debate was turning personal.
To add another wrinkle to the rail industry’s anti-depreciation stance, the article mentioned, “the system promulgated by
the commission partakes in many respects the practice followed
by the British railroads, the financial condition of which, and
their cost of performing service, not withstanding lower wage
rates paid in that country, being too well known to elaborate
explanation.” Delano also complained about this perceived British bias and the apparent inefficiencies in its transportation system. The “anti-British” focus may have started when Adams, in
a letter to the railroads in 1908, quoted a British accountant as
having said: “No profit can exist until the expired outlay of productive plant has been provided out of gross revenue” [Chapman, 1908, p. 623].
A similar article in the Journal [October 18, 1909, p. 6] a
week later framed much the same argument by claiming that
capitalizing betterments (repairs in the eyes of the railroads) is
an appropriation of income and an increase in asset value on
the balance sheet that the stockholders would improperly perceive as source of new capital rather than a charge to profit
and loss. The 1909 rules apparently changed the focus of the
roads because they were now worried about a public perception of too little expense rather than the 1907 problem of too
many new charges.
The Journal also thought that it would be unwise for American railroads to adopt excessive capitalization that had worked
“so disastrously” for English railroads. W.G. Taylor defined the
term “overcapitalization” as “capitalization (stocks and bonds)
merely in excess of the cost of production or reproduction of
the plant” [Johnson, 1908, p. 325].14 It was thought that in the
14
The British also felt that the Americans were moving to their system. A
sarcastic article regarding the situation was published in the British account-
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absence of a dollar for dollar match in long-term bonds and
fixed assets, it would be assumed that the railroads were gouging the public because of the higher rates needed to cover any
“excess borrowing.” Overcapitalization went against the public good. The more colloquial term for this methodology was
“stock watering,” which had given the railroads a bad reputation in the past. This issue would continue contentious for the
next 20 years and would be the crux of future rate arguments.
It constituted the central reason why the ICC was going to attempt systematically to standardize the “value” of all railroads
in the U.S.
Before any of the railroads could file against the ICC, a
parallel set of lawsuits began working their way through the
courts. The Goodrich Transportation Company and the White
Star Lines attempted to have the 1910 issuance of Special Report Circular 10, which required them to report certain accounting data to the ICC, overturned in court. In ICC vs. Goodrich Transportation Lines and White Star Line [224 U.S. 194],
the two companies argued that they did not come under ICC
jurisdiction because the law creating the ICC implied that only
shipping lines affiliated with railroads could be regulated. As
independent Great Lakes steamship lines, they were therefore
exempt. The Times [April 2, 1912, p. 15] reported that that the
court disagreed and indicated that they were required to follow
ICC regulations because they were a business in the pursuit of
interstate commerce by definition of the law.
Because the courts allowed the ICC to require formal reporting by the water-borne carriers, the railroads’ protests over
accounting and reporting issues appeared to be dead, except for
one challenge from the Kansas City Southern Railroad filed in
November 1911. The Journal [November 17, 1911, p. 1] reported that the railroad sued in Commerce Court over the refusal
of the Commission to allow the capitalization of certain outlays.
The argument was narrow and dealt with a $10 million charge
that the ICC wanted taken into income because the railroad did
not “charge against earnings the estimated replacement value
of six parcels of abandoned roads incident to grade reduction.”
Simply put, it had not offset the cost of new railroad grades
ing journal Accountant on July 20, 1907. It noted: “The ‘reform’ is curiously interesting inasmuch as it affords a rather pathetic spectacle of the United States
striving to get back to the low level of British railroad statistics and Great Britain struggling to attain the fullness of perfection exhibited by the now discarded
American method” [ Journal of Accountancy, 1907, p. 318].

Published by eGrove, 2006

127

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
Heier: U.S. Railroad Depreciation

119

they had completed with the value of the abandoned right-ofways for depreciation purposes. The railroad felt that this process not only hurt income but also impaired the market value of bonds issued to pay for the betterments. There appeared
to be a contradiction in the ICC regulations because it allowed
capitalization on the grade changes to the existing right-of-way
but not for the change in location of the same rail system that
would have substantially reduced operating costs.
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kansas City Southern vs. U.S. [231 U.S. 423], upholding the ICC’s rules [the Journal, December 6, 1913, p. 1]: “The Supreme Court sustained a
ruling of the ICC, and established absolute authority of that
body to decide questions of accounting practice.” Adams, however, could not savor this 1913 victory as he had retired two
years earlier from the ICC after nearly 25 years of service. Although the seven-year debate over accounting policy had started
out cordially enough, by the time of his retirement it was beginning to get ugly with civil disobedience, litigation, and recriminations. A Times editorial [September 24, 1910] eyed the suspicious nature of the ICC as it pertained to the dual issues of
accounting treatments and railroad valuation. The article took
the stance that no two railroads could ever be valued the same,
“Yet, it is the [holy] grail of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”
The critical tone of the editorial seemed to point to the illadvised concept that all railroads were equal and that such regu
lations would harm the industry. Adams was portrayed sarcastically: “In obedience to the theories of Prof. Adams [the ICC] has
adopted a system of accounting designed to impede the methods of betterments from earnings which has made the capitalization of American railroads a world’s marvel.” This was probably another veiled reference to the opinion that English roads
were overcapitalized. Whether the ICC indeed viewed the English system of accounting to be superior is not known, but it
probably saw most other industries embracing economic depreciation and became unrelenting on the issue, wavering little from its basic theory. Such regulations, as the railroads and
the press felt, penalized the efficient and well-run railroad.
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
By the end of 1913, the ICC had essentially won on the
i ssues of uniform accounting measures and its authority to
impose reporting requirements on the railroads. The ICC’s
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 nnual report [1913, p. 39] noted: “The Commission continues
a
to receive … the cooperation and assistance of different classes
of carriers in formulating accounting systems which will furnish the Commission with the largest possible measure or information while recognizing the practical limitations.” Within
the next year, the ICC would issue a wide range of accounting
regulations for all the constituent industries and companies under its jurisdiction. Round one of the great American deprecia
tion debate was over.
The ICC and the related concepts of “economic depreciation” and “cost matching” were clear winners, but the necessity of maintaining efficient rail operations in a large, prosperous, and growing country would take precedence over theory
for the near future. In an apparent vindication and a mild rebuke to the theories of Henry C. Adams, the ICC granted the
railroads a five percent rate increase on December 18, 1914. Although reported as a victory for the railroads, it was indicated in the Times [December 19, 1914, p. 1] that gross revenues
compared to expenses had dropped drastically since 1910 due to
the “inelastic nature of many expenses.” According to the Commission, the “recent increased provisions for depreciation … that
may militate against a fair comparison of … comparable statistical items … we cannot say this on the record that such charges as the present returned by the carriers are excessive, viewed
with from the standpoint of proper accounting.”
The ICC commissioners, even with the accounting data before them, could not decide upon the reasonableness of rates of
return as envisioned by Adams, but neither did they scrap the
new system in favor of the old pre-1907 betterment accounting
rules. In this case, it appeared that regardless of what the rates
of return were telling the ICC about them, the railroads were
not generating enough income and corresponding cash flow to
cover operations and complete the necessary asset replacements
mandated by the ICC. In fact, the ICC realized that the roads
were in a dire situation because they would be unable to float
bonds in Europe to finance replacements due to the war that
had erupted in August 1914. In the end, even with Professor
Adams’ rate theories and uniform accounting data, the decision
had come down to one of expediency and necessity to maintain
the integrity of the American rail system for the traveling and
shipping public. In the meantime, the accounting policy of the
railroads would remain at odds with those of American industry in general for some time to come.
The depreciation debate was again renewed in 1923 when
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the ICC ordered the depreciation of track right-of-way and way
structures. This order set off another ten years of protests and
litigation that would culminate in the ICC’s canceling the orders in 1933 due to the economic depression. The final phase
of the debate over betterment accounting would recommence in
the mid-1950s with an attempt by Arthur Andersen to reinvigorate an economically moribund rail system through the convergence of railroad accounting practices with industry GAAP.
This time Arthur Andersen challenged the theoretical underpinnings of railroad accounting rules in light of depreciation
standards issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedures
during World War II. The debate created a strange coalition as
Arthur Andersen stood against the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants which sided with the railroads and the
ICC. The final demise of betterment accounting for rail structures would occur in February 1983 when the ICC, bowing to
pressure from the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities
and Exchange Commission, abolished its usage. Congress abolished the ICC itself in December 1995.
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Street Journal: 5.
“Equipment Depreciation Plays many Roles in Recent Reports” (1908, October
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THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW
COMMITTEE OF THE CHESAPEAKE
AND OHIO CANAL COMPANY, 1828-1857:
EVIDENCE OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL
REPORTING AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Abstract: Canal companies were among the first enterprises to be
organized in the corporate form and to require large amounts of
capital. This paper examines the stockholder review committee of a
19th century corporation, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company (C&O), and discusses how the C&O used this corporate govern
ance structure to monitor and improve financial management and
operations. A major strength was the concern and dedication of the
stockholders to the company, while a major weakness was the political control exerted by the State of Maryland. The paper provides
an historical perspective on corporate governance in the 19th century. This research contributes to the literature by providing detailed
workings and practices of a stockholder review committee. The paper
documents corporate governance efforts in archival sources that provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter and the manner in which the stockholders carried out this responsibility.

INTRODUCTION
Canal companies were among the earliest enterprises to be
organized in a corporation form, and they were also among the
first to require large amounts of capital. Raising the needed capital resulted in absentee owners who required financial inforAcknowledgments: We express our appreciation to the anonymous reviewers and the editor emeritus, Steve Walker, for their comments and suggestions
which improved the paper significantly.
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mation. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a  better
understanding of the origins of corporate governance and financial management in the U.S. by examining activities of a
19th century canal corporation’s stockholder review committee,
specifically that of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company
(C&O). While other studies have discussed accounting practices and procedures of companies in different industries during
this time [Kistler, 1980; McKinstry, 1996; Michael, 1996; Previts and Samson, 2000], there is limited discussion in the literature of corporate governance during the canal era. The C&O
broke ground in 1828, and construction was completed to Cumberland, Maryland in 1850. The company continued operations
until 1889.
A review of the accounting literature reveals that little has
been written about the corporate governance and financial management practices of canals. Kistler [1980] presented an analysis of the accounting practices and management of the Middlesex Canal, which was built from 1793 to 1804 and operated
until 1850. As part of its corporate governance, the Middlesex
Canal Company used a stockholder review committee to audit the company financial records. Stockholder review committees have also been found in early railroad companies (e.g., the
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad [Previts and Samson, 2000]). While
these studies present evidence of the existence of stockholder review committees, they do not provide details of their workings
or findings although some limited evidence of the operations of
a review committee is presented by McKee [1979]. Our study
of the stockholder review committee of the C&O contributes to
the literature by providing evidence of the workings and practices of a canal company that operated independently between
1828 and 1889. It identifies an early example of accountability
required by a corporate charter.
At the time of the C&O’s founding in 1828, there were
very few corporations. There were no known established corporate governance or financial reporting practices in the U.S. In
his discussion of the Forth and Clyde Navigation Company of

Scotland, Forrester [1978] noted many innovative business practices. Boockholdt [1983], in describing early railroad accounting, observed that prior to these early corporations, there were
no precedents for disclosure or accounting methods to be used.
Previts and Samson [2000], in their study of the Baltimore &

For comparison, the Erie Canal was 363 miles and built in eight years
(1817-1825). The C&O was 186 miles and took 22 years to construct.
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Ohio Railroad (B&O), provided evidence that the financial reporting of early corporations evolved over time. They observed
that the B&O served as a school for railroad companies by providing an example of company management that other companies could emulate. Claire [1945] provided further evidence
by describing the evolution of financial reporting at U.S. Steel
around the turn of the century and noting that a measure of
reporting progress was to chart the changes in the annual reporting style of a single company.
The research of the current study takes the evolution in financial reporting a step further by examining the catalyst for
evolutionary change. It is hypothesized in this paper that one
catalyst for change resulted from the accountability demands of
stockholders. In the case of the C&O, the stockholders used the
stockholder review committee to effect this evolutionary change
not only in financial reporting but also corporate governance.
The following section provides a brief discussion of the canal era in the U.S. Information regarding the origins of corporate governance at the C&O is then presented, followed by a discussion of the stockholder review committee and the financial
management of the company. The final section provides some
concluding comments.
THE CANAL ERA IN THE U.S.
As a young man, George Washington had surveyed land and
rivers throughout Virginia into the Ohio Valley. In 1772, Washington proposed the establishment of a company to make improvements on the Potomac River. In that year, Washington obtained a charter from the House of Burgesses in Williamsburg,
Virginia; however, the charter was not ratified by the Maryland
legislature. The start of the Revolutionary War ended all consideration of the project.
In the fall of 1783, General George Washington resigned his
commission as commander-in-chief of the revolutionary army.
On September 2, 1784, Washington started a tour of the western territories to examine his land holdings and to determine
the feasibility of waterway improvements between the coastal
region of the country and the Ohio Valley. In a letter to Virginia
governor Benjamin Harrison on October 10, 1784, Washington

Thomas Johnson presented the charter proposal to the Maryland legislature. Joint approval of the charter was necessary because the state boundary was
set on the Virginia shore.
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bespoke the need for improved communication and transportation with the western territories. The letter reflected Washington’s fears that without communication and trade, the western territories would become Spanish by virtue of trading with
then Spanish New Orleans. From this letter was born the canal movement in the U.S. Survey notes of George Washington,
included in the letter to Governor Harrison, indicated that the
Potomac River route was the shortest distance between Pittsburgh (on the Ohio River) and Tidewater (an Atlantic seaport).
Over the next three months, Washington would travel between
Mount Vernon, Annapolis, and Richmond to obtain, in 1784,
the corporate charter of the Potomac Company.
The Potomac Company made various improvements in the
navigation of the Potomac River. Obstructions were cleared and
canals built around major obstructions, such as the great falls
several miles upriver from Georgetown, Maryland (now in the
District of Columbia).
However, by the early 1820s, the Potomac Company had exhausted its funds, and the navigational improvements carried
out by the company were proving inadequate for the needs of
the region and country. In 1823, a new group of individuals obtained a charter from Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the
federal government to form a new company. The new company,
the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, would absorb the assets, liabilities, and stockholders of the Potomac Company. The
goal of this new enterprise was to build an artificial river (canal) from tidewater Potomac to the Ohio River at Pittsburgh
[Sanderlin, 1946].
The C&O was never profitable enough to pay off the corporate debt borrowed for construction and repairs. However,
the company was able to survive for over 100 years (including
the predecessor Potomac Company). The canal was financially
successful during the 1870s to the 1880s, but this success was
neither sufficient to pay off the corporate debt nor to provide
a return to the stockholders. During this time, the company’s
administrators were successful in waging a political war with
the B&O [Dilts, 1993]. Severe flooding in 1877 and 1889 caused
major damage to the canal works. After the 1889 flood, fund
Persons promoting the C&O Canal and the Erie Canal [Shaw, 1966], as well
as other canal promoters, quote the letter from Washington to Governor Harrison. During the canal era in the U.S., hundreds of miles of canals were constructed to provide transport and communications between cities and states [Appendix 1].
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ing was not available to make repairs, and the C&O was forced
into receivership.
Following receivership, the B&O Railroad emerged as the
majority owner of the repair bonds holding the mortgage on
the canal and assumed control of the C&O. Funding provided
by the B&O allowed the canal to be repaired and returned to
service in 1892; however, another flood in 1924 resulted in the
canal being closed permanently. In 1938, the federal government purchased the canal assets from the B&O for $2 million
[Sanderlin, 1946], and in 1971, the canal was designated a national park.
With the impacts of nature and technology, the C&O succumbed to its archrival, the B&O. The B&O competed on three
fronts – goods to transport, construction routes, and construction funding. The railroad was also a technological rival. Over
the life of the C&O, railroad technology improved and lowered
the cost of rail transport. Canal technology was at its peak and
was unable to make additional efficiency improvements to compete with the railroad. The C&O stockholders, including states,
towns, and the federal government which had contributed the
millions of dollars needed for construction, never received a return on their investment.
The C&O, while never profitable for the individual investors, was beneficial for the region it served. Ransom [1964] stated that economic historians have focused on the railroad as the
most important factor in U.S. economic growth. He argued that
this is misguided, that canal construction in the U.S. predated
the railroads, and that the canals should be re-evaluated to reflect their contribution to U.S. economic growth. Ransom further urged that since canals were not a system, they should be
evaluated individually for their economic contributions.
At the time the federal government purchased the C&O
canal assets (1938), the available corporate records were also
transferred to the government and now reside at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. Included in the records
are the board of directors’ minute books and The Minutes of the
Proceedings of the Subscribers of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
Company (referred to in this paper as the stockholder minute
books) which are the primary sources for this paper. As separate documents, annual reports were presented to stockholders
of the C&O; however, the annual reports for only select years
reside in the National Archives. The list and location of the annual reports for the years covered in this study are presented
in Appendix 2.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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THE ORIGINS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AT THE C&O
The accounting records left by the C&O present evidence of
the corporate governance and financial management of a 19th
century corporation. The 1784 charter of the Potomac Company, after which the C&O’s charter was modeled, required an annual meeting of the stockholders. Thus, the Potomac Company
charter stated that at the annual meeting the “president and directors shall make report, and render distinct and just accounts
of all their proceedings, and on finding them fairly and justly stated, the proprietors then present, or a majority of them,
shall give a certificate thereof” [1784 Virginia Act, p. 515]. This
charge to the corporate officers represents a significant event in
the history of U.S. corporate governance and financial management for it provides a very early example of corporate accountability required by charter. To accomplish this requirement, the
stockholders at each annual meeting of the Potomac Company
selected a committee to review the annual report of the company. The first stockholder meeting was held May 17, 1785. At
the next meeting, held August 7, 1786, a committee of stockholders was selected to examine the records of the treasurer.
The committee reported back to the stockholders the following
day that the accounts were “fairly and justly stated” [Potomac
Company, 1785-1796]. This process was repeated annually.
The 1823 charter of the C&O was almost identical to that
of the Potomac Company and included the phrase above referenced. The charter also stated that the C&O would absorb
the assets, liabilities, and stockholders of the Potomac Company. In so doing it also adopted some of the practices of the Potomac Company, including its corporate governance structure.
The C&O hired a full-time president and a part-time board of
directors.
The C&O continued the practice, started by the Potomac
Company, of having a stockholder committee appointed at the
annual meeting review the current year’s annual report (presented by the company president and the directors) and report
their findings back to the stockholders. A subcommittee would
be selected within the review committee to scrutinize the financial records of the company. This procedure continued until
the June 1831 stockholders meeting at which time this practice
was modified. The stockholders then passed a resolution stating that a committee should be appointed each year to review
the annual report of the next year. The resolution directed that
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the president and directors should have the report ready two
weeks before the scheduled annual meeting to allow the review
committee time to examine the report and prepare its evaluation. The reports prepared by these annual review committees
are presented in the stockholder minute books and assist us in
understanding the functioning of the company’s corporate governance structure.
After completing the canal to Cumberland, Maryland in
1850, the practice of having a committee review the annual report was again modified. As mentioned, the original practice
was for the committee to review the practices and decisions of
the president and directors with a subcommittee reviewing the
company’s financial records. With the completion of the canal
to Cumberland, it seemed there was less need for the stockholder committee to review the decisions of the president and
directors. Therefore, under the new arrangement, three or four
stockholders present at the current stockholder meeting were
selected to review the next year’s annual report, mainly focusing on an examination of the financial records of the company. Additionally, other committees would be established as the
stockholders felt necessary to examine particular issues of interest to them. For instance, a committee in 1855 was appointed
to review a proposal for leasing waterpower to the Alexandria
Canal Company, and again in 1869, a committee was selected
to investigate a proposal to abandon the C&O and turn its assets and operations over to the corporate bondholders.
The company charter provided for a weighting process of
stock voting rights to favor the small, individual investor. The
charter stated that “each member shall be allowed one vote for
every share, as far as ten shares, and one vote for every five
shares above ten” [1784 Virginia Act, p. 513]. The original stock
subscriptions gave the U.S. federal government 40 percent of
the voting rights at stockholder meetings. By 1836, the State of
Maryland had taken control by means of continued subscriptions to stock in the company [Sanderlin, 1946].
Exhibit 1 demonstrates that the State of Maryland investment was five times larger that any other governmental investor.
With the additional subscription of stock in 1836, the State of
Maryland controlled more than 50 percent of the voting stock
rights of the company. Individual investors were noted in a subscriber’s log maintained by the company.
The charter for the C&O was obtained in 1823; however, the
first annual meeting was not held until 1828. These years were
spent obtaining stock subscriptions from the States of Maryhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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EXHIBIT 1
Stock Subscriptions to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal
Company, 1828-1836
Subscriber
Federal Government
City of Washington
City of Georgetown
City of Alexandria
State of Virginia
State of Maryland
Individuals

1828

1836

$1,000,000
1,000,000
250,000
250,000
250,000
500,000
468,889

$1,000,000
1,000,000
250,000
250,000
250,000
5,000,000
468,889

land and Virginia, as well as stock subscriptions from the U.S.
government.
Political Environment of the C&O: Any study of the C&O Canal
Company must consider the economic development and political role of the company. The first president of the C&O was
Charles Fenton Mercer who served from 1828 to 1833. Mercer
was then chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Roads and
Canals. It was Mercer who had introduced the legislation for the
C&O charter and for the U.S. government’s subscription to stock
in the company. By 1833, when John Eaton replaced Mercer as
company president, Andrew Jackson had been elected president
of the United States. Jackson’s predecessor, John Quincy Adams,
was a member of a different political party, and the stockholders of the C&O, in an attempt to enlist further support of the
federal government, supported a change in the company’s presidency to Eaton, who was a member of Jackson’s political party [Garraty and Carnes, 1999].
The officers of the C&O changed to reflect the political party in power in the Maryland statehouse. Maryland had by far
the largest financial interest in the C&O. Such was the power of Maryland over the company that the state’s selection of
nominees for the president and the directors of the company
was tantamount to their election. At the April 1841 stockholder meeting, the committee reviewing the annual report made
the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841, pp. 417-418]:


The company president was elected annually to serve a one-year term.
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The committee, from evidence given them, are satisfied that very valuable and faithful officers have been
removed from the service of the company, and, in some
cases, men not competent to perform the duties required have been appointed in their places, to the serious injury of the best interest of the company.
Some of these removals have been as admitted by
the president’s report to the governor of Maryland, for
political opinion’s sake which, as your committee conceive, no direct interest of the company either required
or demanded.
In addition to these views already presented, there
are other matters which might be adverted to if the time
allowed for this report would permit, which go strongly
to induce this committee to believe that the affairs of
the canal company have been most unfortunately managed.
At this same 1841 meeting, the stockholders, recognizing the
costs of continuous changes in company management, passed
a resolution stating that the C&O is a work of national importance and should not become a political engine and fluctuate
with the tide of the party in power [Minutes of the Proceedings
of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841), p. 414].
Sanderlin [1947] further illustrated the political nature of
the company in his article on Arthur Gorman and the C&O Canal Company. Sanderlin described Gorman’s rise to power in
Maryland politics through his position as the president of the
C&O Canal Company. In 1872, Gorman was “elected” to the
presidency of the canal company in the same year that Gorman’s benefactor William Whyte was elected governor of Maryland. Sanderlin [1947, p. 324] called this “an appointment to
the presidency  …  as a reward for his services in behalf of his
party.”
In 1881, the bondholders also complained about political
appointments in company management. They presented a petition at the annual stockholder meeting containing the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers …  ,
Vol. E (1856-1889, pp. 336-337]:
That they [the bondholders] have received no payments on account thereof since December 1876. That
they believe if the canal is managed on business principles, free from political influences, it can and will pay
the debts due to them.
That they believe it is now and has been for years
too much controlled and managed as a political mahttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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chine for the purposes of promoting the interest of party without proper regard to those of the State of Maryland, who is the largest creditor or of the bondholders.
The minority stockholders made attempts to gain more influence within the company. At the June 1879 annual meeting,
the individual representing the stock held by the U.S. government presented a motion to change the method of election of
the board of directors. The motion was that the board of directors should consist of three members elected by the State
of Maryland and two members elected by the minority stockholders. This motion failed with the State of Maryland voting
against the motion and all other stockholders voting in favor.
By 1836, the State of Maryland had purchased more than
50% of the voting stock of the C&O through additional stock
subscriptions. To oversee the state’s interest in the various companies in which the state had invested, a Board of Public Works
was created in 1825. The original purpose of the board was to
oversee state investments in corporations and to locate additional investment opportunities. The goal of the state was to provide income for the operation of the state government without
direct taxation [Wilner, 1984].
The state did not exercise direct managerial control over
the various state investments. In 1850, the State of Maryland
held a constitutional convention and the oversight of the various state corporate investments was an area of significant debate. Mr. Thomas, the representative from Frederick County,
stated that there was a difference between Maryland and other states with canal investments. The difference was that the
internal improvements companies in other states were owned,
built, and operated by the states as state non-profit entities. Mr.
Smith of Alleghany County said that the state had no duty but
to attend the annual meeting and cast the state’s vote. He further said that the state can have no supervision over the works;
the charter gives entire control to the president and directors
of the company [Wilner, 1984].
THE STOCKHOLDER REVIEW COMMITTEE AND
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
As stated previously, the C&O annually created a committee of stockholders to review the annual report of the president and directors. McKee [1979] discussed the use of a stockholder review committee to perform the audit function at the
East Tennessee and Western North Carolina Railroad Company
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(ET&WN), a company organized in 1866. His paper presented
evidence of the stockholder review committee’s querying certain
payments in the ET&WN company records.
In her paper on the Middlesex Canal, Kistler [1980] stated
that the stockholders of that company relied upon a committee of their number to perform the audit function each year.
She further stated that the committee does not appear to have
reviewed all transactions, noting that the review performed in
1830 was completed in one week, too short a period to complete an audit of all transactions However, she noted that the
degree of audit thoroughness could not be determined.
The C&O review committee recognized similar limitations
in their auditing. In 1838, the review committee made the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers  …  , Vol. B (1836-1841), pp. 176-177]:
The committee have [sic] not, of course, been able to
examine the vouchers of all whom money has been paid
during the year, because such an investigation would require much more time than was allowed them to devote
to it; nor did it seem necessary, inasmuch as the requisitions had received the approbation and were authorized
by the board of directors. They could do nothing more
than look over the requisitions, or warrants, issued for
disbursement, examine the books of the treasurer and
clerk, and vouchers for the expenditure of the contingent fund, etc. and these they have found to be correct
and satisfactory.
In 1839, the C&O review committee, commenting on estimated figures on the financial statements, made this further observation [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B
(1836-1841), p. 291]:
From these causes the statements may be found to
require some variation but although not exact, the subcommittee are [sic] induced to believe, that they are at
least proximately correct in the available basis that they
exhibit for the demands of the current year.
Such “limitations” did not keep the review committee from admonishing the company officers when irregularities were encountered.
Early corporations were founded without any pre-existing
corporate governance methods to follow. The C&O was one of
the first U.S. corporations and, thus, had no other companies
to emulate with respect to its financial reporting or corporate
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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governance systems. One outcome of this was a trial and error
approach to corporate governance and financial reporting.
Over the life of the C&O, the stockholders reviewing the
company finances made numerous observations and recommendations. The first recommendation for change came in
1834, when the review committee directed that [Minutes of the
Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. A (1828-1835), pp. 361362]:
1) Requisitions for salaries and services state the time
period the person was being paid for and the capac
ity in which the person had served the company.
2) Changes be made regarding presentation of the financial statements. For instance, previously the
treasurer’s report consisted of one statement showing total receipts and expenditures for the company
to-date. The recommendation of the review committee was to present a column for the current year information and a separate column for the company
to-date information.
3) Expenses for repairs be accounted for and reported
separately from expenses for construction of the canal.
4) A statement showing the amount of goods being
transported on the canal be presented.
In 1839, the review committee made the following observation
[Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (18361841), p. 289]:
The clerk’s statement however shows other receipts
to the amount of $11,175.58 arising from tolls, rents,
etc. gathered by the several superintendents, which
have been used and accounted for by them in disbursements in the service of the company; consequently these
receipts have not passed through the books of the treas
urer.
Stating that the “practice seems irregular and inconvenient,”
the review committee directed that this process be terminated
and that all receipts and expenditures be “passed through,” or
recorded, in the treasurer’s books.
Two stockholder meetings were held in 1841. At the April
meeting, the review committee admonished the company with
the following statement [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. B (1836-1841), pp. 415-416]:
In one of the documents referred to by the president and directors, in their report of this day, there is a
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statement purporting to be a ‘statement of the debts &
credits of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company on
the first of January 1841,’ but this is admitted to be incorrect. It is therefore not to be relied upon.
The committee are [sic] therefore unable to present
any satisfactory view on this point but will briefly state
that as well as they can ascertain, in the absence of official statements  …
The review committee further stipulated that the company bylaws required that the treasurer present a financial report at
each monthly board meeting, which had not been done since
the current treasurer had been in office. The review committee made further statements regarding individual transactions
relating to the sale of bonds issued by the State of Maryland
for stock subscriptions. It also observed that the manner in
which the bond sales were handled had cost the company a
substantial amount of money. As a result, the stockholders removed the company president, the treasurer, and the directors
from office.
At the August 1841 stockholders meeting, the review committee, having examined the company records further, identified
additional problems. The review committee noted that several
irregularities in vouchers were traced to a disregard of company policy by the former company president. The review committee also divulged that during the five months leading up to
the change in officers, no accounting entries were made in the
company books.
In 1845, the review committee made the following observation about the company’s method of bookkeeping and asked
that it be changed [Minutes of the Proceedings of the Subscribers … , Vol. C (1842-1846), pp. 488-489]:
They find that under the directions given to the
t reasurer, and in accordance with the custom, which
has heretofore prevailed in the company, payments have
been made for more than one purpose on the same warrant and the whole payment charged under the head of
the principal item for which the warrant was drawn.
In consequence of this circumstance the abstract of
receipts into and payments from the treasury instead of

The treasurer referred to had been elected at the last annual meeting for the
first time and had not served a full year. The board of directors met monthly. The
company treasurer was supposed to present a financial report to the board at
each of these monthly meetings.
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exhibiting the actual condition of the affairs of the company in its items as well as in its final balances, only
show the amount charged in the treasurers books under
each head in the abstract instead of the whole amount
of expenses properly chargeable under that head. Thus
under the head of pay of lockkeepers, it appears by abstract that the amount paid in 1845 was $627, whereas
by reference to the accounts of the company it is found
that the whole amount properly chargeable under this
head is $7,801,00.
The final review committee admonishment contained in
the stockholder minute book came in 1857 and related to the
organizational structure. At the 1855 annual meeting, a new
slate of company officers had been elected. These officers had
made changes to the company organization (such as combining the offices of treasurer and clerk). As a result of these unpopular changes in company organization, a new slate of officers was elected at the 1856 annual meeting, and the former
company organization was restored. The 1857 review committee opined that they were grateful to see the former organization restored.
Once the canal was completed to Cumberland in 1850 [Appendix 1], the activity level of the review committee tapered off
with respect to officers and directors, but admonitions with regard to company finance increased. After 1857, the review committee ceased providing commentary. No specific evidence in the
records at our disposal seems to explain this phenomenon, but
some observations seem plausible. After the two decades that
constituted the development stage of the canal, the review committee may have outlived its role as the protector of the stockholders’ interests.
By l850, the prospects for the canal’s completion to Pittsburgh were greatly diminished. The exploitation of recently
discovered coalfields, proximate to Cumberland, made a ready
market for canal transport. With the changing leadership and
political climate in Maryland, this revised market role wherein
rail transport was in ascendancy decreased the incentives for
additional effort to perfect canal transport. In short, the canal
era was reaching an end. A new generation of shareholders
with different, and perhaps less ambitious, expectations may
have become resigned to the declining viability of this form of
transportation. Evidence of this change in interest is found in
the significantly diminished levels of attendance and participation at stockholder meetings. Given the prominent past profile
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of state ownership representatives, it is apparent that the political interest in, and support for, the canal as the “best bet” in
transportation had waned. By the l870s, an entirely different
generation of shareholder representatives were likely involved,
those content to accept the diminished prospects of the canal
despite a brief interlude of profitability.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The surviving records of the C&O Canal Company provide opportunities for improved understanding of the processes of corporate governance and relatedly the financial management and reporting techniques employed by officials of an
early American corporate enterprise. In addition, the materials
provide an early example of accountability required in a corporate charter. In the discharge of this accountability requirement, the company adopted a stockholder review committee to
oversee the annual reporting of the company to the stockholders. The process and findings of the review committee provide
an example of the innovative processes by which the stockholders amended the corporate governance and financial reporting
practices of the company.
The details of the activities of the shareholder review committee discovered in the C&O records reveal a pronounced level of involvement in the oversight of financial activities. This
paper contributes to the literature of accounting history identified in previous research by McKee [1979], Kistler [1980], and
Boockholdt [1983] which has been used to orient our findings
with reference to stockholder committees and canal accounting
and operations in other U.S. settings.
The activities of the C&O stockholder review committee
discovered in our research support and inform our understanding of early control and reporting practices in U.S. corporations
during the canal era. This evidence has shown that in the case
of the C&O, the evolutionary process of financial reporting and
corporate governance was greatly affected by the stockholder review committee. This group requested and effected changes in
financial reporting and corporate governance. Previts and Samson [2000] described the evolution of financial reporting found
in the annual reports of the B&O. This paper provides evidence
that in the C&O, the catalyst for this type of evolutionary change
was the stockholder review committee.
Future research into the financing, operations, and governance of U.S. canals is called for in order to identify the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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 ractices of other canal companies. Such knowledge may assist
p
both in identifying what constituted commonplace practice and
the further tracing back of the origins of such practices.
We encourage scholars to continue to investigate canal companies and the canal era not only for the sake of improving our
understanding of the origins of corporate governance and financial management, but also to provide a clearer conclusion as to
a particular episode, the dissolution of the C&O.
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APPENDIX 1
Canal and River Transportation in the 1850s

Source: http://www.nps.gov/carto/index.htm
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APPENDIX 2
List and Location of Annual Reports for the Chesapeake
and Ohio Canal Company for the Period of this Study:
1829-1857.
Number

Year

Location copied from

1
2

1829*
1830
1831

Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
1850
1851
1852
1853
1854
1855
1856
1857

Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
Library of VA
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
Library of VA
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
MD Law Library
NARA
UVA
MD Law Library
UVA
Report not located

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
MD Law Library: Maryland State Law Library, Annapolis, Maryland
Library of VA: The Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia
UVA: The University of Virginia Library
* The C&O broke ground in 1828, and the first annual report was presented at
the end of the first year of operations in 1829.
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Accounting History
Call for Papers
The fifth Accounting History International Conference
“Accounting in other places, Accounting by other peoples”
The Banff Centre, Banff, Alberta, Canada
9-11 August 2007
Sponsored by: College of Commerce at the University of Saskatchewan
and
Accounting History Special Interest Group of the
Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand
Conference papers will be accepted across a wide range of accounting history
topics, including those on the above theme, and a variety of methodological and
theoretical perspectives. However, in signifying a conference theme, authors are
encouraged to think about non-traditional topic areas and explore other places
and other peoples.
“Accounting in other places, Accounting by other peoples” would include such
topics as:
– The professionalisation of accounting in the developing world;
– The role of imperialism in spreading accounting practice;
– Accounting history issues that interface with race, gender or culture; and
– The role of accounting and accountants in non-business settings such as
art and music.
Submission and Review of Papers: Papers written in the English language
should be submitted electronically no later than 26 March 2007 to 5AHIC@muprivate.edu.au. All papers will be subject to a double-blind refereeing process
and will be published on the conference web site, as refereed conference proceedings unless otherwise advised.
Notification of Acceptance: Notification of papers accepted for inclusion in
the conference program will be made by 15 May 2007.
Conference information is available at the Conference website:
http://www.commerce.usask.ca/5AHIC
Information about The Banff Centre is available at:
http://www.banffcentre.ca
Inquires may be directed to the Conference Convenor,
Nola Buhr of the University of Saskatchewan, at the following e-mail address:
nola.buhr@usask.ca.
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THE R.J. CHAMBERS COLLECTION:
AN “ARCHIVIST’S” REVELATIONS OF
20th CENTURY ACCOUNTING
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE
Abstract: A major, unique accounting archival source, the R.J. Chambers Collection comprises both hard copy and, utilizing cutting-edge
search technology, internet accessible materials. From his academic
beginnings, Chambers was an orderly person, an archivist of the extensive and varied evidence that underpinned his proposals for accounting reform.
Opening research areas for accounting biography, the development of accounting thought, the history of accounting institutions,
prosopography, public sector accounting history, and comparative international accounting history are foremost amongst the myriad justifications for seeking to unravel the accounting history “lodes” in
archives such as the Goldberg, Chambers, and Briloff Collections
[Potter, 2003]. The archiving of the meticulously kept Chambers papers from 1947-1999 provides an opportunity for unfolding the background to events previously withheld from accounting history scholars. Professional episodes in relation to inflation accounting, standard
setting, proposals to reform accounting education, and the like that
appeared prima facie to be worth investigating are now open to scrutiny from a different angle, with a different type of evidence available
in this Collection. This Collection provides a high degree of archival
provenance. In particular, it represents an orderly retention of past
documentation of what Chambers wrote, and perhaps uniquely for
accounting historians, received; thus, providing an extensive window
from which to examine the disorderly present environment of acounting.
Acknowledgments: The R.J. Chambers Collection and this work was financed and assisted by The University of Sydney Accounting Foundation, the
Archives Unit, the Faculty of Economics and Business of The University of Sydney, and one of Australia’s major professional accounting bodies, CPA Australia.
The assistance of Cameron Esslemont and Angelika Dean is also greatly appreciated, as are the comments from two anonymous referees.
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BACKGROUND
Raymond John Chambers (1917-1999) has been described
by his 20th century peers as an “accounting pioneer” [Moonitz,
1982], an “intellectual giant of 20th century accounting thought”
[Barton, 1982; Mathews, 1982; Staubus, 2003], truly a “Renaissance man.” He was selected by Edwards [1994] as one of the
“twentieth century accounting thinkers;” by Colasse [2005] as
one of “les grands auteurs en comptabilité; and, at the time of his
admission, he was the only non-North American to be inducted
into the Accounting Hall of Fame of Ohio State University. He
achieved many other awards and recognitions as listed in Chambers’ Aide Memoire, which appeared in Vol. 6 of his collected
works, reproduced in Chambers and Dean [2000a]. As Foundation Professor of Accounting (1960-1982) at The University of
Sydney, Chambers founded and built what was to be known internationally as the Sydney school of accounting thought [Wells,
1976; AAA, 1977]. Together with Professor Louis Goldberg (University of Melbourne), Professor Russell Mathews (Australian
National University), and other contemporaries, such as Professor Reg Gynther (University of Queensland) and Professor Ken
Wright (University of Adelaide), Chambers pioneered scholarship in the teaching, learning, and research of accounting in
Australian universities [Barton, 1982].
Chambers is probably best known for his proposed system of accounting, Continuously Contemporary Accounting
(CoCoA), a summary of which is provided by Clarke and Dean
[1996; Chatfield and Vangermeersch, 1996, pp. 109-111]. The belief in his system and academic tolerance may be gleaned from
this quote from a previously unreported correspondence: “CoCoA [like airplanes, etc] will rest on its functional superiority;
if not today, then tomorrow, for all change takes time to be assimilated” [R.J. Chambers Collection, SUA P202, Item # 6258,
June, 19, 1981].
To put some balance into this background, Chambers was
certainly not without his critics. He had many debates in the
literature with contemporaries such as Moonitz [1982], Ijiri
[1967, 1982], Littleton [1953], Mattessich [1964, 1995, 2005],
Staubus [1961], and Edwards and Bell [1961]. They gave “as
good as they received” from him. A recent issue of Accounting



Giuseppe Galassi [1999], private correspondence with one of the authors
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Education contained a forum on Chambers’ ideas on education
where again critics and supporters discussed those ideas.
This work will demonstrate another previously unknown
characteristic of Chambers. He was an archivist, and seemingly
so from the beginning of his academic career. On November 15,
2004, the R.J. Chambers Collection (the Collection hereafter),
Chambers’ collected papers and related materials, was launched
by the vice chancellor and principal of The University of Sydney, Professor Gavin Brown. The Collection is both in hard
copy, stored in the Archives Unit of The University, and is internet accessible at [http://chambers.econ.usyd.edu.au]. Brown
observed that Chambers not only wrote a substantial set of materials but he carefully ordered them, together with correspondences with other academics and interested parties, so that he
and others would be able to access them easily.
The Collection’s development and its features described below give insight into how this archive will provide an important missing link in what is known publicly regarding Chambers’
contribution to the accounting literature and to the professional practicing community. There are expected to be several articles and monographs produced (see possible projects noted below in the conclusion).
In the current unsettled environment of accounting, evi
denced, for example, by the disputes regarding principles v.
rules-based standards, the canons of accounting measurement,
and the function of fair values in the new regime of International Financial Reporting Standards, the Collection is a unique
historical source. For, unlike many historical enquiries in accounting in which hazy sources are accessed to explain a rela
tively unequivocal present state of affairs, the Collection, by
virtue of its completeness, order, and comprehensiveness, provides a relatively unequivocal record of the state of past affairs
with which to point to what is reasonably described as the hazy
state of contemporary accounting thought and practice.
CHAMBERS: AN INSIDER OR FRINGE DWELLER?
There are many sources detailing various aspects of Chambers’ life, including two festschrift issues of Abacus (December
1982 and October 2000). Chambers provided useful summaries
in “An Accounting Apprenticeship” [1991] and in the introduc

The current authors [Clarke et al., 2005] contributed to that forum, as did
Tinker [2005], Amernic, [2005], Mattessich [2005], and Lee [2005].
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tory preface to the 1974 reprinting of Accounting, Evaluation
and Economic Behavior. Those aspects have been augmented by
the cataloguing of Chambers’ full correspondence files (19471999) stored in the Collection.
What is unlikely to be well known, especially by younger
accounting academics, is Chambers’ role in lifting the status of
accounting to that of an equal discipline in the learned halls of
The University [Barton, 1982; Wolnizer and Dean, 2000; Clarke
et al., 2005]. He fought for this recognition for half a century. Chambers [2000b] described his struggle on this and other
fronts as being a “life on the fringe.” His posthumously published “Early Beginnings: Introduction to Wisdom of Accounting” [2000c] recounts his early struggles in gaining an economics degree and an understanding of business, finance, and
accounting. Accepting Chambers’ view that he worked “on the
fringe” may appear, prima facie, at odds with our belief that
this Collection provides unique insights by an “inside observer”
of many of the major events affecting accounting thought and
practice in the 20th century. The following shows that there is
scope for both to be correct.
Chambers [2000b] aptly captures his professional and practical experiences in respect of what he perceived to be the outcomes of those experiences. A perusal of many of the materials
in the Collection shows clearly that Chambers observed firsthand the “inner workings” of the early professional attempts
(1950s and 1960s) to have accounting accepted as a truly professional activity; he was also at the forefront of efforts by the
Australian professional accountancy bodies to have graduate
entry into the profession. He was a major proponent of the introduction of a “professional orientation” for new entrants to
the profession’s ranks. He fought unsuccessfully for the merger
of Australia’s two major professional bodies in the 1970s. He
worked on many professional committees for over fifty years,
particularly those dealing with education and the introduction
of a more serviceable system of financial reporting to incor
porate the effects of changes in prices and price levels. In this
sense, Chambers was an “insider.” The Collection reveals that,
as an insider, his counsel was sought by Australian universities
on all the early accounting professorial appointments in the
1960s and 1970s. His advice was also solicited for many overseas professorial appointments as well during that same period.

The first accounting professorial appointments occurred in the early to
mid-1950s. These were followed by several more in the 1960s [see Mathews,
1982; Carnegie and Williams, 2001].
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On the regulatory side, Chambers’ voluminous critical works led
to his appointment as chairman of the 1978 NSW Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, “Company Accounting Standards.”
The Collection contains all of the expert evidence reports prepared by Chambers throughout the 1960s and 1970s, highlighting his close connection to business matters, leading business
personalities, and members of the profession.
Significantly, the Collection also contains details of his overseas travels in the late 1950s through to the early 1990s, featuring his association with the international academy. At the
Collection launch, Professor Gary Previts spoke and referred to
Chambers as perhaps the world’s first “geoaccountant.” On those
travels, he pursued his desire to have accounting thought and
practice viewed as research and principles driven, rather than
merely the product of rote learning and dogma.
Recent interest in Chambers’ ideas is evident in the abovementioned March 2005 issue of Accounting Education, including a forum on Chambers’ [1999] provocative work, “The Poverty of Accounting Discourse.” The forum confirms that his ideas
continue to be considered and debated. In a similar way, the
Collection seeks to ensure that academics in future decades will
be able to access and debate his work, using evidentiary source
material.
HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION
To create the second of The University of Sydney’s Foundation Professors’ series, the Archives Unit, the Accounting Foundation, the Faculty of Economics and Business within The University of Sydney, and CPA Australia combined to provide initial
funding and other support to archive in the Collection all of
Chambers’ collected papers, with particular attention being given initially to his private correspondence.
Fittingly, the Collection was launched in the Great Hall of
The University of Sydney, a venue of some of Chambers’ finest
speeches. Chambers described the period to which the Collection relates as “perhaps the most eventful period in the history of accounting up to the terminal date [1985]. It was a period of substantial growth, of conglomeration on a large scale by

Chambers was appointed in 1960 as the Foundation Professor of
Accounting at The University of Sydney. The first in the Foundation Professors’
archive series was the Philosophy Department’s John Anderson Collection.
Both collections are located within the Archives Unit on the fifth floor of Fisher
Library.
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mergers and takeovers, of intense multinational corporate development, of increasing use of modes of organization and methods of financing that were novel at the beginning of the interval [1946]” [Chambers and Dean, 1986, general preface].
The Collection had a lucky escape from destruction following several moves after Chambers officially retired in 1982.
Physical moves continued in 1999 after Chambers’ death. Many
of the papers were boxed again and placed in rather insecure
storage in a University-owned building that was scheduled to
be demolished. The return to The University of Sydney of Peter Wolnizer as dean of the Faculty of Economics saw urgent
manoeuvres to ensure the Collection was recovered from its
several locations and recompiled in a similar form (layout of
room, etc.) to when Chambers was researching. The Collection was saved from imminent destruction, which would have
been a tragic loss not only for accounting historians, but also
for the history of accounting. With the Collection thus saved,
Graeme Dean assumed principal responsibility for managing the
archiving and digitizing processes that have yielded the international accounting treasure that is the R.J. Chambers Collection. The entire project has been a collaboration by those who
had worked closely with Chambers over an extended period of
time.
The Collection comprises hard-copy files and approximately 20,000 catalogued summary items accessible within a fulltext, searchable electronic repository (see below for details).
The complete electronic archive is expected to be accessible to
scholars and postgraduate students worldwide by the middle of
2006.
The Collection augments a recently launched archive of another Australian academic accounting pioneer, Louis Goldberg,
so ably described in Potter’s [2003] “The Louis Goldberg Collection at Deakin University: Exploring a Rich Foundation for
Historical Research.” Potter provides a useful framework to examine both the Chambers and Goldberg Archives, outlining several historiographic approaches [e.g., the “source-oriented” and
“problem-oriented” approaches]. A smaller collection of papers
of Russell Mathews also exists. Further, the collected papers of a
contemporary U.S. iconoclast, Abe Briloff, are being made available at City University of New York. These, and hopefully more
collections, will form an invaluable database for accounting historians to explore how accounting ideas underpinning current
practice have been forged. Increasingly, that is becoming a pertinent issue as, arguably, practice effectively has changed little
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since the 1930s. Yet, the incidence of criticisms of those practices recur, decade after decade, following, inter alia, the large
unexpected crashes of the genre of Maxwell Communications,
Enron, WorldCom, Vivendi, Parmalat, and HIH [Clarke et al.,
2003]. This is notwithstanding that practice is now governed
by a plethora of accounting standards.
The Collection augments the different types of material
contained in the Goldberg Collection. Whilst the latter is richer
in “old manuscripts,” the Chambers Collection has a more extensive contemporary book collection, especially in areas such
as education generally and management education specifically,
philosophy of science, accounting and financial management,
auditing, financial statement analysis, and professional committee papers. It also has more extensive web-accessible material. Whilst both collections contain substantial correspondence
items, the Chambers Collection has approximately three to four
times the number. It includes letters not only sent by Chambers
but also, it would appear, nearly all of the academic correspondence he received from contemporaries during 1947-1999.
The collections of Goldberg and some other contemporaries
provide useful benchmarks for analyzing the “utility” of the R.J.
Chambers Collection. There will be opportunities for researchers to cross check their sources, thereby reducing possible Collection bias, one of the main criticisms of research done on
such biographical collections [Potter, 2003].
In contrast to many archives, a feature of the Collection is
its provenance, the exceptionally good order that the material
was in when Chambers died. He kept the items in chronological order and sometimes by topic or corresponding person. The
Collection contains several photographs of the library in situ.
This high degree of provenance makes the Collection unique as
an accounting history source.
The physical dimensions of the Collection show the difficulties in maintaining his records. Chambers’ library contained
over 2,500 books, hard copies of over 2,500 articles, newspaper
cuttings, etc. in his numerous filing cabinets. The correspondence files amounted to approximately 15,000 individual items
or letters that Chambers wrote and received from 1947-1999,

Other catalysts for criticisms include: asset stripping following takeovers
in boom periods, as well as undervaluations and undercharges due to price and
price level changes.

“Provenance” is an archivist term that refers to the extent to which the environment from which an archive is created has been retained.
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which, with grouping, has been reduced to around 12,500 entries in the electronic archive. Cabinets of myriad index cards
contained the references that ultimately became the corpus of
his An Accounting Thesaurus: Five Hundred Years of Accounting
[Chambers, 1995].
There were several stages in the archiving process. All entailed classification, metadata creation, and cataloguing of the
material:
ß The initial phase (2000-2002) focused on the cataloguing,
boxing, and storing in acid-free archival boxes of the approximately 15,000 items that constituted more than fifty years of personal correspondence. The Archives Unit
within The University of Sydney provided an archivist to
undertake this task.
ß Then followed (2002-2003) a more extensive recording of
the residual of Chambers’ resource materials – the 2,500
books in his personal library; the 2,500 journal articles,
newspaper cuttings, and miscellany stored then in numerous filing cabinets; and his 20,000-odd card entries.
ß During 2003-2004, another research assistant added
metadata to Chambers’ personal papers, providing indexing according to his Chambers on Accounting series and
Aide Memoire classificatory schema. The various schemata are all described on the Collection website.
ß Finally (March 2005-present), a consultant integrated all
of the records into an electronic archive which offers
full-text search, supports innovative search and extraction strategies, and is integrated to a publishing system
(to be completed in a second stage) to create a “dynamic archive,” allowing researchers to submit their research
into the archive, whilst ensuring that we preserve provenance of the initial material. At this point the value of
research undertaken will be dynamically linked with the
original material to the benefit of those who follow. Also,
the data were double-checked by a research assistant.
Below we provide a more detailed description of the various characteristics, some of which are briefly noted above.
CHAMBERS’ PUBLISHED WORKS –
COLLECTION INSIGHTS
Chambers’ teaching and writing characteristically used
analogies, drawn from economics, decision sciences, law, sociology, philosophy, psychology, art, the physical sciences, and litPublished by eGrove, 2006
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erature, to illustrate the essence of the infelicities of which he
complained in contemporary accounting, to explain the principles underpinning his preferred solutions and to elaborate the
reasoning driving his analyses of contrary suggestions. Those
illustrations were at his elbow. He perceived linkages between
them and the legitimate methods and focuses of accounting,
for they related to other critical elements influencing human
endeavor, of which accounting too is part. In many ways, it is
less remote a part than many of those for other disciplines since
the focuses of accounting (decision making, economic activity,
economic evaluation, monetary calculation, evaluation and assessment) are everyday events to a greater or lesser extent for
virtually all.
A unique feature of the Collection is the lack of distinction
it makes between those matters that elsewhere would normally be so classified to indicate their special relation to teaching
or to research, or to the frequently drawn distinction between
accounting theory and practice. In retrospect, it seems unlikely
that he contemplated any real distinction between teaching and
research, or between what constituted good theory and good
practice.
His teaching was always peppered with examples and analogies drawn from his treasury, his analyses of them, his reasoning, and the supporting evidence. His written contributions,
the output from his research, were the end product of an extensive learning process. Part of that process entailed “exposing”
his ideas in discussion with his colleagues, his contemporaries,
friend and foe alike, and his students. The other part was his
penchant for sending copies of drafts of the proposed piece to
scholars around the world for comment. Many of the resulting
debates through correspondence between Chambers and accounting scholars; e.g., Barton, Baxter, Briloff, Galassi, Goldberg, Hansen, Ijiri, Littleton, Mathews, Mattessich, Moonitz,
Onida, Paton, Shiobara, Someya, Spacek, Stamp, Staubus,
Sterling, Sweeney, and many other European scholars, are preserved in the Collection. These provide not only insights into
how Chambers’ ideas were hewn and honed, but also insights
into the development and firming up of the ideas of many correspondents, both those who held similar ideas and those who
held to the contrary. By the time Chambers was in print, his
thoughts had been well exposed, refined, tested, and rehearsed.
His archive was not a mere museum of which he was the curator; it was his tool kit to which he was forever adding and
from which he was forever learning.
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As such, the Collection provides hitherto unpublished insights into some of the influences that shaped the refinement
of those ideas, the support he received from colleagues, and the
frustrations endured over an academic “odyssey” of more than
fifty years. It augments the six volumes of Chambers on Accounting [1986, 2000a] which contain the distillation of Chambers’
published scholarship, other than that published in books, over
a fifty year period.
Many of those published works addressed the pressing
professional matters of his time. Almost without exception he
corresponded with academic colleagues from many cognate
disciplines, including law, economics, decision sciences, psychology, sociology, etc., with academics who shared and opposed his ideas and with the profession’s policy makers and policy followers. His published papers provide only limited insight
to those ideas and their formulation. Meticulously kept papers
from 1947-1999 provide a unique window into the background
to so much of his work previously withheld from accounting
scholars and practitioners. It is already apparent that the Collection is going to be the object of immediate inquiry by senior
scholars, nationally and internationally, especially, it seems,
those from the U.S. and the U.K. As Potter [2003] notes, such
unpublished material provides insights of a hitherto unknown
research lode. The types of positive research he suggested in
respect to the Goldberg archive aptly apply to the Chambers
Collection: “… biography, institutional history, prosopography,
public sector accounting history, as well as comparative international accounting history.”
The December 1982 and the October 2000 issues of Abacus were devoted to reflections of contemporaries on Chambers’
contribution to accounting thought and practice. Arguably, his
influence has not been fully appreciated by modern-day account
ants, by neither those in practice nor those in academe. A recent autobiographical article by one of Chambers’ contemporaries and at-times critic, George Staubus [2003, p. 179], goes
some way to redressing the balance. He includes the observation
in the subsection, “My Greatest Intellectual Debts,” that “Chambers [had] the ‘greatest’ intellectual effect on him.” As noted in


As well as the October 2000 Abacus festschrift, there is the Abacus 1982
“Special Issue” celebrating Chambers’ “official” retirement from The University
of Sydney. A special forum in the March 2005 issue of Accounting Education
paid tribute to Chambers’ contribution to accounting education.
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the Background, there are many others who have sung Chambers’ praises and many who have critiqued his ideas.
But, it may have surprised some that Chambers’ contributions were made against enormous resistance, both academic
ally and professionally. His posthumously published 1992 contribution “Life on the Fringe – An Accounting Odyssey” [2000b]
explains an in-depth involvement in the teaching of accounting, his research into accounting, the confronting head-on
of the problems that beset conventional accounting, and his
participation in the management of the profession. Consider
also the following observations made in a whimsical-cumserious speech delivered upon his appointment as a senior lecturer in accounting in 1953 (Chambers Collection, SUA P202,
Item #10770):
Outside these walls certainly, and inside them perhaps,
the accountant is a curious figure. Technical people find
him hard to endure; he is rather too thrifty in business
matters to be hail fellow well met. In fact they say it
runs in his veins: some their hearts don’t beat, they click
like cash registers: and I have heard of one business
executive who in high disdain observed Accountants –
they walk just like men. Now there may be something
pathological about accountants that the school of medicine might be interested in. The accountants also have
their rituals, doctrines and dogmas which is something
they have in common with the churchmen; they have
their mumbo jumbo, their abracadabra and their folk
lore which may interest the anthropologist. And what
they do with money symbols I’m sure would intrigue
the mathematician.
Those observations would seem to sit equally well in the postEnron era with the current ongoing debates about accounting
measurement, fair value, and standards, whether they should
be principles or rules-based.
From day one of his academic career, Chambers [Chambers Collection, SUA P202, Item #141, 1955 correspondence]
was keen to rid accounting thought and practice of its myriad
dogma, to replace them “with a sound theoretical, may I say
academic foundation to the subject.” Notwithstanding, he was
always kept at arms length by those he sought most to inform,
those more concerned about protecting their reputations, elevating the importance of their product, and enhancing their social
status. As he put it, he was “on the fringe.” His documented
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e xperiences provide insights into how ideas do, or do not, get
on to the regulatory agendas.
DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COLLECTION
This section provides an overview of (1) how the Collection
is arranged, the schemata used, (2) how it can be accessed, and
(3) the prospect for a “dynamic archive.” These characteristics
provide a window into the environment in which Chambers
plied his trade, allowing researchers to immerse themselves in
his various time-dependent “knowledge spheres.”
Schemata: Retaining its provenance, the Collection’s physical
items are ultimately catalogued for electronic search purposes
primarily. It uses an extended Dublin Core metadata set, allowing for easy extraction of search strategies based on different
contexts. The Collection comprises four main areas:
I. Published Works: About 300 records of his published works
are classified using his autobiographical system. In the early 1970s, Chambers began collecting and summarizing all his
published works, the forerunner of his Autobibliography [1976]
monograph, published by the International Centre for Research
in Accounting. It contained paragraph-level summaries of his
published works in chronological order. All articles are catalogued to Dublin Core with abstracts and, where possible, articles are included either in full or as an integrated, searchable,
full-text index as determined by copyright constraints.
II. Unpublished Works: Over 12,000 records, mainly correspondence, are classified using Chamber’s schemata of “On Accounting,” “Aide Memoire,” and “Series,” developed by the Sydney
University archivist in line with Chambers’ files. This material has been further indexed using extended Dublin Core to cater for recipient (the receiver of the correspondence), organization (the organization of the recipient or writer), and theme (an
overarching classification based on major thematic concepts).
Finally, as the material is currently in physical format primarily, the metadata has been extended to cater for the eventual ongoing digitization of material based on a researcher’s use and
requirement, offering details of original status, pagination (size
and number), cost of digitization, and copyright management.
Within the Unpublished Works, there are further schemata
supporting extended metadata elements of:
III. Series: A classification prepared by a professional archivist
Published by eGrove, 2006

165

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 23
Dean, Wolnizer, & Clarke: The R.J. Chambers Collection

157

who, upon examining his personal correspondence and related
materials, identified a 66 item schema that Chambers had explicitly or implicitly used to store the materials on shelves in
his work office. The schema reflects faithfully how Chambers
had catalogued those materials.
IIIa. On Accounting: In their general preface [Vol. 1, Management and Finance, 1985] to the six-volume set, Chambers on Accounting, editors Chambers and Dean observed:
The selection includes direct contributions to professional and academic periodicals, the prepared scripts
of a number of conference papers and other addresses
published in professional and academic journals, conference proceedings or otherwise, a number of published pieces, and a selection of texts of addresses and
submissions to inquiries not otherwise published. Within this selection there are a series of papers on observed
accounting practices, on the generation and content of
recommendations and standards devised or endorsed
by professional and other organizations. There are series on information generation, measurement, communication, and choice. There are series on basic ideas,
theories, and theory construction and on research in accounting education. But the individual pieces in any of
these series may appear at widely separated dates; some
pieces could quite properly fall into any one of several of the above groups; and ideas first treated in one setting have been used or developed in other settings. The
division of the materials of selection was intended to
minimize mere repetition, but that intention was moderated where it seemed desirable to indicate the origin
or development of some specific theme. The volume titles are indicative of the general themes of each, but
within each the arrangement is chronological.
IIIb. Aide Memoire: This classification is based on what was designed by Chambers following his official retirement in 1982.
As noted in the preface of Vol. 6 of Chambers and Dean [2000],
Chambers’ Aide Memoire gives in chronological order the places and circumstances which gave rise to the contents of Vols.
1-VI of Chambers on Accounting and to other publications and
unpublished material over some 60 of the most turbulent years
in the history of accounting. The contents of Vols. I-V were
grouped by material content. The references in the Aide Memoire ease access to any item reproduced in Vols. I-VI.
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IIIc. Recipient/Writer: the recipients of letters written by Chambers and the writers of material to Chambers
IIId. Organization: the organization of individuals to whom
Chambers wrote and from whom he received material
IVa. Personal Library Book Listings: About 2,500 records of material from his personal library have been classified according
to the Chambers library system. Chambers maintained an extensive collection of books over his academic and professional
life. Correspondence in the late 1940s and early 1950s in the
Chambers Collection reveal that he was arguably one of the first
Australian accounting academics to seek overseas books on accounting and cognate discipline matters to inform his theoretical ideas about a “better system of accounting.” Those books
were also classified on his office shelves using an abridged Dewey classificatory schema, retained in this Collection. His 2,500
book collection entails great breadth, covering education, decision making generally, communication, economics, accounting,
law, ethics, business biography, psychology, metrology, philosophy, and scientific methods.
IVb. Personal Reading Material: Thousands of records of material from his filing cabinets are referenced using an abridged
Dewey-type classificatory system developed by Chambers. This
part of the Collection is testimony to Chambers’ obsession with
order. Having maintained an extensive set of professional and
academic material for many years, the system he developed was
to be the antecedent of what appeared as the schema for arranging nearly 6,000 (of approximately 20,000 available) items
in his magnum opus, An Accounting Thesaurus: Five Hundred
Years of Accounting [1995]. This aspect is described in detail in
Clarke [1996].
Access: The archive website serves as a reflection on Chambers
as an individual, educator, mentor, and researcher. It provides
details about his seminal work on a comprehensive theoretical
foundation for a style of accounting, CoCoA. Once the archive
is accessed, the user is presented with the ability to review with
ease the records based on the major metadata elements (e.g., title, creator, date, publication) over the major groupings – Published Material, Unpublished Material, Personal Library Book
Listings, and Personal Reading Material. Further, the archive
supports two main search strategies: (1) standard searching
with keywords or advanced Boolean searching using different
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metadata elements; and (2) phrase (context) searching wherein
the user is presented with a comprehensive list of phrases within the material (including metadata) based on the input of a
single keyword. The researcher can thus understand the context
in which words are used. Finally, there is the ability to search
by date, allowing a chronological view of what was happening
in different periods.
The archive will also eventually support an innovative extraction tool which will allow researchers to extract the results
of their work as in overview, summary, and page format as an
e-book that can be downloaded and used off-line as a basis for
their research. The archive is developed using a mixture of open
source and managed source products. It uses Unicode and supports numerous data types, including audio and video.
A Future Dynamic Archive: Classifying the archive “dynamic”
is perhaps a somewhat curious, and certainly novel, notion for
an archive. But the archive has been developed so as to be integrated in the future with a publishing system that will allow
researchers to integrate the information extracted from the archive with their research and then to resubmit that work back
as an e-book to a parallel archive for inclusion in an overall
repository.
These archival characteristics, especially the classifications,
provide insights into Chambers’ ordered nature and the breadth
of his scholarship. Clearly, he was a voracious, insatiable reader
on myriad aspects of human endeavor, always looking for different angles from which to address what he saw as the fundamental issues in commerce in general and in accounting thought
and practice in particular.
CHAMBERS – ARCHIVIST PAR EXCELLENCE
The scale and systematic nature of this Collection reveals
Chambers to be an accomplished archivist. Perhaps following the approach of the late 16th/early 17th century British
empiricist, Sir Francis Bacon, Chambers arguably saw value
in storing his voluminous collection of materials on accounting and cognate disciplines in “a goodly huge cabinet.” A commentator on an earlier draft of this piece noted that the early amassing and ordering of items begs the question of why
this was undertaken from the beginning of Chambers’ academic  career. Was it ego driven? Who knows? Possibly it is indicative of his commitment to lifelong learning. It is clear from the
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correspondence he had with others that, although confident of
his own reasoning, he was always sufficiently humble intellectually to stand corrected if presented by a more formidable array of evidence than his own or with superior argument.
But, there are some plausible explanations in the Collection
itself for its detailed classificatory order. Several correspondence
items reveal that Chambers was directly involved in the forma
tion of the NSW Division of the Business Archives Council of
Australia in the early 1950s. Indeed, Chambers was its first treas
urer, a position he held from many years. Later he would become the national body’s secretary. As likely as not, his exposure to and interest in those business archives was a natural
by-product of this venture. Perhaps a contiguous explanation for
his early desire to have order is Chambers’ lifelong interest in
mathematics, exemplified by his fascination with Euclidian geometry. Chambers sought to bring order, by “shuffling things”
systematically, and through that archiving process, he sought
a better understanding of the relationship between accounting
and its context. Perhaps, equally likely, it was driven by his passion for accounting and a desire to rid it of its infelicities. His
early interest in seeking order contrasted with what he saw as
a chaotic accounting world of accounting thought and practice. Hence, likely as not, imposing order to his ever burgeoning tool kit was crucial were he to achieve a better understanding of the “nature of things,” including especially the function
of accounting.
Whatever his motivations, Chambers was extremely ordered
in keeping a hard-copy record of the development of his initial
ideas on the issues he addressed over the following 50 years,
and the basis upon which they became modified or further entrenched and honed to emerge in the literature. So, what eventually appeared in print, in a congress plenary, or in a mere talk
to a professional body, Rotary Club, or student orientation function, invariably was not “first thoughts,” but his current state
of thinking, shaped by the extensive exposure of his ideas in a
wide variety of settings.
Those who were colleagues of Chambers within his Department of Accounting will attest that it was always difficult to argue with him and emerge with other than a feeling of having
learned something new. Frequently this meant exposure to an
angle that had not been in your mind previously or an historical insight into the issue of which you had not been aware.
The many who engaged him in debate in the staff common
room in the Merewether Building, the heartland of The UniverPublished by eGrove, 2006
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sity of Sydney’s Faculty of Economics at that time, the account
ants, economists, political scientists, economic historians, and
the statisticians were visibly struck by the extent of his knowledge of their discipline, its core theorems, current practices,
contemporary dilemmas, disputes, arguments, and counter-arguments.
Those who were his colleagues were aware that his extensive library included books and journals relating to each of
those disciplines. They also were aware of the large card system he maintained to house his references, quotes, and the like
for invariably he could quickly direct us “go and read this” or
confront us with a “you haven’t dealt with …” as he rattled off
a list of relevant literature much of which we were unaware.
It was also common knowledge amongst his colleagues that he
scoured the financial pages of newspapers and financial bulletins every day and marked up items to be processed by his research assistant to be included in an extensive, classified cuttings file that was kept in blue folders or in his extensive filing
cabinets, all of which have been retained but for those blue
folders. This helps to explain how seemingly within a few moments he could come up with numerous examples of the matters in issue. Whereas in debate his opponents could produce
one or two examples, almost invariably Chambers could produce a more substantial array, frequently both contemporary
and historical. It is a reasonable suspicion that few colleagues
were aware of the enormity, extent, or the order of the sources he archived, and why he was always, almost instantaneously, so “well informed.”
Kohn [1989] has made the point that the chance of scientific discovery is increased by the extent to which a researcher’s
mind is “honed” to the making of connections between matters
not otherwise perceived to be related. This is possibly what Rozak [1986] had in mind with his notion of master ideas. Chambers indeed dealt with master ideas [1955, 1962, 1966], the absence of which Hirsch [1987]10 complained in his explanation of
cultural illiteracy. Chambers’ Accounting Thesaurus [1995] not
only illustrates that he pursued his scholarship in a manner consistent with the ideas of Kohn, Rozak, and Hirsh, but beyond

Kohn explains how hitherto unmade connections were forged only with a
mind prepared through exposure to a wide variety of knowledge.

To Rozak, master ideas underpinned lesser manifestations in workable,
day-to-day practices.
10
Hirsch’s complaint was that a chronic unawareness of everyday events,
facts, and general information constrained one’s capacity to think.
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that, Chambers provides insight into what underpins the accumulation of argument and counter-argument, confirming and
refuting examples, as well as the understanding of the origins,
history, and development of the ideas and practices of accounting and cognate disciplines. Comprising only approximately a
25% selection of the contents of his card index, the Thesaurus
displays the breadth and depth of the knowledge upon which
he drew to make these connections that formed the basis for
his adjudication on the ideas and practices of accounting.
CONCLUSIONS
The Collection contains both the background to the distillation of Chambers’ ideas and hitherto unpublished insights
into some of the influences that shaped the refinement of those
ideas, the support received from his colleagues, and the frustrations endured over his academic odyssey. Many of Chambers’
published works addressed the pressing professional matters of
his time. An extensive correspondence with academic colleagues
from disciplines including law, economics, psychology, and sociology, many of who shared and many who opposed his ideas,
as well as the profession’s policy makers and policy followers, is
the backdrop to Chambers’ published works. His writings provide only limited insight to those ideas and their formulation.
The physical and electronic archiving of meticulously kept
papers provides a unique opportunity for unfolding the background to so much previously withheld from accounting scholars and practitioners. Various professional episodes in relation
to inflation accounting, standard setting, accounting education
reform proposals, and the like that appeared prima facie to be
worth investigating now become feasible with evidence available in this database. That accounting historians are now able
to explore via the internet issues that have underpinned many
of the developments in accounting thought and practice in the
later half of the 20th century is a fitting legacy from Chambers,
archivist par excellence.
This article seeks to bring to the attention of scholars worldwide this immense, newly created historical database. As noted, Potter’s [2003] overview of the Goldberg Collection reveals
several possible research avenues that such a biographical collection provides. Some possibilities from the Chambers Collection are illustrated through the following bon môts:
• Numerous unpublished formal submissions made by
Chambers to many organizations, professional and legislative,
over many decades appear in the Collection.
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• Multiple items reveal Chambers’ leading role in ensuring
that accounting was accepted as a legitimate university discipline. They provide insights into Chambers published works
[1987, 1999] and those of his reviewers [Amernic, 2005; Lee,
2005; Mattessich, 2005; Tinker, 2005]. In particular, many show
his drive for accounting is not to be perceived as simply an invariant code of accepted practices or a process of learning by
rote that is passed on uncritically to ensuing decades of students and practitioners.
• Augmenting the point above, influences in the area of curriculum development, inquiry, and critical thinking are shown
in the Collection to have been worldwide.
• Further to that point, over 25 years of correspondence reveal the impact on Chambers of a relatively unknown U.S. accounting academic, Ernest Weinwurm. Particularly revealing is
Weinwurm’s correspondence with Chambers generally, but specifically, their deliberations on theory and measurement. Weinwurm apparently opened doors for Chambers into the U.S. deci
sion sciences literature in the 1960s and an appointment to the
Executive Committee of TIMS, the leading U.S. management
science body.
• A fruitful episode in Chambers’ professional career is the
virtually complete set of correspondence on the formation, professional crisis, and alleged “conspiracy of silence” associated
with the 1978 NSW government-appointed Accounting Stand
ards Review Committee and its report, Company Accounting
Standards.
• There are several larger correspondence files with some
of Chambers’ contemporaries, each worthy of a separate study,
for the windows they open to the development of accounting
thought.
• Chambers’ role in the attempts of Australia’s emerging
professional bodies to gain university recognition is evident
from the myriad correspondence between Chambers and professional representatives over the period of the Collection.
• Chambers’ frustrations in founding Abacus are well documented and were the source of Wells’ [2000] account.
• Chambers’ [2000b] perceptions of a “life on the fringe”
are evident everywhere in the Collection, as is the support from
one of his fellow market price advocates, Sterling [1970].
• Unusual engagements, such as the observation of a leading U.K. economist, G.L.S. Shackle, who lamented that he
had completed a major economics treatise before he had had
an  opportunity to read Chambers’ magnum opus, Accounting,
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 valuation and Economic Behavior [1966], and the dialogue
E
between a Melbourne mathematician examining the logic of
Chambers’ system, contain a rich vein of interdisciplinary enquiry.
But there are many more possibilities. Potter [2003] notes
that there has been a dearth of studies of intellectual accounting
pioneers. The Chambers, Goldberg, and other contemporaries’
collections certainly ensure that there should be much work to
add to that hitherto untapped research area. Clearly, Potter’s review and our brief summary above suggest that there will be
many other projects awaiting researchers’ interest and perspicacity in unravelling the lode to be mined in the R.J. Chambers
Collection.
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Abstract: On February 19, 1942, following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the declaration of war against Japan, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 which empowered the Secretary of War
to exclude “any and all persons” from designated areas in the United
States. Shortly thereafter, some 120,000 civilians of Japanese descent
were prohibited from living, working, or traveling on the West Coast.
By October 1942, over 100,000 “evacuees” were relocated and confined to ten remote internment camps for the duration of the war.
The War Relocation Authority (WRA) administered these camps
and had the responsibility to feed, house, educate, and provide employment for the evacuees. This article describes the WRA’s use of accounting information and situates the role of accounting within a labor-process framework. It initially discusses labor-process theory and
provides an overview of the internment episode and cooperative accounting in the U.S. It then focuses on particular accounting policies,
procedures, and reports that were used by the WRA to manage enterprises, monitor internment activities, and socialize evacuees with
American capitalistic values.
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INTRODUCTION
The December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor triggered the
most racially prejudicial, federal governmental action in modern
American history. As a response to the attack, Japanese and Japanese-American civilians were forcibly relocated to internment
camps for the duration of the war. The 1940 Census identified
126,947 U.S. residents of Japanese ancestry, 112,353 of whom
lived in the Western Defense Command states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington. Approximately two-thirds of
these Japanese Americans had been born in the U.S. Eventually 104,000 of them (officially called “evacuees”) were forcibly
resettled into ten remote relocation centers (RCs), while 8,000
others voluntarily took up residence outside the western states
[“Notes on the Japanese in the United States,” Entry 16, box
498, folder 79.100 #1]. While the stated rationale for relocation
was national security, there was not one documented case of espionage or sabotage by a Japanese American prior to their internment.
From March 1942 until the end of the war, the immensely complex issues associated with the control and administration of the RCs was handled by the War Relocation Authority
(WRA), a badly understaffed governmental agency that was created for this purpose. This article will examine the great variety of matters with which the WRA was forced to deal, ranging
from the administration of the ten RCs, the creation of business enterprises, and the resettlement of evacuees into employment opportunities further east. In our view, the WRA established cooperative business enterprises, as opposed to ones that
were WRA or privately owned, in part to monitor, manage, and
socialize a captive population (i.e., control the labor process)
given the WRA’s very limited resources within a wartime economy. In the context of these enterprises, as well as the WRA’s
ongoing reporting requirements, accounting information played
a crucial role in the internment episode.
The article is organized as follows. We initially discuss
labor-process theory in terms of exactly what it says about control and the use of accounting information. We next describe
the cooperative enterprises that were established at the RCs.
We then provide an overview of the internment episode, giving
particular emphasis to some of its racial aspects. There follows

All primary-source records we examined are located in Record Group 210,
Entries 1, 3, 16, 29, and 48 at the National Archives of the United States in Washington, DC.
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then a rather lengthy description of the mass of data that the
WRA was charged to collect, either by virtue of its own decision or by fiat from higher governmental authorities. A substantial amount of the documentation was prepared by WRA statisticians and accountants and illustrates labor-process theory in
action, albeit in the tightly controlled, non-market setting of internment camps. We conclude by describing how this episode
and its use of accounting and cost-control procedures support
labor-process theory.
LABOR-PROCESS THEORY
According to Friedman [1978], labor process necessarily involves resistance between workers and owner/managers and requires that emergent administrative controls and procedures result from a dynamic process of interaction between these two
competing groups. Labor-process theory has been helpful in understanding the interface between workplace dynamics and the
use of accounting information. Labor process has also been the
subject of a number of noteworthy studies by accounting and
labor historians alike, although none of these studies examined
cooperative businesses in controlled, non-market settings. For
example, Nelson [1975] described the role of contractors as intermediaries in large, 19th century factories. Clawson [1980]
and Hopper and Armstrong [1991] described how owner/managers sought to dominate and disempower workers in early and
mid-20th century industries. Braverman [1974] applied Marxist theory to explain the inevitable workplace conflict between
workers and owner/managers that crosses national boundaries,
time periods, and industry settings.
The labor-process literature of the past three decades
has furnished considerable insight into traditional labormanagement relationships, although interactions between Japanese-American evacuees and governmental administrators can
hardly be called “traditional.” Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital [1974] was the catalyst for an outpouring of support,
revision, and rebuttal. Braverman’s history of U.S. labor control emphasized a series of devices (piece rates, internal contracting, deskilling) deployed by management to exploit a homogeneous work force he perceived, in best Marxist tradition,
to be in class conflict with capital. Later theorists have critiqued Braverman on three issues – (1) his failure to take into
account worker resistance, (2) his assumption of labor’s homogeneity, and (3) his focus on the exploitative aspects of capihttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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tal (management).  Gordon et al. [1982], Thompson [1989], and
Greenbaum [1994] all wrote that the heterogeneity of the labor
force, reflected in the diversity of its origins and its ethnic antagonisms, among other factors, reduced the resistance of labor towards management and kept the movement divided.
Another compelling argument, and one more germane to
the Japanese internment episode, was Burawoy’s [1979, 1985]
demonstration of the community of interests between labor and
management that has led to a consensual voluntarism on the
part of workers collectively. Burawoy [1985, p. 28] wrote: “History suggests, however, that the outcome of class struggle mollifies the opposition of interests and frequently coordinates the
interests of capital and labor.” This diminished antagonism has
also been highlighted in the labor-process analyses of Littler
and Salaman [1982] and Knights and Willmott [1990]. Certainly, accounting has a role to play in making labor systems work,
be they in captive or market-based environments. As Hopper et
al. [1986] suggested from a Marxist perspective, the reporting
structures of accounting and its modes of calculation provide a
technology to harness the compliance of labor. Similarly, from
a Foucauldian perspective, the knowledge generated from the
accounting system permits the efficient wielding of power by
governmental and business administrators.
As we illustrate in later sections of the paper, the relationship between WRA administrators and the thousands of confined evacuee workers and managers generally evidenced both
cooperation and voluntarism during the three-year internment
period. Thus, the next section of the paper offers a new example to support labor-process theory – the cooperative business
enterprises that were established at the internment camps. Also
included are brief remarks about the history of cooperatives in
the U.S.
COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
On March 18, 1942, the WRA was established to administer, maintain, and control all aspects of life at the ten permanent RCs, tasks that must have appeared daunting given that the
WRA’s top officials had no experience with mass relocations of


We would be remiss not to point out two major acts of disobedience that
did occur at the RCs in late 1942: the Poston strike and the Manzanar riot. See
Okihiro [1973] for details on these particular incidents.
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this magnitude. WRA administrators had to act quickly to assemble a staff and create policies for the housing, feeding, edu
cating, and employment of some 100,000 detained individuals
of all ages in communities of between 5,000 and 20,000 evacuees that would be maintained temporarily, but indefinitely, until the war ended. The RCs were intended to be as self-sustaining as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For example, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American military personnel.
The decision to structure the centers’ business enterprises
as cooperative associations was made in May 1942, soon after
the WRA was established. According to Dillon S. Myer [1971, p.
41], director of the WRA from June 1942 until the end of the
interment, “… the WRA had hit upon a formula that it hoped
would be a stimulant to work performance, would not be costly, and would be acceptable to the public.” Cooperative associations were a common form of enterprise and were especially
popular in the agricultural regions of California. According to
Kerr and Harris [1939], self-help cooperatives were first established in the early 1930s when the federal government provided financial assistance to stimulate capital formation during the
economic depression. Barter cooperatives were initially created for services such as barber shops, sewing rooms, and crop
distribution. They reached a peak in popularity in 1933 with
176 different groups and over 30,000 members [Kerr and Harris, 1939, p. 4]. The Wagner-Lewis Relief Act of 1933 stimulated the development of production cooperatives principally for
baking, canning, gardening, and sewing products. In the late
1930s, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) received government funding to aid cooperatives in conjunction with the
1938 Federal Relief Act. Jones and Schneider [1984, p. 57] noted over 500,000 families and 600 cooperatives had been formed
in 37 states between 1931 and 1938, and that self-help produc
The names and locations of the ten sites were: Central Utah – Topaz UT;
Colorado River – Poston AZ; Gila River – Rivers AZ; Heart Mountain – Heart
Mountain WY; Jerome – Denson AR; Manzanar – Manzanar CA; Minidoka –
Hunt ID; Rohwer – McGhee AR; Tule Lake – Newell CA; Granada – Amache CO.

“A self-help production cooperative may be defined as a democratic association of the unemployed and underemployed who have organized to obtain
the necessities of life through their own production of goods” [Kerr and Harris,
1939, p. 1].
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tion cooperatives “represent the only major historical attempt
by the U.S. legislature to incorporate workers’ participation in
management into government programs.”
By their nature, cooperatives draw on their membership for
managers and governance, a structure ideally suited to the RCs
because of the WRA’s limited resources, the RCs’ remote locations, the shortage of professionally trained managers, and the
need to start business enterprises quickly to service the thousands of captive persons. Further, the decision to pay most captive workers the same basic wage and to distribute a portion
of the surplus to them were common practices among self-help
cooperatives. In the case of the RC cooperatives, a portion of
any surpluses generated by the enterprises above the direct costs
for materials and the cash advanced to evacuees would revert
back to the WRA as partial repayment for the fair value of the
food, shelter, medical care, and other services provided by the
government. The balance of the surplus would be distributed to
the evacuees in the form of additional cash advances. According to Myer [1971, p. 41], accounting data played a critical role
in determining the surplus:
The policy further provided that a full accounting would
be kept of maintenance costs on the one hand and the
income from the sale of products surplus to the center needs on the other, and appraisals would be made of
the increases in capital values of land and structures.
As mentioned, the decision to structure the RC businesses
as cooperative enterprises was made early by WRA administrators. Cooperatives would utilize evacuee workers and managers to produce clothing goods and provide laundry, dry cleaning, shoe repair, and other needed services. In a May 25, 1942
letter, Harvey M. Coverley, assistant regional director of the
WRA, stated that, “a definite decision had been reached to the
effect that all consumer services on relocation centers will be
managed by cooperative associations.” Coverley also outlined
the guiding principles for the cooperatives [Entry 16, box 421,
folder 69.014]:
1. All cooperatives will be owned by their members.
2. Each member will have only one vote in membership
meetings regardless of the number of shares owned.

Myer [1971, p. 46] noted that three different plans were considered: “(1)
WRA management of shops and services, (2) granting of concessions to private
operators, or (3) management by the residents on a consumer cooperative basis.”
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3. All goods shall be sold for cash.
4. Lowest prevailing market prices shall be charged.
5. A certain percentage of profits shall be set up in reserves for cooperative education.
6. Any profits distributed to members as dividends shall
be in proportion to the total number of shares outstanding and number of shares owned by each member.
7. All labor employed by cooperatives shall be treated
fairly.
The WRA’s long-term policy for operating the cooperatives
emerged from a conference in late August 1942. In addition to
specifying the standards of organization, dividend distribution,
and merchandise pricing, the WRA also established uniform accounting procedures and a set of accounts that “should be regu
larly audited” [Myer, 1971, p. 46]. Clearly, these enterprises operated at a far lower total cost than if they had been staffed
by non-Japanese-American employees and operated as privately
owned canteens. Using evacuee workers also allowed the WRA
to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures, while any work done for
private industry (i.e., contract labor) would be charged at prevailing prices.
The WRA’s fiscal 1943 appropriation request included $4
million for establishing cooperatives, but, according to Myer,
this entire expenditure was best viewed as a loan that “will
be repaid to the Government in full” [Entry 16, box 37, folder
12.100]. Of course, the evacuees were strongly opposed to repaying the government for these cash advances, arguing that
persons who had been relocated against their wills should not
be burdened with the cost of basic services.
Each business cooperative (e.g., Community Enterprises,
Inc.) was registered in the state in which each RC was located. They were run by Japanese-American managers who were
selected by the WRA for their skill and expertise, since a number of evacuees were college educated and many had experience running small businesses prior to the evacuation order.

According to a February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, president of the Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises: “The
evacuees have often been reminded that it was the duty and responsibility of the
War Relocation Authority to provide evacuees with the three essentials of living:
food, clothing and shelter” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].

As of December 1943, eight of the ten enterprises had been set up as cooperatives; another (Gila River) was in the process of reapplying for state approval; and another (Heart Mountain) continued to operate as a trust [Entry 16, box
216, folder 24.040 #4].
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These managers fell under the supervision of one or two WRA
staff advisors and were given a monopoly (in exchange for a
monthly rental fee) for furnishing the goods and services not
supplied by the government. According to a typical letter from
the head of the WRA’s Community Management Division to a
potential supplier, “[the corporations] must follow an accounting system prescribed by [the] Gov; must agree to accumulate
adequate reserves before distributing profits; and must agree
to using a mark-up system that will permit them to operate on
a sound business basis” [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1].
According to an August 25, 1942 WRA policy statement, consumer cooperative enterprises were to be given exclusive rights
to operate at all ten RCs. The enterprises were expected to follow WRA procedures for pricing, merchandising, and distributing dividends. They were also required to obtain regular audits
of their accounts and financial reports [Myer, 1971]. Patrons
who purchased additional shares in the cooperatives were entitled to receive a portion of the cooperative’s profits as dividends, but only after the monthly cash advances for clothing
(between $2.00 and $3.75 per month) had been repaid to the
government.
One WRA internal report indicated that as of June 30, 1944,
a total of $1,131,740.22 in patronage rebates had been declared
and that $580,306.23 had been actually distributed to evacuees.
As of December 31, 1944, there were 36,696 members out of
an aggregate population of 80,003 that still resided at the RCs.
There were a total of 166 shops and services, employing 1,825
evacuees. While the number of employees may seem small, it
should be noted that the WRA directly employed evacuees in
mess halls, camp maintenance, police, fire, and sanitation departments, and other basic services. For 1943, total enterprises sales were $7.52 million, with net profit of $913,000. Corresponding numbers for 1944 were $7.13 million and $910,000
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
Community services such as dry cleaning, beauty shops,
barber shops, and shoe repair were among those that were
operated as cooperative enterprises. Operating costs included
the material cost of purchased goods, staff wages, and facility
rental charges of either $.235 cents per square foot per year

There was a significant difference among the various projects as to the percentage of dividends actually paid. Jerome paid all it had declared ($105,036.36),
while Poston declared $215,044.81 but paid only $39,558.41[Entry 16, box 417,
folder 69.010 #4]. According to Myer [1971, p. 47], a total of $2,298,820 was distributed in patronage dividends out of $21,890,167 in gross revenues.
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for unheated or $.28 per square foot for heated facilities
[WRA Administrative Manual, Entry 29, box 3]. According to
WRA officials, the payment of rent entitled the cooperatives to
operate as monopolies and precluded individual evacuees from
charging for services provided to other evacuees [Entry 48, box
230, folder 75.000]. As mentioned, the difference between an
enterprise’s revenues and operating costs would be distributed
to members of the association only after the government’s cash
advances had been repaid.
In October 1942, the National Society of Co-operative Accountants (NSCA) proposed setting up a uniform accounting
system for the War Relocation Co-operative Enterprises for a
fee of $15,000 or $1.50-2.00 per hour plus travel and expenses.
The proposal was rejected by Otto Rossman of the Community Enterprise Section of the WRA who indicated that the WRA
planned to use in-house staff to set up its accounting systems,
although Rossman did indicate that the NSCA would be contacted for follow-up audits [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1].10
The decision to use WRA and evacuee staff resulted in a range
of accounting practices that lacked uniformity and clearly hindered inter-project comparability. For example, the superintend
ent of the Community Enterprises Section in Washington indicated by letter to the acting superintendent of the Gila River
Project [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3]:
The control and system and auditing [at Gila River] is
the best we have seen in cooperatives. If all the enterprises use the same system, we can then send out comparative reports. This is very difficult to do with different types of reports, as you can well imagine.
COOPERATIVE ACCOUNTING ON THE RCs
Evidence reveals that the WRA used comparative financial
information to help stimulate cost efficiency and instill a spirit of competitiveness among the RCs despite the lack of accounting uniformity. For example, the WRA prepared semi-annual reports that summarized the financial performance of the

Rent rates were revised downward in February 1943 to the above figures in
response to complaint letters from evacuees at the Rohwer, Manzanar, and Tule
Lake RCs [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #3].
10
All RCs except for Granada were audited by the Northwest Cooperative Auditing and Service Association of Walla Walla WA. Granada was audited by the
Consumers Cooperative Association of Kansas City [Entry 16, box 417, folder
69.010 #6]. Box 418, folder D contains multiple copies of the accounting system
set up by Northwest.
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centers’ business enterprises and focused on key performance
indicators. Meeting key indicators, such as a three-to-one current ratio, also triggered cash rebates to the evacuees and thus
served as an inducement to meet the WRA’s financial targets.
Detailed reports were prepared regularly to assess and compare
the performance of each center. The semi-annual report ending
December 31, 1943 included a section on business enterprises
that contained the current ratios for all ten RCs, ranging from
8.83 at Central Utah to 2.09 at Tule Lake. The report included
the following comments about the financial performance of the
business enterprises [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]:
During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio
of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the
end of the year most of the Enterprises had hit this ratio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Several of the Enterprises had established such good cash
[positions] that they were able to pay a cash rebate just
before the Christmas season. This, of course, is a fine
morale builder at this particular time.
Certain evacuee officers and managers of the project cooperatives appeared similarly concerned with meeting financial
targets despite not having the opportunity to benefit financially. For example, while noting that the Jerome cooperative was
compelled to dissolve despite being rated as the best performer
among the ten center co-ops, Katsujiro Iseri, president of the
cooperative, discussed the following financial indicators in his
year-end summary report [“History of the Jerome Co-Operative
Enterprises, Inc.,” Entry 16, box 427, folder 69.020]11:
According to the report of the WRA Business Enter
prises, the ratio of operating expenses to gross sales in
the case of Jerome Co-Operative Enterprises, in comparison with the other center co-ops, is the third from
the lowest. The ratio of net savings to gross sales is the
second highest among center co-ops. The average ratio of assets to liabilities of all center co-ops is 2.95 to 1,
but ours is 5.01 to 1, which rates ours at the top.

11
The archives also include a set of financial reports entitled “Combined Balance Sheet and Operating Statement of Business Enterprises Operating on Relocation Centers.” Each of the ten projects is listed on the same page. The following data are included: current ratio, total net savings, average monthly sales per
employee, average sales per capita [Entry 16, box 429, folder 69.034].
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Once the evacuees had been removed from the West Coast
assembly centers (ACs) and relocated to permanent camps, dispersing evacuees to other regions of the country became one of
the WRA’s policy goals. The archives reveal that certain WRA
field officials tried very hard to relocate evacuee accountants
who worked on the project cooperatives to other cooperatives
further east. An exchange of letters between Don Elberson, chief
of Consumer Enterprises at the Tule Lake Project, and Merlin
G. Miller, director of the Education Department of the Consumers Cooperative Association in Kansas City, reveals the difficulty in accomplishing this goal given the prejudice against Japanese Americans and the resistance to employ them.12
Despite the difficulties mentioned above, and the relatively
small number of resettlements, relocations of accounting personnel were sufficient to cause staff shortages to the degree that
they impacted the quality of financial reporting. For example,
the December 1943 semi-annual report noted that, “there is constant turnover of personnel which is particularly serious in the
accounting department where financial reports have to be submitted periodically” [“Semi-Annual Report, July 1 to December
31, 1943,” Entry 3, box 6]. Similarly, a December 5, 1944 letter
from Charles M. Beltt, business enterprise advisor to the head
of the Business Enterprise Section in Washington DC, stated
[Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]:
As we all know, there has been a very fast turnover in
the personnel of the Business Enterprises and in some
instances the cooperatives have lost nearly all of their
12
On February 10, 1943, Elberson recommended three evacuees for employment. He spoke most highly for Mr. Tanaka, who, although an alien, “is very
thoroughly Americanized” and “in terms of knowledge of accounting theory and
practice and business organization, he has no peer on this project.” Later, in his
three-page, typed letter, Elberson discussed the role of cooperatives in overcoming the racial stereotyping that confronted skilled workers like Mr. Tanaka: “It is
rather inconceivable to me that the employment of one of these people in an organization the size of C.C.A. could be sufficient to split your organization open
on a racial question … It is true that the cooperative movement professes that it
puts into practice racial tolerance where other groups merely talk about it. We,
who attempt to sell the cooperative movement to the Japanese as an instrument
to be used for their general welfare, have much of this point, and I feel that it
is quite obvious that the cooperative movement itself has as much to gain from
this as the Japanese.” Unfortunately, Elberson was not fully persuasive as Miller’s February response indicates: “I, myself, am convinced by your argument, but
this is not the case for our entire staff, and we do, here, usually work as a unit.
Frankly, our situation is complicated by the fact that part of our staff and our
employees come from a long mental background of the old slave-holding states
psychology of color prejudice” [Entry 48, box 281, folder 516].
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accountants and other key employees, and they have
been unable to fill these vacancies with qualified people.
Beltt noted that employee turnover caused the financial statements to contain errors and to lack uniformity for comparative
purposes. This theme was frequently reinforced in the WRA archive. Emil Sekerak of Topaz wrote to Rossman in 1943, claiming that the lateness of its financial statements and the RC’s failure to use the uniform reporting form were occasioned by the
recent turnover of chief accountants three times [Entry 16, box
417, folder 69.010 #4].
In 1944, auditing had become so desperate in Community Enterprises that Mr. Provinse, the head of the Division, employed George Mori, an evacuee, to travel from camp to camp
doing auditing work. In a July 22, 1944 letter, Provinse said a
precedent had been set for such an unusual action by the YMCA
and the Red Cross [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #4].
With typical care and perspicacity, Myer drafted a 15-page
guide for the liquidation of the cooperative enterprises as early as January 1945 [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #6]. The
final version was dispatched to the project directors in August.
In a September 19 memo, Rossman informed Myer that the
accounting side of the liquidation was impossible as the “staff
had melted away to almost nothing” [Entry 16, box 417, folder
69.010 #6]. Nevertheless, the WRA utilized its financial reports,
flawed as they were, to evaluate and compare the performance
of project enterprises.
Accounting information and financial reports also served a
variety of managerial purposes at the RCs, including comparative costing.13 Costs were also monitored to defend against the
many critics of WRA policies and activities. For example, each
center had to submit its planned menus to Washington for approval “to make sure that the public was adequately informed
of WRA feeding policies and procedures” [CWRIC, 1997, p.
163]. A June 14, 1943 letter from J.W. Clear, WRA budget and
finance officer, to the project director at the Granada RC clearly illustrates the importance of the Handbook, the level of re13
The authors of the Handbook described its purposes thusly: “It is intended
that the accounting records prescribed in this Handbook provide a means of preparing adequate financial operating statements to permit: A substantial basis for
budgetary estimates; adequate budgetary control; comparative operating costs
as a tool of good management; costs of production to assist in intelligent industrial planning and marketing; an adequate means of accounting for all funds advanced to the War Relocation Authority; a source for supplying information with
a) the evacuees, b) other government agencies, c) the public.
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porting detail, and the degree of administrative accountability
within the WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]:
There should be no conflict of thought as to the preparation of any monthly reports as the procedures prescribed in the Finance Manual will govern all cases. We
have, therefore, made the necessary changes in your report as to the Total Number of Meals Served, etc. We
are unable to check your figures for the daily average
number of persons served for the month or by separate mess halls. Will you please advise how you computed the averages as shown. In the future will you also
please support any deductions from the ‘Stores to Account For,’ which are covered by Survey Reports, by attaching copies of those reports to the Monthly Subsistence Report.
Because evacuee cash advances (i.e., wages) were capped
far below comparable civilian wages, there were few economic
incentives to induce workers to perform above minimum performance levels.14 WRA policies initially specified that a job would
be provided to every evacuee who was willing and able to work.
In addition, evacuees were given food, clothing, housing, education, and medical attention whether they worked or not, although the business enterprises were required to reimburse the
government for the allowances given to their employees.15 This
meant that jobs were often overstaffed, and there were few penalties that could be imposed for absenteeism, tardiness, or poor
job performance.
In our view, the WRA responded to its charge by combining
administrative mechanisms that included traditional, accounting reporting procedures, as specified in the Handbook, with a
variety of more creative, non-market social factors that included aspects of a less than fully democratic society. In a June 10,
1942 memorandum to Thomas Holland, chief, Employment Division, a senior employment officer described the challenges
confronting the WRA [Entry 16, box 492, folder 72.100]:
14
As an example of the wage disparity between Caucasian and evacuee workers, the CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted that, “a WRA librarian received $167 a
month, while her evacuee staff received $16 a month.”
15
According to the U.S. Department of the Interior [1975, p. 81], the decision to provide jobs to everyone who was willing and able to work led to “a number of glaring abuses – a great deal of overstaffing on evacuee jobs at some of the
centers, creation of a large number of ‘boondoggling’ positions, and encouragement of inertia and slack working habits among a large percentage of the evacuee population.”
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In the Relocation Centers, at present, the ordinary incentives to work are largely lacking. The wage is small
and the worker sees little prospect of being able to improve his future position through present work or sacrifice. The people enjoy security of a kind but without
freedom or future … Closely related to the lack of work
incentives is the weak position of the Administration as
employer. The ordinary employer holds a strong sanction over his employees in that he can terminate the
employment and endanger the livelihood of an employee whose performance is not satisfactory to him. Conversely he can offer greater pay as a reward for more or
better work. The WRA can do neither. Unless it is prepared to resort to physical duress, the Administration is
compelled to treat idlers nearly as well as the workers.

Thus, notwithstanding the frustrations of inducing worker
efficiency in the RC environment, the WRA staff collected extensive data on each individual worker’s job performance and
maintained a personnel file on every evacuee who resided in
them. They established cooperative associations as the form of
enterprise best able to minimize costs, overcome work resist
ance, and facilitate skill development that would enable WRA
officials to disperse evacuees to other parts of the country. The
WRA collected cost data as a way to stimulate efficiency in the
absence of normal market mechanisms (layoffs, discharges,
plant closings, etc.).
COST ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL PROCEDURES
While many top WRA officials had administrative experience with isolated populations at the Department of Agriculture or the Bureau of Indian Affairs [U.S. Department of the
Interior, 1975, p. 83], the mass relocation of over 100,000 civilians to isolated camps must have represented an extraordinary set of challenges. As a first step, the WRA had to prepare
budget estimates and develop detailed administrative policies.
The largest single item within the WRA’s fiscal 1943 budget of
$70 million was an expenditure of $20 million for evacuee food
costs. Although $.50 per person per day was the daily food allowance initially proposed for the ACs, the WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 20.2.8/9] reduced the allotment to $.45 per person per day, in part because the RCs could provide foodstuffs
from their cooperative farms. The overall cost was calculated at
$1.20 per day for evacuees except at Tule Lake. Figure 1 illustrates the costing procedures that were proposed by WRA staff
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to determine per-person food cost at the RCs. Although comparable examples are not reproduced, this same level of accounting detail was proposed for estimating the costs of operating
housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hospital/dispensary.
FIGURE 116
Proposed Outline for Food Costs
Explanation of Accounts
10.

Provision of food for evacuees other than those in hospital. Includes costs
of food and of operation of kitchen, commissary, dining halls, and refrigeration and food storage facilities.

11.0

Direct Costs
11.1 Food issued to kitchens, but not including food inventory held in
warehouse
11.2 Evacuee labor used directly in operating kitchen, commissary, refrigerator plant, etc. … but not including central office force
11.3 Caucasian labor employed in this activity
11.4 Freight on food issued to kitchen, but not including freight on food
inventory
11.5 Fuel for cooking and heating buildings and water
11.6 Miscellaneous
Allocated Costs
12.1 Water. A charge for water, prorated from the Center water account
as nearly as possible on the basis of quantity consumed.
12.2 Electricity. A charge for electric power and light, prorated from total electric power cost as nearly as possible according to consumption.
12.3 Garbage disposal. Proration as equitably as may be of total cost of
garbage disposal for whole project.
12.4 Trash disposal.
12.5 Cartage. Charges incurred by WRA for cartage of food from railroad station to project, within project, prorated from project total
for cartage as nearly as possible according to load.
12.6 Office and general supervision. A pro rata charge for general office
service not carried as a specific project expense.
Buildings: Maintenance and Repair. Includes items of a more or less recurrent nature, including labor, material, and supplies, incident to maintaining in operating condition the buildings used for kitchens, dining
room, and food storage, refrigeration, and preparation.
Equipment: Maintenance and Repair. [Same as above]
Investment Items. These are items of major outlay, usually recurring only
infrequently, if at all, the cost of which must be spread over a considerable
period rather than charged currently.
15.1 Land cost, building construction and replacement of buildings used
for … Includes replacement of complete units or substantial parts
thereof, as in case of serious damage by fire or wind.
15.2 Equipment cost, installation and replacement for …

12.0

13.0

14.0
15.0

16
Letter on August 13, 1942 from Stauber, to Mr. Leland Barrows, executive
officer, WRA [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]. Stauber proposed that a summary form, based on these procedures, be prepared monthly with data reduced to a
“per evacuee-day” cost basis. Stauber recommended a similar costing approach
for housing and sanitary facilities, laundry facilities, and the hospital/dispensary.
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The Finance Handbook contained WRA Form 202 – Revised
which was entitled “Monthly Report of Administrative Mess Operation” [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook, 1945, Section EG].
This standard form was prepared at each RC and described how
the average cost per meal was to be computed. Another statement entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Food Costs” was to be
prepared by each mess hall at a RC and was to supplement the
center’s monthly report [Entry 29, box 5, Finance Handbook,
1943, Sections E-G]. This supplemental report was to include
columnar headings for the total number of meals served, the
daily average number of rations served, the cost of food consumed, the average food cost per ration, and remarks. Another
statement, entitled “Comparative Mess Hall Labor Costs,” was
to include columnar headings for the daily average number of
rations served, the labor costs, the average labor cost per ration
per month, and remarks. Clearly, these two statements served
managerial purposes of promoting greater cost efficiency for
mess hall operations.
In addition to providing essential information for budgeting
and cost control, a carefully proscribed, cost accounting methodology enabled WRA officials to respond definitively to in
quiries from the media, other federal agencies, government offi
cials, and political critics of WRA policies. For example, data
emanating from a comprehensive cost accounting system could
explain the following response to an inquiry from Secretary of
Labor Frances Perkins [Entry 16, box 494, folder 72.520]:
The policy of the War Relocation Authority, an agency
of the Federal Government, requires payment by evacuees of $4.69 per week to cover cost of food and lodging
when such evacuees are engaged in private employment
and taking meals and lodging on the project.
Since a number of evacuees were well-educated and many
had experience running groceries and other small businesses before their internment, the WRA could employ them in accounting positions at the centers. For example, of the 3,845 people
listed as working at the Rohwer Center on May 11, 1943, 26
were described as engaged in accounting activities. The fact that
only a $3 monthly wage differential existed between the controller and the lowest level clerk clearly illustrates the challenges the WRA faced in creating economic work incentives. The
breakdown of these positions is presented in Figure 2 [Entry
16, box 495, folder 72.510].
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FIGURE 2
Occupational Titles in Use at Rohwer Relocation Center
Title
Accountant, Cost

Total
4

$16
2

$19
2

Controller

1		

1

Bookkeeper II

1

1		

Bookkeeper III

3

3		

Accounting Clerk

5

5		

Audit Clerk

3

3		

Cost Clerk II

9

9		

Job Title Description
Prepares financial statement, audits
books – Maintenance, Public Works, Agriculture, Trans. & Supply Division.
Supervises the financial affairs of Cooperative Enterprise.
Keeps record of the business transactions – Community Service.
Keeps record and works on one phase
of records Administration Division
Performs the more routine calculating, typing, and posting necessary in accounting – Administrative, Community
Service, Co-op Enterprise.
Checks and verifies the figures, calculations and postings pertaining to various
transactions Administrative Division.
Computes the cost of a working unit –
Public Works, Maintenance, Trans. &
Supply, Administrative Division.

Cost accounting methods used at the projects were also subject to periodic audit by the WRA’s headquarters staff. For example, the project director at Gila River sent a letter to Myer
regarding a recent audit [Entry 16, box 37, folder 12.000]. The
letter described a number of questions that WRA officials had
raised, but that Mr. Dodd, the project director, had channeled
to Myer. The first question and Dodd’s response, reproduced below, illustrate the comprehensiveness of the cost accounting at
the centers:
1. How are the farm produce costs arrived at from farm
to mess? Our cost system includes the following
charges:
(1) direct and indirect labor
(2) materials, such as seeds, fertilizer, sprays, dust,
etc.
(3) cost of farm employment expenses and operation
(4) transportation to and from the farm, transportation of material, and transportation of produce
(5) land and water rentals
(6) miscellaneous expenses such as evacuee office
wages, office material, etc.
(7) salaries of appointed personnel …
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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In summary, WRA officials recognized the importance of
maintaining detailed records that monitored costs in order to
justify appropriation requests, promote cost efficiency, and assuage critics who charged that evacuees were given favored
treatment over native citizens in regard to wages, provisions,
and accommodations during a period of wartime shortages. As
mentioned, many career WRA officials had cost accounting experience from prior service at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and
the procedures they initiated at the RCs were fully described in
the government’s Finance Handbook. Instilling a desire among
captive workers to work in a cost efficient manner was an entirely different matter and one that required a more creative solution.
In summary, and from a theory perspective, the decision
to establish cooperatives and their use of accounting and cost
controls enabled the WRA to minimize resistance and control
the labor process in a non-market setting amidst a captive labor force that the WRA could not physically compel to work.
The next two sections of the paper reviews certain key aspects
of the interment episode and then highlight how accounting information was used to monitor and socialize the evacuees.
THE INTERNMENT EPISODE: A BRIEF RETROSPECTIVE
While the internment appears unequivocally reprehensible
in retrospect, it is noteworthy that the injustice done to citizens of Japanese descent did not go unrecognized by WRA officials. For example, a WRA booklet of May 1943, entitled “The
Characteristics of the Project Population, A Handbook of General Statistics,” contained the following introductory comments
[Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]:
It was about an [sic] year ago that nearly a hundred
thousand Japanese were suddenly divorced from the
scheme of things in American society and corralled into
far-flung desert waste lands while the nation girded itself for the supreme task of winning the war. The war
has obliterated every vestige of individual achievement
for the whole of the Japanese. Issei and Nisei alike now
find themselves in the bottom stratum.17
The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
17
Issei were native-born Japanese who had emigrated to the U.S. after 1907
and could not become U.S. citizens by law. Nisei were American-born, American-educated, U.S. citizens of Japanese descent.
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Civilians (CWRIC) was established in the early 1980s to re-examine the internment episode in detail. The CWRIC [1997, p.
12] held 20 days of hearings, received testimonies from 750 witnesses, and described the losses that were not covered by the
Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948 to include,
“… the stigma placed on people who fell under the exclusion
and relocation orders; the deprivation of liberty suffered during detention; the psychological impact of exclusion and relocation; the breakdown of family structure; the loss of earnings
or profits; physical injury or illness during detention.”18 The
CWRIC [1997, p. 18] also concluded that, “the broad historical
causes which shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war
hysteria and a failure of political leadership.” It clearly intimated that racial prejudice was a major driving force, citing General DeWitt’s February 1942 recommendation for forcible exclusion [CWRIC, 1997, p. 6]:
In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities
are not served by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation
Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized,’ the
racial strains are undiluted.19
In terms of the actual relocation, the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) preceded the WRA and was charged
with assembling Japanese-American civilians in 64 civil control
stations and relocating them to15 regional centers.20
Several of these ACs were hastily constructed at nearby racetracks or fairgrounds where living conditions were deplorable. Evacuees were fed and housed there for one to four
18
Russell Robinson, WRA chief of the Evacuee Property Division, estimated
that the evacuees left behind $200 million worth of real, personal, and commercial property when forced to leave their homes [U.S. Department of the Interior,
1946e, Entry 1, box 1, p. 108].
19
Further to this point were comments by General DeWitt that were quoted
by the Associated Press on April 13, 1943, during a hearing of the House Naval
Affairs Subcommittee [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010 #5]: “It makes no difference whether the Japanese is theoretically a citizen. He is still a Japanese. Giving
him a scrap of paper won’t change him. I don’t care what they do with the Japs
so long as they don’t send them back here. A Jap is a Jap.” Weglyn [1996, p. 28]
noted that 73% of those interned were American citizens who “were imprisoned
for no reason other than their race.” Dillon Myer, long-time director of the WRA,
noted in a speech to the American Legion that 72% of the evacuees had never
seen Japan [Entry 16, box 471].
20
Voluntary relocation outside the WDC ceased as an option at the end of
March 1942.
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months until permanent camps could be built. The WCCA’s policies did call for a space allowance of 200 square feet per couple, food rations not to exceed $.50 per person per day, and a
yearly clothing allowance that ranged from $25 to $42 depending on an evacuee’s age and sex. In point of fact, the ACs spent
on average only $.39 per person per day [CWRIC, 1997, p. 142].
Drinnon [1987] observed that by the end of March 1942, over
90,000 persons were living at ACs where they stayed an average of 100 days.
During their residence at these centers, evacuees were assigned a family identification number and were required to
wear regulatory ID tags to identify each family member, their
personal property, and every transaction involving the exchange
of goods or services.21 An evacuee’s individuality was routinely compromised by requiring everyone to eat in common mess
halls and to use common showers, latrines, and laundry facilities.
The internment camps were intended to be as self-sustaining as possible given the constraints of a wartime economy and
the existing prejudice against any policy that appeared to favor
Japanese evacuees over “native” American citizens. For example, evacuee wage rates were capped at $19 per month so that
they fell below the $21 that was initially paid to American military personnel. Milton Eisenhower noted that, “a storm of protests developed throughout the country about the possibility of
the evacuees being paid any amount of money greater than the
amount paid to American soldiers, namely, $21 a month” [Entry 16, box 53, file 12.202].
By August, 1942, the WRA’s charge also included the dis
persal and permanent resettlement of evacuees in non-designated areas of the U.S.22 As of January 1, 1945, just under 32,000

21
Icihasi described the use of identification numbers at his AC: “The Camp
has a population of 18,400, each of which is numbered for identification; for instance I am No. 5561A, which is required for every transaction in the Camp.”
Transactions included the purchase of clothing, medical attention, and patronage at camp stores and enterprises [Chang, 1997, p. 110].
22
In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in August 1942, Myer explained the softening of the original policy [Entry 16, box 429, folder 71.100]: “We strongly believe
that loyal American citizens among the evacuees should be allowed every opportunity and encouragement to reenter private employment or enterprise…With
this in mind I issued about two weeks ago an instruction to our field offices covering procedures through which individual loyal American citizens of Japanese
ancestry may be permitted to leave relocation centers to accept private employment in the middle-western States.”
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evacuees had been settled outside the RCs.23 Of these, 14,000
had gone to the East North Central region which included Chicago and 8,500 to the Mountain states. Interestingly, nearly
1,500 had been allowed to return to the Western Defense Command, mostly to Oregon and Washington. The resettlements increased significantly during 1945 when it appeared the war was
winding down. Only 194 persons had been permitted to go to
California precedent to 1945; subsequently, 43,181 returned to
the state that had been the center of Japanese ethnic culture
before the evacuation outrage [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1946b, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 42-45].
Table VI of the WPA’s semi-annual report for July 1-December 31, 1944 [Entry 3, box 4] provided interesting place-of-origin and occupation data for evacuees who had been granted indefinite departure from the RCs. Of 111,170 original evacuees,
29.4% had left the RCs. Of the 38,520 foreign-born detainees,
only 14.23% had departed; the corresponding number for the
72,650 native-born was 37.55%. With respect to the mobility of
various occupational groups, it seems that those with middling
skills were most in demand (e.g., sales/clerical 52.63%, semiskilled 42.51%, trained but without specific expertise 41.98%).
Those with greater expertise followed (e.g., professional and
managerial 37.56% and skilled 35.02%), while those without
skills lagged behind in terms of their occupational mobility (e.g.,
unskilled 28.53%, no occupational classification, 22.10%, agriculture and fishing 25.19%).24
Although the WRA’s staff performed yeoman service in attempting to place evacuees with private industrial and servicesector firms outside the containment area, bureaucratic delays
in determining an evacuee’s loyalty and a reluctance to hire
workers of Japanese ancestry meant that “only a small percentage of the internees were able to leave the camps” and be resettled [Robinson, 2001, p. 5]. Typical was a letter G. Richardson,
head of the Community Enterprises Section, wrote to J.W. Hannon on October 15, 1942, in which he characterized these efforts in patriotic terms [Entry 16, box 416, folder 69.010 #1]:

23
The WRA maintained monthly records on the relocation rate for evacuees
per 1,000 population. Over the course of 1943, the monthly rates ranged from
3.9 to 23.6%. These rates ranged from 7.4 to 30.4% and 12.7 to 39.1% for 1944
and 1945 respectively [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1975, p. 211].
24
These percentages are derived by dividing those on indefinite departure on
December 31, 1944 by the original job classification identified for each evacuee
in 1942.
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It has been determined that this problem shall be handled in a thoroughly democratic, American way. The
WRA is cooperating with both military and civilian
agencies to enable this mass migration to proceed in a
planned, orderly, and decent manner.
WRA officials often described relocation and resettlement
efforts similarly; however, their sentiments are belied by a comment Richardson made trying to place Japanese Americans
with eastern cooperative groups. He assured Mr. Lincoln, for
instance, in a December 10, 1942 letter that “… each candidate
would be thoroughly investigated by the FBI” [Entry 16, box
416, folder 69.010 #1]. These “democratic” principles are also
contradicted by the fact that evacuees who failed to answer
the now infamous Question 28 in the prescribed manner were
disqualified from relocation.25 However, the WRA’s community
activities advisors may be cast in a more sympathetic light if
one considers their efforts to “Americanize” the evacuees for a
smoother transition to resettlement. For example they secured
movies for educating evacuees about sections of the country to
which they might be relocated [Entry 16, box 417, folder 69.010
#4].
The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 30.5.5, 30.5.9] specified that the prime objective of the WRA’s Community Activities
Section was to facilitate the relocation process by sponsoring interaction between the evacuees and “groups typically American
in concept.” RC residents were allowed to participate in “Japanese style games, sports, and cultural activities,” but only if they
were not specifically nationalistic. Baseball was in; Sumo wrestling was out. Likewise, the Community Analysis Section was
charged with the responsibility to engineer sociological investigations and to provide programming that was geared toward
the “assimilation of evacuees into American life” [WRA Handbook, Entry 29, box 1, 30.8.1B].
Regardless of their personal motives towards evacuees,
WRA officials followed the procedures and completed the stand
ard forms that were specified in the WRA’s Finance Handbook.
The purpose of the Finance Handbook was “to cover all phases of accounting involved in the activities of the War Relocation Authority” [Entry 29, box 5, p. A-1]. Thus, the accounting and record keeping for both WRA-operated activities (mess
halls, hospitals, fire and police departments, and agricultural
25
Question 28 was an oath of allegiance to the U.S. It will be discussed in detail in the succeeding section.
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units, among others) and evacuee-managed cooperative enterprises (general clothing stores, food and drug stores, shoe repair shops, watch and radio repair shops, etc.) were indicated
in the Handbook.
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
Four decades prior to Orwell’s dating of his futuristic vision, the U.S. government had collected an astounding amount
of data on the evacuees. Even before the WRA’s statistical division was established, the WCCA was gathering information related to the AC phase of the relocation operation. A letter from
M.M. Tozier to Myer reviewed the categories of information the
WCCA was being asked to provide [Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100
#1]. These included documentary materials taken from evacuees
at the ACs (e.g., diaries, minutes of evacuee meetings), all AC
newspapers, vital statistics of all evacuees, reports on AC operations, daily recapitulation reports on the whereabouts of all
detainees, etc. Subsequently, when the WRA assumed responsibility, a letter sent from Myer to John McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War [December 5, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, file 79.100
#1], requested additional information from either the WCCA or
the War Department. The specifics of the WRA’s informational
needs are summarized in Appendix A.
By the end of 1942, the WRA had ceased to depend upon
the WCCA for its statistical data. B. Ralph Stauber served singlehandedly as the relocation planning officer until he was given
a small division (Relocation Planning) of his own in 1943, the
result of a nine-page, single-spaced memo to Myer on November 7, 1942, in which he proposed a statistical division for the
WRA. His grand design for 1943 was a “locator file” in which
would appear a Hollerith alphabetic punch card for each evacu
ee. These cards were to include standard demographic information about age, gender, education, occupation, family size,
medical history, criminal record, and RC location. However, additional data categories about links to Japan were also maintained, such as years of residence in Japan and the extent of
education received there.
Perhaps the most intrusive statistics were those associated
with Japanese Americans identified as “repatriates,” either by
virtue of an evacuee’s application to be sent to Japan and/or by
a request emanating from the Japanese government [Entry 16,
box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The punch card project was so extensive and immediate that the WRA subcontracted the funchttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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tion to IBM. A March 24, 1943 memo from Leland Barrow informed Clear and Stauber that 30,000 locator cards had been
completed on an initial contract of 40,000 with a final total of
80,000 expected [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2]. By April
9, Stauber complained to the WRA director that the file project had been slowed by variations in the data gathering at the
RCs [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #2].
Stauber’s 1942 proposal to Myer, envisioning a statistical
division of the WRA to gather in-depth information on all RC
operations, was approved in early 1943. These data would include the physical facilities of each, with particular attention to
the number of available apartments for evacuee living. At the
Rohwer Center, for example, the 1,050 single persons all lived
in six-person units [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. Agricultural and industrial statistics were kept on operations and
individuals, as were records of those evacuees who worked off
the RCs and the payments made to them. The cost of subsistence payments and clothing allowances was maintained, leading to “profit and loss” statements for each project (Entry 16,
box 498, folder 79.100 #1).
Additional information on evacuees included lists of visitors to the RCs and those who were visited [Entry 16, box 498,
folder 79.100 #1]; data on short and long-term leave hearings
for educational, occupational, and relocation purposes [Entry
16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3]; and background details on the
characteristics of those evacuees confined to the centers’ stockades [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. “Gallup Poll” inquir
ies were regularly solicited to gauge evacuee opinion on an assortment of issues [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. The
WRA wanted to differentiate the attitudes of the Kibei, Japanese Americans who had been educated in Japan, from the Nisei and Issei. What were the characteristics of the repatriates,
both those who wanted to emigrate to Japan and those whom
the Japanese government had specified for return? Did evacuee
reactions change as their internment lengthened? Were there attitudinal variations among the occupants of various RCs? How
did those who sought employment relocation differ from those
who did not [Stauber to Myer, November 7, 1942, Entry 16, box
498, folder 79.100 #1]? Based upon these and other questions,
an “Analysis Unit” was formed as a component of the Relocation Planning Division of the WRA. The analytical and estimation activities of this unit are summarized in a letter from its
head, Evelyn Rose, to Stauber in October 1943 [Entry 316, box
498, folder 79.100 #3].
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On March 7, 1944, a new handbook of statistical procedures was sent by Stauber to all project directors. This resulted
in a new reporting system which was operationalized on April
1 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]. In a letter from Stauber to R.R. Best at the Tule Lake Center on April 23, 1944, the
head of the Relocation Planning Division prioritized the information required by the Washington office [Entry 16, box 498,
folder 79.100 #4]. It will be seen below that Tule Lake housed
those evacuees considered the most dangerous by the government. See Appendix B for details of this prioritization with accompanying references to the new manual.
While much of this wealth of information was amassed to
improve the internment process irrespective of its inherent immorality, the outcomes did not always reflect benevolence. Myer
wrote to Senator Holman on June 21, 1943, disclosing the number of native-born Japanese Americans 17 years and older who
had “declined to subscribe to an oath of allegiance”; namely,
“Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of
America and foreswear any form of allegiance to the Japanese
emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?” The WRA had sufficient information to report that 79%
had so sworn and 21% had refused [Entry 16, box 498, folder
79.100 #2]. Subsequently, the wording of this infamous “Question 28” was “rephrased to read whether they would abide by
the nation’s laws and refrain from interfering with the war effort” [Myer speech to the American Legion, November 16, 1943,
Entry 16, box 471]. A later statistic, reported by the U.S. Department of the Interior [1946c] after the war, had only 11% of
the evacuees declining to swear the oath.26
The oath of allegiance, combined with information regarding those Japanese Americans requesting repatriation, formed
the basis for a heinous process known as “segregation” that adumbrated the advent of McCarthyism a decade later with an additional leavening of racism and xenophobia. Segregated at the
Tule Lake Center were those evacuees, along with one or two
immediate family members, who failed to respond affirmatively to Question 28 and/or those viewed as potentially interfering
26
The WRA Handbook [Entry 29, box 1, 60.4.3B] was very specific as to
which evacuees would be eligible for permanent relocation out of the camps.
First and foremost was the need for an “unqualified affirmative” to Question 28.
Additionally, Japanese-American male citizens were eligible only if they had not
lived in Japan for ten years of more after age six, had not received all or most of
their education in Japan, and had received no formal education in Japan after
the age 15.
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with the war effort [Myer speech to the American Legion, November 16, 1943, Entry 16, box 471].27
The discussion of the WRA’s data gathering efforts heretofore has suggested several reasons for this time-consuming and
expensive undertaking. In the first instance, the WRA was the
servant of government and, as such, was required to provide
sufficient data to demonstrate that the captive population was
maintained efficiently and cost effectively. In some instances,
comparative statistics from the ten RCs were required for gauging the relative competency of their individual managements.
As an agent of government also, the WRA had to pay particular attention to those Japanese Americans whom the state perceived to be the most dangerous – the Kibei, the repatriates,
those who had declined the oath of allegiance, and those who
were segregated.
In other instances, the statistical collection had the potential for improving life on the RCs specifically as attitudinal data
were gathered and analyzed. Information about the evacuees
was provided to academics, such as Leonard Blum of UCLA and
D.S. Thomas of UC Berkeley, for psychological, sociological, and
statistical study. The distinguished American author and Japanese-Hawaiian advocate, Edgar Rice Burroughs, requested and
received information about evacuee mobility from the RCs to
employment opportunities further east [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3]. Ultimately, however, it was the economic data the
WRA collected on the cooperative enterprises operating on the
RCs that benefited the evacuees most directly.
The State Department had a distinct interest in the WRA’s
statistical operations. In November 1943, the State Department
wrote Myer to the effect that it might need detailed information about the costs of Japanese-American detention if post-war
negotiations took a particular direction. Stauber informed the
WRA leadership that the Relocation Planning Division was already compiling those costs. Myer wrote to Secretary of State
Cordell Hull on December 8, 1943: “The system of statistical
records and cost accounts provided in the regular operating
procedures in the War Relocation Authority appear to be adequate to furnish the information requested …” [Entry 16, box
498, folder 79.100 #3].
A related and interesting observation was made by Myer
27
Evidence in Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #3 suggests that correlations
between Question 28 declinations and repatriation requests were made routinely, even when segregation was not at issue.
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in his November 1943 speech to the American Legion when he
averred that it was his feeling that the WRA had to do all it
could to make life bearable on the RCs lest the Japanese mili
tarists take retaliatory actions against American prisoners of
war [Entry 16, box 471].
The archive also reveals an exchange of information between the WRA and several foreign governments. A letter from
Stauber to Hector Allard, the secretary of the Canadian legation in Washington, proposed a reciprocal exchange of information and visitation to Canadian operations that paralleled the
RCs [October 13, 1942, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]. In
particular, Stauber was interested in hearing about conditions
the Canadian government imposed upon employers of evacuee labor. Additionally, there is evidence of the Spanish government’s interest in the operation of the RCs and the utilization
of a captive labor force. The repressive Franco regime is reputed to have employed convict labor in the aftermath of the
Spanish Civil War. A letter from Stauber to John Provinse, the
chief of the Community Management Division, requested data
in preparation for a 1944 visit to the RCs by the Spanish Embassy under the auspices of the State Department [Entry 16,
box 417, folder 69.010 #5].
We should also point out that the WRA maintained daily time reports for all evacuee workers, some 2,500 to 3,000
at each center. A post-war conclusion with respect to their efficiency was discouraging. Although the average working day
was seven to eight hours of on-the-job presence, the WRA felt
it was getting only two to three hours of performance [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1946c, Entry 1, box 1, pp. 32-34]. If
this analysis is correct, it could suggest that the cooperatives
may have provided sufficient incentives to make them a superior
labor control structure than the direct hiring of labor at low
wages, which was the only recourse for the WRA. However, it
is conceded that no evidence exists in the archives of the work
performance of cooperative employees; thus, any comparison to
the WRA’s direct hires in terms of their relative efficiency must
be pure conjecture.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In our view, the need to house, care for, and sustain thousands of captive workers in semi-permanent centers convinced
top WRA officials that cooperative enterprises would be the organizational form that would best overcome worker resistance,
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provide positive incentives, and promote cost efficiency in the
non-market environment of RCs. A letter on October 9, 1942
from E.R. Fryer, acting project director (Gila River) to Philip
M. Glick, the WRA’s solicitor, reveals the thinking behind cooperatives. It is most helpful in illuminating the WRA’s underlying rationales implementing this structure [Entry 16, box 495,
folder 72.510]:
We are obligated not only by virtue of our commitments but even more so by our position as guardians to
take every possible action to maintain and, in fact, promote economic respectability. Otherwise, not only will
we fail in our efforts during war time to preserve human values but in the difficult post-war period we shall
have on our hands a great American minority that shall
have lost some of its most admirable qualities. On the
purely practical side, industrial and agricultural enter
prises will fail if we do not by some means make our
people a living, vital part of them. Otherwise, each
evacuee will generate inevitably into a $16 or $19 worker. Here at Gila we are about within two weeks – to
launch a net enterprise. We certainly don’t want a repetition of Manzanar – strikes, sit-downs, bitterness,
charges and counter-charges. It is clearly within our
power to dignify the ‘net’ enterprise. We can easily give
it all the vitality needed. We need to make it a Community Enterprise with the proceeds deposited into a community trust fund for the benefit of all members of the
work corps shared in proportion to their man-days of
work.
It is especially noteworthy to observe that top WRA administrators discussed the use of non-economic (i.e., social) incentives as a way to stimulate evacuee work performance and bring
vitality to the cooperative enterprises. On September 1, 1942,
Director Myer issued Administrative Instruction No. 27 on the
subject of Employment and Compensation [Entry 16, box 495,
folder 72.510].28 This Instruction contained the most detailed
policy statement to date and included such items as basic pol
ices, compensation and work rules, employment in consumer
enterprises and the private sector, and unemployment compensation. It reaffirmed that all employment would be voluntary,
but went on to describe the social inducements that would be
28
The CWRIC [1997, p. 167] noted: “The new policy adopted in August
[1942] remained substantially unchanged throughout the WRA program.”
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used to promote work effort and desired behaviors. Section II,
“The Work Relocation Works Corps and The Order of Merit,”
and Section III, “Merit Rating Board,” are reproduced in Figure 3:
FIGURE 3
Administrative Instruction No. 27
II

The War Relocation Works Corps [WRWC] and The Order of Merit
A. The Work Corps was designed to place in the hands of the evacuees an
instrument of organization understood by the American people, and an
organization which can focus attention on work for the public good and
will give recognition to evacuees.
B. Each evacuee, upon first being assigned to a job, shall become thereby enlisted in the WRWC…Upon completion of three months’ employment, if his conduct and quality and quantity of his work for that period
are certified to the Project Director as outstanding by the Merit Rating
Board, an evacuee may be cited by the Project Director for special recognition and be made a member of the Order of Merit which is herby established as a unit within the WRWC. The Merit Rating Board may recommend that such merit recognition shall be withdrawn, for cause, and
the Project Director may, upon such recommendation, terminate the
membership of an evacuee in the Order of Merit.
C. Preferential consideration shall be given to members of the Order of
merit in connection with leaves for private employment, assignment to
preferred types of employment within the relocation center, promotion
to supervisory positions, and in such other matters as the Project Director may consider appropriate, in recognition of the superior initiative,
efficiency, leadership and loyalty of evacuees who achieve in the Order
of Merit.
III Merit Rating Board
A. There shall be on each relocation center a Merit Rating Board of seven members, appointed by the Community Council. Members of the Administrative Staff may serve on the Board if requested to do so by the
Community Council. This Board may be assigned a full-time evacuee
secretary.
B. The Merit Rating Board shall develop and install a simple work report
to be made periodically by each supervisor for members of the Work
Corps working under his direction. This work report shall cover quality
of work, quantity of work, and conduct. (Attitude, punctuality, loyalty to
the United States, etc. shall be considered as part of conduct.)
C. The Merit Rating Board shall constantly seek all proper work incentives
by planning awards and recognition and may make appropriate recommendations, from time to time, to the Project Director.

The most interesting aspect of Instruction No. 27 is its
r eliance on non-market factors to spur work effort and recognize achievement. For example, a Merit Rating Board, comprised of evacuees, would evaluate the conduct, quantity, and
quality of an evacuee’s work. Superior performance would result in membership in a select “Order of Merit,” which included
benefits such as job promotion and leaves for private employhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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ment outside of the center. In essence, therefore, cooperative associations provided a structure for labor control through peer
monitoring and evaluation.
Another point of interest in Instruction No. 27 is the call
for evacuees to demonstrate loyalty and patriotism to the U.S.
In retrospect, the idea that captive workers would be expected
to express loyalty to their captors seems almost ludicrous, but
Japanese Americans were widely mistrusted in the early 1940s
and were subjected to frequent and overt acts of racial prejudice, especially in the months immediately following Pearl Harbor. WRA officials believed that displaying acts of loyalty to the
war effort, such as putting forth a full-day’s work effort and later volunteering for military service, would help the evacuees obtain employment and join the mainstream of American life.
In essence, evacuees had far fewer options than native
workers in utilizing their labor power despite severe wartime labor shortages. Evacuee wages were capped; evacuees were forcibly relocated and detained at remote locations. They were unable to pursue other opportunities to leverage their bargaining
position in regard to wages and work conditions. On the other
hand, evacuees were not slaves or convicts, and they could not
be physically compelled to work, in part because of the government’s intent to abide by the terms of the Geneva Convention.29 Evacuees were provided with basic necessities whether
they worked or not, so the economic motives for work effort
(e.g., resources necessary for food, clothing, and shelter) were
essentially nonexistent.30 Given these unique circumstances, the
29
Glick discussed the reasons against work compulsion: “It is probably impossible to compel Japanese to work against their will. While their detention can
be shown to relate to the National safety as a war measure, the product of their
work would be in no different category from the standpoint of war need than the
product of the work of any other American citizen. Furthermore, it would be unwise to attempt to compel them to work in view of present negotiations between
the State Department and the Japanese Government, under which the Geneva
Convention of 1929 regarding treatment of prisoners of war would be extended
to civilian internees and under which the compulsory labor of civilian internees
would be prohibited. It is not expected that the lack of authority to compel labor
will be a practical obstacle in view of the administrative devices of preferential
treatment that can be used” [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000].
30
A February 19, 1943 memorandum from Taizo Inazu, president of the
Board of Directors of the Manzanar Cooperative Enterprises, to Dr. William. J.
Bruce, superintendent of the Consumer Enterprises Division, listed ten points
indicating why the WRA should lessen the financial burden on cooperatives.
Point number 6 reveals the incentive problems the WRA constantly faced: “It is
felt by the residents that the Cooperative is a division of the WRA set-up to serve
the interests of the residents” [Entry 48, box 228, folder 69.030].
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WRA felt that cooperatives would be the most effective and cost
efficient way to control the labor process. Philip M. Glick, solicitor of the WRA, described why cooperative enterprises were
selected [Entry 16, box 225, folder 31.000]:
The lack of power to compel Japanese to work without
their consent may not, however, be a serious obstacle to
carrying out the Authority’s plans for work programs.
Most of them will likely prefer work to idleness, particularly where an increase in income is assured. The
Authority can provide other inducements. Cooperation in the work program as a sign of patriotism and
loyalty can be stressed. It can be rewarded through
various types of awards, insignia, or preferential treatment. Lack of cooperation can be discouraged through
various administrative devices, including, if necessary,
withdrawal of privileges and denial of more than bare
subsistence.
Ultimately, a full understanding of the success of the WRA
cooperative associations transcends both labor process and accounting, lying instead with both the culture of the JapaneseAmerican community and the demands of a wartime economy.
Rather than sustaining resistance that would have caused any
managerial system to fail, Japanese-American evacuees generally portrayed a voluntarism that reflected itself in a commitment
to hard work and a patriotism in light of the severest adversity best exemplified by the 442nd, the most decorated battalion
of American soldiers in World War II, whose bravery belied the
atrocities committed by the American government against civilians who shared their ethnicity.31
We are unable to conclude that the WRA’s policies, including the decision to establish cooperative enterprises, were inordinately successful. However, the evacuees’ spirit of voluntarism
and active support of cooperative associations enabled WRA
officials to act relatively humanely towards the detained Japanese civilians, although these officials were not immune from
obtaining benefits from the wage ceiling which was imposed
on evacuees.32 The few documented cases of civil disobedience
31
Myer, in his speech to the American Legion, mentioned the exemplary service record of the 442nd [Entry 16, box 471].
32
For example, a letter on April 13, 1943 from Paul A. Taylor, project director
(Jerome), to D.S. Myer (subject: rates for personal services of evacuees working
for the appointed personnel) is most revealing [Entry 16, box 495, folder 72.500]:
“The appointed personnel at the Jerome Project have expressed a need for the
services of a few evacuees to work in their homes as housekeepers, cooks and
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and the evacuees’ willingness to staff key managerial positions
despite receiving wages far below market suggest that coopera
tive associations enabled the WRA to use non-economic incentives and to avoid physical punishments that typified earlier captive worker environments. That said, it is impossible to
parcel out the impact of the cooperative business structure on
the response of the Japanese-American evacuee population to
their forced confinement.
We can conclude, however, that the accounting information and control procedures played a critical role in the internment episode. The WRA had to justify its policies continually
and publicly and to minimize expenditures during a period of
severe wartime shortages. The Finance Handbook contained the
set of templates for recording transactions and creating reports
that enabled top officials to compare the centers’ performance
and monitor their operations. Compiling average daily meal cost
figures and creating an elaborate system of repayment for government advances are two examples of the procedures which
promoted cost efficiency. Thus, in conjunction with the social
mechanisms associated with cooperative business enterprises,
accounting played a key role in the management and administration of the RCs.
We would not be relating the full story of the JapaneseAmerican evacuation unless we provide the WRA the opportunity to deliver its final verdict on the relocation program that it
directed [U.S. Department of the Interior, 1946d, Entry 1, box
1, p. 99]:
While some of the evacuees will never recover from
the bitter experiences of the evacuation, the Authority is convinced that because of the industry and integrity of the Japanese American, they will quickly build for
themselves a better social and economic pattern than
they had before the war.
nurse maids. I would like authorization for an acceptable full and part-time rate
that the appointed personnel should pay for this service. I would suggest that a
rate be established on the following basis:
(192 Hour Basis)
Per Hour
Per Month
$.0833
(A) 16.00 – wage paid to evacuee worker
				
by appointed personnel
	  .1510
(B) 19.00 – subsistence
) Paid by
			
3.50 – clothing allowance ) appointed
		
(B) 6.50 – quarters
) personnel
			
––––
) to WRA
$.2343		
$45.00 – Total paid by appointed personnel”
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It is our conviction that with these words the WRA was putting a much too favorable spin upon the whole relocation episode, which remains one of the most shameful events in race
relations in the recent history of the United States. The best
that can be said for the WRA’s participation is that the record
seems to indicate that the agency generally did the best it could
to make the process as palatable as possible for the oppressed
ethnic minority. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that the WRA was
an arm of the government and the military establishment that
had orchestrated this abomination.
In conclusion, we believe that there are innumerable opportunities to extend this line of research and examine the role of
accounting for repressed or captive workers in other non-market settings. One of the most intriguing areas for study is the
accounting for convict labor which was common in Australia
in the mid-1800s and throughout the U.S. South after the Civil
War and well into the early 1900s. Many interesting questions
arise regarding leases of human capital. For example, how were
these leases structured? What role did accounting play in justifying punishments for failing to meet predetermined task levels? What kinds of accounting information were used by outside
contractors who supervised production and marketed convictmade goods? Answering these and related questions will illuminate accounting’s role in controlling the labor process of repressed and/or captive workers.
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APPENDIX A
Information Requested by D.C. Myer from the War Department
(January 1943)
A) Records or Documents Concerning the WCCA Program
1) AC populations (age, sex, occupation, family size, place of original residence, place of origin, RC to which sent
2) daily recapitulation reports (nos. 1-12, 44-46, 52-54, 113, 127, 133-34,
any issued after 142
3) addresses of individual evacuees at different stages of the program
4) property records of the WCCA covering assistance to evacuees in conjunction with property management and disposal in cooperation with
the Farm Security Administration and the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco
5) social data registration schedule (WCCA Form S-3)
6) copies of records, correspondence, applications, or declinations related
to repatriation
7) vital statistics during the assembly center stage
8) information on sick, insane, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled evacuees
9) case records of evacuees hospitalized or other medical treatment at the
ACs
B) Reports or Information Concerning Individual Evacuees
1) visitor-visitee file kept by WCCA
2) individuals sent to RCs from ACs ahead of schedule and reasons
3) individuals released from ACs and reasons
4) information about transfers to reunite families
5) records of those with a “shady past” or those who obstructed administration, or those with “bad performance at ACs
6) names of students given leave and institutions attending
7) evacuees from Alaska and reasons for evacuation
C) Reports or Information on Special Situations or Conditions
1) report on Santa Anita riot – causes, names, actions taken
2) other specific difficulties in ACs or RCs
D) Information Concerning Physical Facilities and Plant Operation
1) reports of engineers on facilities at RCs (sewers, electricity, water) – adequacy
2) information on equipment and supplies
3) relief grants and clothing allowances pending at time of transfer from AC
to RC
E) Observations or Comments on Various General Phases of AC Operations
1) reports of the WCCA on the entirety of assembly centers operations
2) evacuee governance at assembly centers – recent shift from self-govern
ance (discontinued) to advisory councils, why the change, conditions
that led to the change
3) most cooperative and uncooperative groups or organizations of evacuees
at the ACs
4) offenses committed and how they were dealt with
Source: letter from Myer to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War [January 5,
1943, Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #1]
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APPENDIX B
Principal Items or Classes of Information Needed
by the Relocation Planning Division

1a. Material called for in the manual regarding the Census of March 31 (manual
50.8.6)
1b. Population distribution by age, sex, citizenship at 3 months intervals back to
the beginning of the project
2. Current population reports daily, weekly, and monthly (manual 50.8.2-5)
3. Special information incident to clarifying and correcting records, and clarifying of particular evacuee cases, etc.
3a. Queries from the Central Utah Laboratory to facilitate completion of our
Central records
3b. Listing of unauthorized residents of Tule Lake for purpose of clarifying status through interview, hearings, etc.
3c. Cleaning up the residual of incomplete repatriation applications
3d. Supplying corrected lists of seasonal leaves transferred or pending to other
projects
4. Completing lists of aliens in residence, particularly those transferred to Tule
Lake in the segregation movements.
5. Maintaining a current integrated set of records including a locator file, an
evacuee case file, and special records (manual 50.8.1 B(4))
6. Consultative services to Project offices, including review of monthly reports
for accuracy, completeness, and comparability of statistical data (manual
50.8.8)
7. Analysis services, analysis and interpretation of statistical data pertaining to
evacuees (manual 50.8.7).
7a. Analysis of repatriation applications, giving classification by such factors as
age, sex, citizenship, year and method of entry into the U.S., residence and
schooling in Japan, etc.
7b. Information concerning stockade residents (many information categories
specified)
7c. Kibei: the number of the so-called “1940 Kibei,” that is, Kibei who are unmarried, whose families are not in the U.S. since 1935, by age, sex, years in
Japan, number requesting repatriation, etc.
7d. Inductees
7e. Project employment – distribution of employment – number of families having one or more wage earners – relation of employment status to welfare
load – nature and origin of welfare relief cases (drawn predominately from
what groups)
8. Auxiliary reports
8a. Check list of segregee movements to Tule Lake, giving dates of each movement and number transferred, by age (under and over17), sex, citizenship,
reason for segregation
8b. Check list of non-segregee movements out of Tule giving date, and number
of evacuees, by age (under and over 17), sex, and citizenship
8c. Prompt return of receipted train lists
Highest priority items are identified as 7c, 7b, 7d, and 7a in that order. 7e will
take time with immediacy depending upon project considerations. 1a, 1b, 2, 5, 6,
and 8c are to be handled routinely. 3 is to be handled as circumstances require. 4
must be kept completely current to meet commitments. 8a and 8b are small jobs.
8c must be dealt with promptly.
Source: Stauber to Best, April 28, 1944 [Entry 16, box 498, folder 79.100 #4]
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“THE ROARING NINETIES”: A
COMMENT ON THE STATE
OF ACCOUNTING HISTORY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Abstract: This comment on a recent contribution by Fleischman and
Radcliffe [2005], entitled “The Roaring Nineties: Accounting History
Comes of Age,” specifically deals with their cautionary comments
on the general condition of accounting history research in the U.S.
around the close of that decade. The author contends that public interest in accounting’s past is currently strong, especially following the
recent corporate scandals and audit failures in the U.S., and points
out that accounting history research projects which are of relevance
to policy makers and regulators are likely to be both funded and, accordingly, recognized.

Dick Fleischman and Vaughan Radcliffe have rendered a
timely, interesting, and well-written account of an action-packed
decade in accounting history research and publication which
has been captured by the colorful title “The Roaring Nineties:
Accounting History Comes of Age” [Fleischman and Radcliffe,
2005]. Readers of this contribution gain a strong sense that accounting history, as a field of scholarly endeavor, is more popular than ever before. Indeed, the authors stated, “it was only
in the last decade of the 20th century that a substantial expansion and maturation of its research agenda occurred” [Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2005, p. 61; see also, Walker, 2005]. The
underlying level of enthusiasm in the field, as is manifest within
the article itself, is equally evident in recognizing the fact that
this contribution appeared in the Accounting Historians Journal
within five years after the end of “the roaring nineties” (1991
to 2000).
Notwithstanding the generally positive tone described
above, the final section of the article, entitled “concluding remarks and a cautionary word,” refers to an ominous cloud on
the horizon of accounting history research and publication in
the U.S. [Fleischman and Radcliffe, 2005, pp. 82-86]. Indeed,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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the authors argued that “the field’s prospects in the U.S. seem
to be diverging from the promising conditions seen in much of
the rest of the world” [p. 83]. According to Fleischman and Radcliffe [2005, p. 84], “conditions in the U.S. are significant for researchers worldwide, not only because history is threatened in
one jurisdiction but because that jurisdiction has proved to be
an influential model in both the practice and study of accounting.”
Without desiring to re-examine the difficulties being faced
in the U.S. by accounting history, as discussed by Fleischman
and Radcliffe, it is useful to summarize the recent adverse indications. These include the apparent exclusion of accounting
history from major U.S. journals; the failure to renew the professoriate in this field; the disinclination of accounting departments to provide doctoral training in the field; and the declining U.S. membership of the U.S.-based Academy of Accounting
Historians. In their final sentence, Fleischman and Radcliffe
[2005, p. 86] almost worryingly stated a hope that the roaring
nineties “will not also be regarded as ending with the quiet but
discernable death of accounting history in the U.S.” (emphasis
added). In sharing this hope and also in supporting the authors’
portrayal of accounting history in a broader international context, the following brief comments are made in the interest of
furthering discussion and debate on the trends identified.
Is interest in accounting history at or near death in the
U.S.? Looking in from the outside, and acknowledging the disadvantages this external insight may provide, the present answer is almost certainly a negative one. Why is this so? It is
because never before in the U.S. has there been such a strong
public focus on accounting and audit from the early 2000s when
“a raft of corporate scandals highlighted how auditors failed to
blow the whistle on financial reporting frauds, such as Enron,
WorldCom and HealthSouth” [Parker, 2005b, p. 12], and which
brought the dramatic demise of Arthur Andersen. Should any
readers wish to find out more about such happenings, venture
to a cinema complex near you and watch the movie Enron: The
Smartest Guys in the Room or read one or more of the almost
endless array of books on such major corporate collapses and
the related accounting and audit debacles. These spectacular
happenings and the associated reforms made to the regulation

At the time of writing, the author was a trustee of the Academy of
Accounting Historians. All views expressed in this paper are the personal views
of the author and may or may not be supported by the Academy.
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of accounting and audit in the U.S., along with activities within
the accounting profession generally, have stimulated an industry
of accounting watchers, commentators, and authors. Many authors of this genre have taken an historical perspective in preparing their works, including those who have focused attention
on accounting practices, accounting firms, and, more generally,
the accounting profession.
The writer, for instance, has recently reviewed in an accounting journal two books which take an historical perspective in examining the recent U.S. events. The first of these two
books is entitled Unaccountable: How the Accounting Profession
Forfeited a Public Trust by Brewster [2003] [Carnegie, 2005b];
the other is Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting Values, Unexpected
Consequences by Squires et al. [2003] [Carnegie, 2005a]. There
are many other books of this ilk or similar [see, for example,
Jeter, 2003; McLean and Elkind, 2003; Toffler and Reingold,
2003; Wood, 2004; Eichenwald, 2005; Skeel, 2005].
It is true, of course, that such authors are almost always
not accounting academics in leading universities with long lists
to their names of refereed articles on the historical development
of accounting. Yet, authors of this genre are typically experienced writers who seem to rely heavily on the official histories
of firms, such as Arthur Andersen, and/or classic accounting
history texts, such as A History of Accountancy in the United
States: The Cultural Significance of Accounting by Previts and
Merino [1998] and The History of Accounting: An International
Encyclopaedia, edited by Chatfield and Vangermeersch [1996],
as well as, in a number of cases, oral history interviews and
recollections of their experiences by leading accounting professionals. Classic texts on accounting’s past at least summarize,
in a convenient form, the relevant accounting history research
which underpins their preparation.
Books released for the mass market of the kind described
by non-accounting historians are typically interesting and easy
to read. They would surely not have been published unless there
was sufficient commercial interest in their preparation. And so,
there presently exists commercial interest in historical perspectives on accounting and audit in the U.S. There is also greater
oversight of accounting and audit in the U.S. than ever before
as a result of the disasters which have sparked this unprecedented popular interest in accounting’s past.
What are the research topics that are occupying the minds
of U.S.-based members of the Academy of Accounting Historians? It is very difficult to submit any authoritative response to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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this question. One way of gleaning some fragmentary evidence,
however, is to examine the program of the 2005 Research Conference of the Academy which was held in Columbus, Ohio during October 6-8, 2005. Among the concurrent research papers
presented, only one research paper was identified which directly addressed the issues which are effectively selling books, such
as those written by Brewster [2003] and Squires et al. [2003].
The single paper is entitled “Neo Liberalism, Deregulation and
Financial Reporting Abuses during the Last Two Decades in the
United States” by Merino et al. [2005]. At the time of writing,
no articles of this genre have appeared in the Academy’s journal, the Accounting Historians Journal.
It would appear that the calamity which has besieged the
accounting profession in the U.S., with implications for the accounting profession worldwide, and which has occupied many
non-accounting historian authors has yet to exercise a discernable impact on the research agendas of many, if not most, U.S.
accounting historians. And yet, accounting and other policy
makers and regulators in the U.S. are likely to be at least interested in being acquainted with rigorous and robust research
findings which assist them in their analyses of issues and in
formulating policies and/or rules and even in identifying past
accounting solutions that may be relevant to current problems.
Are prominent and even exciting research opportunities being
identified and realized by Academy members in the U.S.? If not,
perhaps U.S. accounting academe is failing, at least in part, to
fulfill a vital role in the U.S. economy and society and, therefore, to realize its potential for the nation and beyond.
It is to be hoped that research within institutions of higher
education, including accounting research, is responsive to what
goes on in the world. Many scholars at least hope that their
research will assist in shaping public opinion and even lead to
changes in behavior in society. The popular commercial interest
in the history of accounting will hopefully translate into greater receptivity towards history by the U.S. accounting research
community. Fear of failure to sharpen up to society’s expectations and needs may even persuade the editors of capital-markets journals and their followers, in particular, to become more
interested in, or at least tolerant of, the important insights that
can be provided by rigorous historical investigation and analysis in accounting. If not, claims that such research groups live

A copy of the conference program is found at the following site: http://fisher.osu.edu/acctmis/hall/conference/ (site visited on October 18, 2005).
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in their own world as self-perpetuating institutions may become
increasingly valid in the aftermath of the recent major accounting shocks in the U.S. [see, for example, Lee, 1995, 1997; Williams and Rodgers, 1995].
Of course, it may be argued that any emerging focus by accounting historians in the U.S. on corporate failure is not sustainable as the accounting profession is now beginning to regain
public trust in that country [see, for example, Parker, 2005a,
b]. However, the outgoing chairman of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), William McDonough, is
cited as stating that “‘investors’ faith in the accuracy of audited published statements has not been fully restored” [Parker,
2005b, p. 12]. According to McDonough, the alleged securities
fraud at Refco indicates “there is much work still to be done”
[Parker, 2005b, p. 12]. Indeed, the work of the PCAOB has
shown that there are still, in the reported words of McDonough,
“significant difficulties” in the dependability of certain auditing
work being undertaken in the U.S. by major international accounting firms [Parker, 2005b, p. 12; see also, Norris, 2006].
Unlike previous rounds of corporate failure in the U.S., where
the accounting profession has experienced scrutiny which then
subsided, this round of intense scrutiny has never been strong
er and will not be completely shaken off if ever, until leading
companies are no longer regularly required to restate their accounts through the work of the PCAOB.
Increasingly, research in higher education institutions is being measured in convenient and supposedly reliable ways. One
key way of quantifying research productivity is by means of
measuring the amounts of direct funding which academics receive, if any, for their proposed research projects from public
and other funding bodies [Carnegie and Napier, 2002, p. 711].
Around the globe, accounting historians in at least some countries are becoming increasingly conscious of the need to seek
external funding for their research activities, and there is evidence to suggest that certain scholars are becoming well versed
at obtaining competitive research funds to assist in financing
their accounting history research on a variety of topics, including corporate collapse and audit failure. This should be recognized as a positive trend for accounting history research in
an international context rather than a perceived threat to the
field.
The growing need to seek and attract such research funds
by means of competitive grants, especially in terms of establishing or maintaining the visibility of research groupings or comhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/23
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munities, appears to be no less urgent in the field of accounting history than in the U.S at this time. Accordingly, U.S.-based
Academy members should aim, where possible, to make their
research more visible, and perhaps by necessity of more relevance to economy and society, by seeking available financial
support from public and other funding agencies in the country. There is an old adage: “What gets measured gets done.” In
the modern era of academe, “what gets measured gets recognized.” Through increased recognition, the field will prosper internationally.
Presumably, recognition is what accounting history research and publication in the U.S. currently needs most of all.
If that recognition comes in line with the current enhanced
levels of public interest in the field as outlined above, at least
some other problems, as elucidated by Fleischman and Radcliffe [2005, p. 85], will tend to be addressed, if not tempered in
due course. The so-called problematic organization of the field
in the U.S. may be perceived as less of a concern should accounting history research and publication gain enhanced recognition and even contribute to the shaping of public opinion on
a scale not yet experienced. Such things, of course, are much
easier said than done! Predicting the future is not the aim of
this exercise. Notwithstanding, the perceived threat to accounting history in the U.S. can equally be perceived in more positive terms, if not as an opportunity, in the current climate.
This contribution will hopefully generate further discussion
and debate on the subject. If so, such contributions may assist
in demonstrating that accounting history research is essential
in augmenting our understanding of accounting’s past and present both in and beyond the U.S. Irrespective of where historical accounting research is undertaken, “explanations adopting
a historical perspective will help us to understand the nature
of accounting change and its impacts on organizational and
social functioning, as well as enabling us to appreciate better,
and thereby effectively critique, the accounting of today” [Napier and Carnegie, 1996, p. 6; see also Carnegie and Napier, 1996;
Previts et al., 1990, pp. 3-8].
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Vaughan S. Radcliffe
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO

“IT’S OYSTERS, DEAR!” PROFESSOR
CARNEGIE’S PRESCRIPTION AND
THE SEEMING FATE OF ACCOUNTING
HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES
It is always a thrill to find someone who is familiar with
one’s work. I well recall the time that someone first came up to
me at a conference and advised that she/he had read my work
during Ph.D. studies, had thought it marvelous, and so on. I
will not embarrass the colleague in question by naming names;
suffice it to say that he/she is now a well-known academic at an
institution not far removed from my own. The question, I suppose, is, who should be more embarrassed in reviewing such
a navigation of the tropes of conference life, the then student
bent on making a good impression or the lonesome academic
who so very much wanted to believe what was being said?
It was with a frisson of excitement therefore that I found
that our good colleague Garry Carnegie had penned a response
to the recent review paper written by Dick Fleischman and myself. I have not had a comment on a paper come quite so soon
before, and so there were loud echoes of that first conference
encounter and exchange of familiarity in work when I first
heard of this note. Unfortunately, the frisson of excitement is
gone, and the familiarity with the work in question seems distant. Whether more or less distant than that of my earlier interrogator is for the reader to decide.
Carnegie starts well enough with a strong précis of arguments made in the piece regarding the seeming decline of accounting history in the U.S. He notes a series of factors including the apparent exclusion of accounting history from major
U.S. journals, a failure to renew the accounting history professoriate in the U.S., the lack of available doctoral training in the
U.S., and the declining U.S. membership of the Academy of Accounting Historians. Carnegie lists these factors without apparent disagreement and then wishes to share in the hope that the
authors, Dick and I, came to in wanting not to believe that the
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nineties might become known as ending with the “quiet but discernable death of accounting history in the U.S.” Carnegie mentions that he added the emphasis here, but in a way he need
not have; the original manuscript used the term “death rattles”
but as with any co-authorship, a more measured colleague (in
this case Dick) called on a less measured colleague (in this case
me, I admit) to cool it. So death rattles might have been too
strong, but a sense that the end of the 1990s marked a tipping
point in the trajectory of U.S. accounting history seems to hold
true.
In a way, I wish I had not cooled it for the sounds of the
death rattles are, quite honestly, clearly there in each of the
gatherings of friends that constitute the Academy of Accounting Historians’ annual research conferences and in the lovely
ice cream socials held at the annual meetings of the American
Accounting Association. I say this despite the promising inclusion of accounting history in the body of the AAA’s annual
meeting program even though this comes under the delightful
title of “History, Integrative and Other.” So next on to Carnegie and to the other.
What is Professor Carnegie’s prescription to cure that which
ails the accounting history academy in the U.S? It is to write
popular works of the type he lauds in his text (e.g., Parker, 2005;
Brewster, 2003; or Squires et al., 2003). In other words, a blast
of populism should show the public interest benefits of a keen
understanding of accounting history and should allow us all to
join friend Carnegie in his belief that answer of whether accounting history in the U.S. faces death should be overwhelmingly “negative.”
Where to begin? An immediate observation would be that
a similar prescription of populist appeal is hardly of attraction
or interest to capital market researchers, agency theorists, or
others who toil in their allotments within the AAA’s intellect
A disclaimer is due here; I have served as a trustee of the Academy, but
do not speak for this fine body in any formal capacity. These views are strictly my own; furthermore, I have good reason to believe that these views are different from those of my co-author on the “Roaring Nineties,” Dick Fleischman.
As always, Dick’s sense of propriety is strong, and so he insisted he not be an author on any reply. This means Dick is never found suspect of self-dealing given
his service to the Academy as editor of the Accounting Historians Journal. It also
means that his younger and more naïve or doleful co-author has free rein to express just why Professor Carnegie’s prescription seems so unlikely to cheat fate
for the Academy and its friends.

Either the AAA’s staff has been reading sophisticated social theory or discussion of the other happened by some curious chance at the keyboard.
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ual array. So in that sense, we are different people with a different lot. A further observation, and as a trained field researcher who combined this with historical work that did not quite
meet the 30-year rule alluded to by Carnegie (and so had a
closer link to practice, or a “history of the present,” something
Carnegie seems to like) I would simply say, there is no substitute for lived experience.
Not even the academic tourism of the conference circuit can
fill in for the lived experience of trying to plough one’s furrow
as an accounting historian in the unforgiving ground of contemporary North American business schools. Remember that North
American Ph.D. graduates are now very rare with some 90 per
year seeming to be the prevalent count. Precious few of these
have the interest or training to engage in accounting history,
and, candidly, this observation alone, together with the demographic profile of active Academy members, assures that powerful demographic forces are bearing down to shape the future
of academic accounting history in the U.S.
But beyond this, Professor Carnegie’s prescription contains
a sense of the willed disbelief of that initial encounter and expression of familiarity with work, which now seems so long
ago. Surely, we want a field to succeed if we have worked long
and hard with its problems. We look for that success or at least
continuation with the fervor of a drowning man grasping for
aid. And yet wanting this does not mean that it is true. At the
simplest level, a renewed public interest in accounting does not
necessarily equate to a popular interest in accounting history. As
Carnegie notes, this is all easier said than done. Even the most
talented accounting historian seems unlikely to crack the best
seller lists. Indeed, it is telling that, as Carnegie himself notes,
the public works he admires work at a distance, several times
removed, from the accounting history he claims are their basic
source. Furthermore the authors of such work are “almost always not accounting academics.” In this sense, the Carnegie prescription seems to recognize its fallacy even within itself and in
its own terms. Wishing for a new and more publicly embraced

Populism is not needed to ensure their continued sense of purpose given
that it is adherents of such work that overwhelmingly handle the levers of control within American accounting academe. These colleagues seem unmoved by
the shriller aspects of positive accounting theory, and certainly seem not to follow the idea of one really big market for ideas. As historians have noted from a
distance, such a view fails to account for the seemingly very large investments
made by accountancy’s positivists in social networks and social dexterity of a
type long exhibited by the more successful characters within AAA central.
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form of accounting history is not the same as, indeed is quite
distinct from, the scholarship whose demise he claims not to
see. In a sense this is reminiscent of Alice in the Looking Glass
and her conversation with her cat:
By the way, Kitty, if only you’d been really with me in
my dream, there was one thing you would have enjoyed
– I had such a quantity of poetry said to me, all about
fishes! Tomorrow morning you shall have a real treat.
All the time you’re eating your breakfast, I’ll repeat ‘The
Walrus and the Carpenter’ to you; and then you can
make believe it’s oysters, dear!
It is with regret that I find that Professor Carnegie’s prescription is to the seeming fate of accounting history as Alice’s
poetry of fishes is to her cat. Belief in the Carnegie prescription is as making believe “it’s oysters dear” for you and for me.
Just because we wish it were so, does not make it so in practice. We can still make believe, however, if it makes what may
lie ahead any easier. I would rather see a call of this nature lead
to fervent effort to train a new generation of accounting historians to take the place of those who will retire. Failing that, we
might try to make believe its oysters for us all, a willed state
that surely beats embrace of the signs of the alternative. Death
rattles anyone?
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